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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON SHARE REPURCHASES
In my first chapter, we document and study the use of Rule 10b5 1 preset repurchase
plans. We exploit this new and widespread form of payout to examine an issue at
the core of payout decisionsthe tradeoff between commitment and financial flexibility.
Relative to open market repurchases, preset plans provide an expanded repurchase
window and increased legal cover, albeit at the cost of reducing repurchase flexibil-
ity and the option to time repurchases. These costs and benefits are significantly
associated with Rule 10b5-1 adoption. Consistent with preset plans signaling com-
mitment, Rule 10b5-1 repurchase announcements are associated with greater and
faster completion rates, with more positive market reactions, and with more dividend
substitution than open market repurchases. Lastly, we find that preset repurchase
plans represent a unique payout tool whose introduction encouraged a different set
of firms to buy back stock and significantly altered the payout landscape. My second
chapter examines the strategic use and timing of share repurchases by insiders for
personal gain. Using grant level compensation data and a hand-collected sample of
monthly repurchases, I find a positive relation between CEO equity sales and share
repurchases. I identify the relationship by instrumenting equity sales with equity
grant vesting schedules. This relation is persistent across firm characteristics and
does not appear to be destroying shareholder value. The results indicate managerial
self-interest motivates a subset of share repurchases.
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Chapter 1 Commitment versus Financial Flexibility in Payout Decisions:
Evidence from 10b5-1 Preset Repurchase Plans
1.1 Introduction
Beginning with the SEC safe harbor provisions of 1982, payout policy has evolved
dramatically over the past three decades. Share repurchases now represent the largest
form of payout (Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Skinner (2008)), with more firms
repurchasing than paying dividends and with aggregate repurchase volume outpacing
aggregate dividend payments (Floyd, Li, and Skinner, 2015). One potential expla-
nation for the expansion of repurchase activity is that managers view repurchases as
being more flexible than dividends (Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, 2005). The
flexibility of repurchases allows firms to more easily respond to fluctuations in stock
prices and investment opportunities. This flexibility comes with a price, however, as
dividends send a stronger signal of commitment to investors (Farre-Mensa, Michaely,
and Schmalz, 2014).
As the payout options available to managers have grown, so has their ability to
trade-off flexibility with signaling commitment. As with any tradeoff, the optimal
payout policy will differ across firms depending on the relative costs and benefits of
each method. The relative benefits of financial flexibility are a function of the firm’s
ability to access capital: a firm with ample financial slack and correctly priced, liquid
stock should place less value on financial flexibility in payout policy. Further, man-
agers must consider the value of the option to “time the market,” i.e., to increase
repurchases if the firm’s stock is underpriced and to reduce them if the price is at or
above fair value. In an efficient market, the value of this option clearly relates to the
manager’s desire and ability to successfully exploit inside information. The primary
benefit to signaling commitment is an increase in stock price when the firm announces
payout decisions because payout announcement returns increase with expected pay-
out levels (e.g., Comment and Jarrell, 1991). Managers have strong incentive to
maximize stock prices: Higher stock prices imply greater compensation. Thus, while
maintaining financial flexibility is important, signaling commitment adds firm value
by increasing investors’ expected level of payouts and thereby increasing stock price.
The tradeoff between signaling commitment and maintaining the ability to abandon
payouts or time the market is at the core of payout policy.
In this paper, we provide a fresh perspective on this tradeoff by studying how
firms react to a change in the menu of payout options. In 2000 the SEC enacted
Rule 10b5-1 to allow insiders to trade while in possession of material, non-public
information by establishing a preset trading plan with a third party. Though the
SEC originally intended the Rule to clarify enforcement of insider trading laws for
individuals, the Rule also resulted in permitting firms to repurchase shares under the
same conditions. Preset repurchases under Rule 10b5-1 are unique in that they allow
firms to repurchase in a continuous fashion and provide additional legal coverage, at
the cost of partially relinquishing the timing and abandonment options associated
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with open market repurchase (OMR) programs. Further, when firms adopt a preset
repurchase plan, they incur a real, costly commitment, which traditional open market
repurchases lack. Prior to the introduction of preset repurchases, researchers exam-
ining the signaling-flexibility tradeoff were forced to compare across payout methods
(e.g. self-tenders, OMRs, and dividends). Comparing preset and traditional OMRs
allows us to hold constant factors that often confound payout decision, such as taxes,
or compensation-driven incentives (Fenn and Liang (2001) and Cheng, Harford, and
Zhang (2015)), providing a clean setting within which we can examine this tradeoff in
payout policy. Studying preset repurchases also provides insight into how an addition
to the menu of payout options affects firms’ broader payout decisions.
We hand-collect 1,933 repurchase announcements between 2001 and 2014 that
reference Rule 10b5-1. The use of the Rule to repurchase shares has been increasing
rapidly since its enactment: We document only four such announcements in 2001,
compared to at least 200 announcements per year during 2011-2014. In recent years
Rule 10b5-1 plans are more than twice as popular as accelerated share repurchases,
and approximately one quarter of all repurchase announcements include a Rule 10b5-1
component.
We first establish that preset repurchase plans indeed represent a greater commit-
ment than OMRs, the most prevalent form of share repurchase. Relative to matched
OMR programs, Rule 10b5-1 plans are associated with faster completion, greater
completion rates (the dollar amount repurchased relative to the announced dollar
amount) and are more likely to be completed. Thus, Rule 10b5-1 programs are a
stronger commitment to repurchase shares, and a commitment to repurchase them
more quickly, than are OMRs.
We next study the determinants of the decision to adopt a Rule 10b5-1 preset
repurchase program relative to an OMR. Because firms delegate repurchase respon-
sibilities to a third party and because Rule 10b5-1 prohibits adjustments to plans
during blackout windows, a preset plan reduces a firm’s ability to modify future re-
purchases. We find that the likelihood of adopting a preset plan is greater for firms
with more stable cash flows, no dividend payments, better recent stock performance,
or more liquid stocks. These results are consistent with managers trading-off other
sources of financial flexibility against financial flexibility in their repurchase program.
We also draw from a growing literature that characterizes the 2008-2009 financial
crisis as an unanticipated shock to credit supply (e.g., Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010;
Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian, 2011; Bliss, Cheng, and Denis, 2015),
which in turn increased the marginal benefits of financial flexibility. We find that
10b5-1 repurchase plan usage significantly stagnated during the crisis relative to es-
timated expected growth patterns, consistent with preset repurchase plan adoption
likelihood decreasing as the marginal benefit of financial flexibility increases.
Firms enter into a trading plan during an “open window” when they are not in
possession of material, nonpublic information, limiting a firm’s ability to trade on
information (i.e., “time their trades”). We find that firms with a record of worse
repurchase timing are more likely to adopt a 10b5-1 plan, and smaller, younger,
less financially sophisticated firms are among the first to adopt Rule 10b5-1 plans.
These results are consistent with firms that are unable to or uninterested in making
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information-based trades being more likely to adopt a preset plan.
By allowing a firm to continue repurchasing while in possession of material, non-
public information, 10b5-1 plans expand a firm’s available repurchase window and
provide legal cover for these trades. We find that firms that should be more con-
strained by blackout windows, either due to longer reporting lags or more frequent
releases of material information through 8-K reports, are more likely to adopt a 10b5-
1 plan than an OMR. However, we find no evidence of firms at higher risk of litigation
being more likely to adopt a preset repurchase plan.
We also show that firms without an active repurchase program when Rule 10b5-1
was enacted were more likely to choose 10b5-1 plans over OMRs. These results are
consistent with preset repurchases facilitating buy backs within a different set of firms
and occupying a unique space within the payout landscape.
Our data reveal that most firms that adopt a 10b5-1 plan continue to use a
preset plan for future repurchases. Hence, adopting a 10b5-1 plan for the first time
represents an important decision. We focus on first-time 10b5-1 plan adoption using
a Cox proportional hazard model, which estimates how quickly firms adopt 10b5-1
plans. The hazard model generally corroborates our prior results and further shows
that firms whose CEO’s bonus is tied to earnings per share and firms with more
dilution or executive options adopt a 10b5-1 plan more quickly.
We next turn our attention to stock returns around Rule 10b5-1 repurchase
announcements. On the one hand, 10b5-1 plans, by construction, should not be
information-driven, potentially reducing their announcement effect. On the other
hand, establishing a preset trading plan lessens the firm’s repurchasing flexibility
and, on average, represents a stronger commitment to follow through on the an-
nounced repurchase plan. Empirically, we find that 10b5-1 announcements are met
with positive and significant cumulative abnormal returns, which are generally in-
creasing in the expected portion of the plan to be effected under the Rule. In fact,
after matching on firm characteristics associated with 10b5-1 adoption, returns as-
sociated with repurchase announcements fully effected under Rule 10b5-1 are more
than double returns to matched OMR announcements. The results are consistent
with investors valuing the increased commitment of a preset repurchase plan, per-
haps due to expected reductions in agency costs associated with free cash flow as in
Jensen (1986).
In a final series of tests, we examine how preset repurchases fit into the broader
set of payout policy choices. First, we test how 10b5-1 repurchases contribute to the
substitution of repurchases for dividends and find that the substitution is concentrated
in the subset of firm-year observations associated with Rule 10b5-1 announcements.
These results are consistent with preset plans being distinct from traditional OMRs
by emerging as the preferred substitute for dividend increases, likely because 10b5-1
plans represent a greater commitment and are thus more similar to dividends. Next,
we document that the determinants of payout policy, particularly with respect to
repurchase policy, changed significantly around the enactment of Rule 10b5-1. In
sum, our results suggest the advent of Rule 10b5-1 significantly changed which types
of firms engage in stock repurchases and how repurchases fit into a firm’s broader
payout policy.
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Our findings contribute to the payout policy literature along multiple dimensions.
The literature focusing on how firms choose to distribute cash to shareholders has
primarily examined the choice between dividends and share repurchases (e.g., Bren-
nan and Thakor, 1990; Allen, Bernardo, and Welch, 2000; Jagannathan, Stephens,
and Weisbach, 2000; Guay and Harford, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Grinstein
and Michaely, 2005). Our results also contribute to the research examining the choice
of payout vehicle. For example, Brickley (1983) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skin-
ner (2000) examine the choice between regular and special dividends, Comment and
Jarrell (1991) compare the signaling strength of Dutch auctions, tender offers, and
OMRs, and Bargeron, Kulchania, and Thomas (2011) examine the choice to repur-
chase through accelerated share repurchases relative to OMRs. We contribute to this
literature by documenting and examining the costs and benefits associated with a new
form of payoutRule 10b5-1 preset repurchase plans. Further, we contribute to the
literature examining market reactions to payout announcements, particularly their
relation to completion rates (e.g., Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Bonaimé, 2012). Fi-
nally, we contribute to the discussion regarding payout “smoothing” (e.g., Lambrecht
and Myers, 2012; Michaely and Roberts, 2012; Leary and Michaely, 2011), as we have
identified a means by which firms can commit to regular repurchase transactions, un-
encumbered by blackout windows.
Additionally, we contribute to a nascent literature examining SEC Rule 10b5-1,
primarily with respect to its use for personal sales by insiders. Jagolinzer (2009)
finds that executives trade strategically under the Rule: Insiders consistently sell
before bad news and after good news, earning higher returns than non-Rule users.
Henderson, Jagolinzer, and Muller (2012) find the decision to disclose insider use of
Rule 10b5-1 is positively correlated with firm level litigation risk. We find no evidence
that litigation risk is associated with the firm’s use of the Rule to repurchase stock,
indicating that the motives to adopt a preset plan to repurchase appear distinct
from those associated with insider trading at the individual level. While trading by
insiders using SEC Rule 10b5-1 plans has received much attention in the academic
literature and popular press, we are the first paper, to our knowledge, documenting
the prevalence, determinants, value, and payout policy impacts of the use of Rule
10b5-1 at the firm level to repurchase stock.
1.2 Hypothesis Development
Financing frictions result in the need to preserve financial flexibility in corporate
finance decisions. Firms need to maintain sufficient financial slack to invest in positive
net present value projects as they arise. One way to maintain financial flexibility is
to build it into corporate payout policy. Managers state that flexibility is one of the
most important reasons they choose share repurchases over dividends (Brav, Graham,
Harvey, and Michaely, 2005). Empirical evidence corroborates managers’ views and
shows that financial flexibility is related to both the level and form of corporate
payout (e.g., Guay and Harford, 2000; Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach, 2000;
Lie, 2005; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007; Bonaimé, Hankins, and Harford, 2014).
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Clearly, maintaining sufficient flexibility is important to managers when choosing an
optimal payout structure.
However, payout vehicles that provide firms with more discretion come at the cost
of sending weaker signals of commitment. A long line of research (see Farre-Mensa,
Michaely, and Schmalz (2014) for a review) documents positive abnormal returns
around payout initiations and increases, consistent with investors generally viewing
the benefits of cash distributions as outweighing the potential negative signal about
profitable investments. For example, abnormal returns to repurchase announcements
are increasing in the implied level of commitment, with returns to fixed-price tender
offers being greatest, followed by Dutch auctions, then OMRs (Comment and Jarrell,
1991). Moreover, prior literature documents that announcement returns are increas-
ing in a program’s size (e.g., Stephens and Weisbach, 1998) and prior completion
rates (Bonaimé, 2012), consistent with investors’ (positive) reaction to repurchase an-
nouncements increasing in their expected value of future repurchases. These findings
all suggest that committing to distribute cash causes investors to positively reassess
firm value, possibly because these distributions reduce agency costs associated with
free cash flow as in Jensen (1986).
We reexamine the flexibility-signaling tradeoff within the context of an important
recent change in the payout choice set. On October 23, 2000, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) enacted Rule 10b5-1, which for the first time allows
insiders or the firm itself to trade company stock while in possession of material, non-
public information. Prior to Rule 10b5-1 courts disagreed on when insider trading
liability arises. The Rule was intended to clarify that liability arises when insiders
trade while in “knowing possession” of material, non-public information and to es-
tablish conditions under which insiders may legally trade in company stock. In an
attempt to provide “appropriate flexibility” to insiders who wish to trade in company
stock, the Rule specifies conditions that constitute an affirmative defense: that the
insider establish a trading plan in advance with a third party, over whom they do
not exert influence.1 Thus, while the Rule specifically targeted insider trading for
individuals, it also permitted firms to establish preset trading plans to repurchase
shares.
Specifically, under Rule 10b5-1 firms enter into a trading plan during an “open
window” when they are not in possession of material, nonpublic information, which
provides an affirmative defense to any subsequent trading under the plan. The Rule
states that a firm must either: (i) specify a written trading plan with either the
amounts, dates, and prices to repurchase or a trading formula in a binding contract
with a broker or dealer, or (ii) delegate the repurchase decisions to a broker or dealer
(the company can have no further influence). The firm may modify the plan, but
only during an open window. In addition, though early termination of a preset plan
1According to the SEC: “Taken as a whole, the revised defense is designed to cover situations in which
a person can demonstrate that the material nonpublic information was not a factor in the trading
decision. We believe this provision will provide appropriate flexibility to those who would like to
plan securities transactions in advance at a time when they are not aware of material nonpublic
information, and then carry out those pre-planned transactions at a later time, even if they later
become aware of material nonpublic information.” https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm
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is legal, it jeopardizes the affirmative defense associated with 10b5-1 repurchases.
Lastly, to maintain an affirmative defense at the motion to dismiss phase of litiga-
tion, the firm must publicly announce the plan and enter into it under good faith
(Henderson, Jagolinzer, and Muller, 2012). In sum, relative to OMRs, preset Rule
10b5-1 repurchases restrict a firm’s ability to ex post modify repurchase activity or to
exploit inside information, but expand a firm’s available repurchase window and pro-
vide additional legal coverage. These costs and benefits of preset repurchases relative
to OMRs motivate our four hypotheses below.
1.2.1 Abandonment Options
Preset repurchase plans provide less flexibility since they reduce a firm’s ability to
modify repurchases. Essentially, firms adopting a preset plan partially relinquish the
abandonment option associated with OMRs, which leads to our first hypothesis, the
Abandonment Option Hypothesis : Firms with more internal capital or easier access
to external capital markets will value the abandonment option inherent in OMRs less
and thus be more likely to adopt alternative payout strategies without abandonment
options, specifically, preset Rule 10b5 1 repurchase plans. The empirical predictions
of the Abandonment Option Hypothesis are that firms with greater cash and cash flow
and firms with predictable cash flows should be more willing to adopt 10b5-1 plans to
execute share repurchases. We also predict that firms that can easily access the debt
market, i.e., those with excess debt capacity, or the equity market, i.e., firms with
liquid stocks that are not trading below fair value, should be more likely to adopt
preset trading plans.2
We also note that, consistent with firms facing a direct trade-off between flexibility
and commitment, firms with lower or unstable internal reserves and limited access
to external capital markets are likely to value flexibility the most and are likely the
firms for which the commitment signal is most costly because these firms risk financial
distress to fund payouts.3 Further, committing to payouts likely provides little benefit
to these firms because agency costs should be low. Alternatively, firms with sufficient
internal resources and easy access to external capital likely value flexibility the least
and incur minimal costs to signaling commitment while also reducing agency costs
surrounding the use of the capital.
2We summarize variables used to test each hypothesis in Table 1.3 and provide detailed definitions
in Appendix A.
3While it may seem counterintuitive for a firm to access external capital markets, particularly the
equity market, to fund distributions to shareholders, recent empirical evidence by Farre-Mensa,
Michaely, and Schmalz (2016) suggests that firms rely on external capital to finance as much as
one third of payouts, contradicting the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984). Further,
our argument does not hinge on firms accessing external capital to fund repurchases per se; we
simply argue that firms that diminish cash holdings by committing to payouts may be obliged to
raise capital externally to fund future projects.
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1.2.2 Timing
Next, preset plans differ from OMRs in that the firm must delegate repurchase re-
sponsibility to a third party (without further influence) and thus the firm forfeits full
control over the program, which reduces its ability to make information-based trades
as in Dittmar and Field (2015). A firm may be willing to forfeit the option of exploit-
ing inside information because it prefers to allocate resources to its core business. We
also acknowledge the possibility that managers still time repurchases executed under
Rule 10b5-1, either by creating complex price matrices that reflect the firm’s private
information regarding stock prices or by (illegally) exploiting alternative information
channels to influence broker trades ex post. In either case, repurchasing under the
Rule creates an additional barrier to timing repurchases because in the former situ-
ation firms must commit to a price matrix, however complex, in the latter situation
they must risk accusations of insider trading.
Other firms may recognize that poor repurchase timing could lead to bad press.
Many companies, including Viacom, Pfizer, C.R. Bard, Lowes, Exxon Mobil, Boeing,
and EBay, have been accused of poor repurchase timing in the popular press.4 Just
as managers often cite preset 10b5-1 trading plans when asked about questionable
personal transactions5, companies can use Rule 10b5-1 as a buffer against accusations
of poor timing. Companies less concerned about timing or with a reputation of poor
timing would value this buffer more. We hypothesize that firms that value the timing
option associated with OMRs the most will be less likely to adopt preset repurchase
plans, which leads to our second hypothesis, the Timing Option Hypothesis : Firms
that place more value on the timing option associated with OMR plans will be less
likely to adopt preset Rule 10b5-1 repurchase plans.
The empirical implications of the Timing Option Hypothesis are that firms with
a history of poor repurchase timing will be more willing and likely to outsource
their repurchase program through a 10b5-1 plan either due to a lack of skill or an
indifference to timing repurchases to correspond with low stock prices. We also expect
that small firms, young firms, and those with less financially sophisticated treasury
functions will be more likely to adopt preset plans.
1.2.3 Information Releases and Trading Blackouts
Rule 10b5-1 plans expand a firm’s available repurchase window, and repurchasing
firms often cite avoiding blackout windows as the motivation for repurchasing under
Rule 10b5-1. While the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) generally does
not mandate blackout periods, most companies impose explicit blackout windows to
minimize the costs associated with illegal insider trading (Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon,
2000). Blackout windows generally last from quarter end until the release of earnings,
4See “Hey, Big Spender!” (Barron’s on January 27, 2014) and “Apple Buybacks Pay Most Ever as
CEOs Spend $211 Billion” (Bloomberg on August 5, 2014).
5For example, in March of 2011 when Douglas Bergeron, CEO of VeriFone Systems Inc., was ques-
tioned about selling $14 million of VeriFone stock immediately prior to a stock price decline, Berg-
eron defended the sale of his stock by pointing to his preset Rule 10b5-1 trading plan. (“Executives’
Good Luck in Trading Own Stock,” The Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2012.)
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as well as during other major corporate events that may result in insiders possessing
material, nonpublic information. Firms with greater than $75 million in public float
must release earnings within 35 days of fiscal quarter end and 60 days of fiscal year
end; smaller companies must release earnings within 45 and 90 days. Though firms
may choose to some extent when to report earnings, reporting lags are most likely
driven by factors other than the desire to repurchase sooner. For example, Sengupta
(2004) finds that investor base, litigation risk, and accounting complexity are associ-
ated with reporting lags. Hence, blackout windows may substantially constrain firms
by preventing them from repurchasing for months at a time throughout the year. In
fact, some firms report blackout windows prohibiting repurchasing during two-thirds
of all trading days.6 Further, a firm with a large repurchase program may not be able
to execute the entire program in the desired time frame due to blackout windows and
volume conditions, which limit repurchases to a maximum of 25% of the average daily
trading volume. To summarize, we hypothesize that blackout windows are a real con-
straint, but preset repurchases will circumvent this constraint. Thus, the Blackout
Window Hypothesis states that firms that are more constrained by blackout windows
are more likely to adopt a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan to circumvent blackout window
restrictions. Empirically, this implies that firms with long reporting lags or frequent
releases of material information will be more likely to adopt Rule 10b5-1 plans.
1.2.4 Litigation Risk
Finally, Rule 10b5-1 repurchases differ from OMRs in terms of legal cover. Firms may
value additional legal cover as shareholders endure losses and managers suffer indi-
vidual consequences when caught engaging in financial misrepresentation (Karpoff,
Lee, and Martin, 2008). In 1982 the SEC enacted Rule 10b-18 to provide safe harbor
to firms that repurchase under the manner, timing, price, and volume conditions.
However, even if the firm meets all Rule 10b-18 conditions, it cannot legally engage
in repurchases while in possession of material, nonpublic information. Though the
new Rule 10b5-1 does not provide safe harbor, it does provide the firm with an affir-
mative defense. An affirmative defense differs from safe harbor in that a firm admits
that its actions were a literal violation of the law against trading while in possession
of material nonpublic information, but may introduce as evidence the existence of
a preset Rule 10b5-1 trading plan establishing the trades when it was not in such
possession, which, if found to be credible, will negate any criminal liability for insider
trading.7 Therefore, 10b5-1 plans provide companies with an additional shield from
potential lawsuits related to repurchase activity. For example, during its July 25,
6In their August 3rd, 2006 Q2 Earnings Conference Call Captaris stated that Rule 10b5-1 plans
would allow them to repurchase during “blackout periods, which comprise about two-thirds of the
trading days in each quarter.” Further, a July 1st, 2011 article “Corporate Buybacks on the Rise”
in Traders Magazine stated: “Corporations have about eight months out of the year when insider
trading rules create blackout periods. However, under the SEC’s 10b5-1 rule, companies can set
up a system to perform automatic stock buybacks during those times.”
7“Rule 10b-18 confers no immunity from possible Rule 10b-5 liability where the issuer engages in re-
purchases while in possession of favorable, material, nonpublic material, and nonpublic information
concerning its securities.” 1982 Adopting Release, supra note 4, at 47 FR 53333.
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2014, conference call, Centene Corp. stated that “the only way to do it [repurchase]
and be clean and above board is on a 10b5-1.” The Litigation Risk Hypothesis states
that firms that are more subject to litigation risk will be more likely to adopt a Rule
10b5-1 plan. The empirical predictions of the Litigation Risk Hypothesis are that
firms with a high estimated probability of litigation are more likely to adopt a preset
repurchase plan.
1.3 Sample formation and descriptive statistics
1.3.1 Sample construction
To construct our sample of preset repurchases, we search Factiva for announcements
of Rule 10b5-1 repurchases and accelerated share repurchase (ASR), another type
of preset repurchase, over the period 2001 to 2014. We verify all Factiva results to
ensure that the use of Rule 10b5-1 corresponds to a repurchase and not an insider
transaction. Our search identifies 1,933 announcements with a Rule 10b5-1 plan
by 950 distinct firms and 832 announcements with an ASR by 430 firms. As most
firms announce preset plans in conjunction with OMR announcements, we merge
our hand-collected Rule 10b5-1 and ASR data with repurchase announcements from
Thomson Financial’s Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers & Acquisitions and
Repurchases databases.8 We generally use non-preset OMRs (OMRs), i.e., OMRs
without a Rule 10b5-1 or ASR component, as our control group. We further exclude
block transactions, tender offers, and any repurchase program with missing data on
the size of the announced program. We reconcile slight discrepancies in dates between
the two SDC databases by searching Factiva for the repurchase announcement and
recording the first available announcement date. This merge yields 14,198 repurchase
announcements documented between 2001 and 2014.
We merge our repurchase announcement sample with several databases to con-
struct other variables of interest and control variables. Specifically, accounting data
and data on actual repurchases are from Compustat quarterly or annual filings, stock
price data from CRSP, institutional ownership data from Thomson Financial 13F
filings, options data from Execucomp, and 8-K filings from Edgar.
Our analyses center around two samples. The first sample conditions on a repur-
chase announcement and is used to compare preset repurchase plans to non-preset
OMRs. We present repurchase plan details, completion rates, and announcement
returns at the repurchase announcement level. When we use multivariate regressions
to test our main hypotheses, we continue to use this conditional data but collapse
it to the firm-year level. If a firm announces multiple types of repurchases within a
year, we assign that firm-year observation the repurchase program with the highest
commitment level. The second unconditional sample includes both repurchasing and
non-repurchasing firm-years, over our sample period. We generate this sample from
8To present the most complete sample possible, we use the union of flagged repurchases within the
SDC M&A database with the SDC Repurchase database as our sample. During our sample period,
approximately one-third of repurchase announcements appear in both databases, approximately
one-half in the Repurchase database only, and the remaining one-sixth in the M&A database only.
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the same intersection of databases as the conditional sample and use it to test how
the introduction of preset repurchases fits into the broader payout landscape.
1.3.2 Rule 10b5-1 repurchase plan frequency
As shown in Figure 1.1 and Panel A of Table 1.1, the use of Rule 10b5-1 plans
has grown rapidly. In 2001, the first year during which firms could adopt a Rule
10b5-1 plan, only four announcements contained such adoptions. These findings
are consistent with a post-enactment learning period in which firms and investment
banks confirmed the application of Rule 10b5-1 to repurchases over time.9 Yet during
the last four years in our sample period (2011-2014), at least 200 announcements
contained a Rule 10b5-1 adoption each year. In fact, in recent years over one-quarter
of repurchase announcements in our sample included a preset component. Therefore,
the growth in Rule 10b5-1 plans cannot be explained by the growth in repurchase
announcements during our time period because 10b5-1 plan use is growing even as a
percentage of total repurchase announcements.10
We also compare Rule 10b5-1 plans to accelerated share repurchases (ASRs),
another type of preset plan. In an ASR, an investment bank immediately delivers
borrowed shares to the firm, resulting in an instantaneous reduction in shares out-
standing by the amount of the repurchase. The investment bank then conducts the
repurchase over time at prevailing market prices. The difference between what the
firm paid the investment bank for the shares and what the investment bank actually
had to pay to purchase them on the open market is settled at the end of the contract.
(See Bargeron, Kulchania, and Thomas (2011) for an in-depth description of the me-
chanics of ASRs.) In sum, along the commitment/flexibility spectrum, ASRs provide
the greatest level of commitment or the least flexibility. The immediacy of ASRs
makes them ideal for managerial motives, such as takeover defense and manipulation
of EPS numbers, while the hands-off nature of 10b5-1 plans are the least compatible
with managerial motives. Further, the SEC has ruled that ASRs do not qualify for
safe harbor or affirmative defense status.11 Thus, ASRs and Rule 10b5-1 plans differ
from a structural and legal perspective, as well as in their likely motives.
While ASRs have become more common, Rule 10b5-1 plans are the preferred
preset repurchase method, particularly in recent years. We observe 2.4 times as
many 10b5-1 plans as ASRs during our sample period (2001-2014). In 2014 only
13% of repurchase announcements included an ASR whereas 29% included a 10b5-1
plan. These results are consistent with more firms preferring to maintain some level
of flexibility in their repurchase programs.
9We observe a similar phenomenon following the introduction of the safe harbor provisions (Rule
10b-18) in 1982 (see, e.g., Grullon and Ikenberry (2000)). Many managers took several years to see
enough precedence and implement a new method of payout (open market repurchases).
10Some firms mention preset repurchase plans in other corporate announcements, e.g., earnings
reports and conference calls. While there is some overlap with our sample of preset repurchase
announcements, we calculate that 377 of these mentions correspond to distinct firm-year observa-
tions, implying that our original estimates of the use of preset plans are likely conservative.
11https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/r10b18faq0504.htm
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Preset repurchase announcements vary significantly by the expected portion of the
repurchase to be effected under a preset plan. Table 1.1 Panel A also presents Rule
10b5-1 announcements by type. We refer to announcements as “boilerplate” if the
firm “may” adopt a preset plan or conduct the repurchase through other means such
as open market purchases, privately negotiated transactions, or block transactions.
The boilerplate group represents approximately half of all Rule 10b5-1 announce-
ments. “Expected” plans indicate that the company “expects to” or “intends to”
adopt a preset component. Firms often include a general description of preset plans
in these announcements. Expected plans make up the smallest group of announce-
ments at 234 announcements or 12% of all 10b5-1 announcements. “Partial” plans
include a preset componentwith certainty. Partial plans use definitive language or
provide specific institutional details about the preset component of the plan. Ap-
proximately one quarter of Rule 10b5-1 announcements are partial. Finally, 269 or
about 14% of plans are “pure,” i.e., cover the full repurchase program.12 We gener-
ally include all types of 10b5-1 plans in our analyses, though we often show results
by type or without boilerplate plans. Firms announcing any type of 10b5-1 plans
are important to study because they choose to include 10b5-1 plans as a potential
repurchase mechanism.
1.3.3 Rule 10b5-1 repurchase plan details
We collect preset repurchase plan details regarding size, duration, motive and broker,
if mentioned, and report summary statistics on Rule 10b5-1 plans in Panel B. We
should note that these summary statistics apply to a small portion of the sample, ex-
clude boilerplate plans by definition, and are skewed towards pure plans fully executed
under the Rule. Therefore, these figures provide a glimpse inside these repurchase
contracts, but do not represent the full sample. For the subset of firms that report the
size of the preset repurchase, the average (median) Rule 10b5-1 program represents
5.2% (3.5%) of shares outstanding. While the size of Rule 10b5-1 programs appears
smaller than that of other repurchase programs, we find that the total announced
repurchase size is slightly larger for repurchases containing a preset component than
for those that do not (8.08% versus 7.73%; p = 0.0625).
The dollar value of preset plans varies substantially from $2 million at the 10th
percentile to $200 million at the 90th percentile for Rule 10b5-1 plans. The mean
(median) dollar value is $82 million ($16 million). For firms that voluntarily disclose
the size of their preset repurchase program, the mean (median) percentage of the
total repurchase program under a Rule 10b5-1 plan is 94% (100%), and 87% will
be conducted fully through a Rule 10b5-1 plan. We should note again, however,
that these figures are biased upward because most firms that combine preset plans
with other plans do not separately report the value of the preset component and are
therefore not included in calculations for this table.
The mean time to commencement of a Rule 10b5-1 plan is 13 days, and 74 plans,
or approximately one-third, begin within one day of the announcement. Rule 10b5-1
12Examples of Rule 10b5-1 announcement types can be found in Section I of the Internet Appendix.
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plans last 195 days on average, and the most frequently observed duration of one
year is reported by approximately one in six (47 out of 299) firms. Other common
time windows include one month (14 plans or 5%), two months (38 plans or 13%),
three months (20 plans or 7%), and six months (22 plans or 7%). The figures are on
par with the duration of OMR plans: 70% of OMR completion announcements occur
within one year of the authorization, and the median duration for the subsample
of firms that announce a completion is 223 days (Bargeron, Bonaimé, and Thomas,
2017). In sum, the duration of the majority of preset plans is long enough to represent
a real and costly commitment.13
1.4 Rule 10b5-1 commitment
Given that accelerated share repurchases are executed immediately and in full, they
represent a firm commitment to repurchasing the entire announced amount of stock.
Rule 10b5-1 plans, on the other hand, allow firms some flexibility in terms of their
execution. Anecdotally, we observe firms establishing a “price matrix,” which implies
repurchasing more (fewer) shares as the price decreases (increases).14 However, firms
can only put into place or modify a 10b5-1 plan during an open window, thus creating
a greater commitment for the firm than a fully flexible OMR. If 10b5-1 plans represent
a greater commitment to follow through with the announced repurchase, we expect
greater completion rates and more plans completed relative to OMRs.
To test whether completion rates differ across Rule 10b5-1 and OMRs, we limit
the sample to the period from 2004 to 2014 since fewer than 5% of repurchases
contained a Rule 10b5-1 component prior to 2004 when firms and investment banks
were learning how to apply the Rule. Further, after 2003 firms are required to report
detailed quarterly information on actual shares repurchased. We calculate completion
rate beginning the quarter the firm announces the repurchase program through the
following eight quarters. Completion rate is the dollar value of shares repurchased,
i.e., the number of shares repurchased times the average repurchase price per share
as reported in Compustat, divided by the dollar value of the announced repurchase
from SDC. Following Stephens and Weisbach (1998), we truncate completion rate at
100%. We report average cumulative completion rates for Rule 10b5-1 plans along
varying levels of commitment as well as for OMR announcements without a preset
component.
Panel A of Table 1.2 shows average completion rates and the percent of plans
completed by quarter and by level of commitment to the Rule. Rule 10b5-1 plans
13Internet Appendix Table IA1 shows plan details for pure 10b5-1 plans only. Pure plans represent
on average 6.51% of shares outstanding or $56.33 million worth of stock. Internet Appendix
Table IA13 shows plan details and the breakdown by type for accelerated share repurchases.
Approximately one-third of ASRs announcements are “pure,” one-third are “boilerplate,” and the
remaining are partial (26%) and expected (6%). ASR plans represent on average 6.22% of shares
outstanding or $604 million worth of stock.
14Firms do not report the price matrix itself in public disclosure; rather, several firms mentioned
that they set up a pricing matrix. We provide an example of a price matrix in Internet Appendix
Figure IA1.
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are associated with higher completion rates and a greater fraction of plans completed
earlier in the program. Further, completion rates are generally increasing in the level
of commitment to a Rule 10b5-1. For example, by quarter one, pure plans are on
average 54% complete, compared to 40% complete for non-Rule programs. Similar
patterns hold throughout the first year of the repurchase program and are especially
strong when excluding boilerplate plans: When we exclude boilerplate plans, we find
that completion rates are greater by 3 to 9 percentage points on average for Rule
10b5-1 repurchases than non-Rule repurchases during the first six quarters after the
announcements. In addition, during the first year more preset repurchase plans are
completed: By quarter four over half of partial and pure plans are complete, while
only 38% of non-Rule 10b5-1 repurchases are complete. These results suggest a trend
of completion rates increasing with the level of commitment to the Rule, specifically
during the first year to year and a half of the repurchase program. By quarter
seven completion rates stabilize across groups, indicating that executing a repurchase
program through a Rule 10b5-1 plan may not increase the ultimate completion rate
of the program but rather significantly increases the speed of completion. By quarter
eight we identify average completion rates ranging from 71% to 78% across all groups,
similar to OMR completion rates documented in previous studies (e.g., Stephens and
Weisbach, 1998; Bonaimé, 2012; Babenko, Tserlukevich, and Vedrashko, 2012). It is
interesting to note that even the adoption of a pure plan does not imply that the firm
will repurchase 100% of authorized shares with certainty. These results point to the
possibility that a non-trivial portion of firms establish a conservative price matrix or
allow brokers some discretion over trades.
It is possible that firm characteristics correlated with adopting a preset repurchase
program are driving completion rates. To address this issue, we identify control firms
that strongly resemble Rule 10b5-1 announcers but do not repurchase under the Rule.
We then examine differences in completion rates and percentage of plans completed
between matched control firms and sample firms. To construct a control group of
firms, we propensity score match to the five nearest neighbors using the logit model
specifications presented in Panel A of Table IA3 in the Internet Appendix. We verify
that none of the variables on which we match are statistically different between our
sample and the matched sample, giving us confidence in our matching process.
Panel B of Table 1.2 reports the difference in completion rates or percentage of
plans completed between Rule 10b5-1 repurchase programs and matched non-Rule
10b5-1 programs. To account for the fact that we estimate propensity scores, we
use the correction proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2009), who find that ignoring the
estimation error can bias results in either direction. Completion rates are significantly
greater for Rule 10b5-1 plans than for non-Rule 10b5-1 plans during the first six
quarters, and results are generally stronger as the level of commitment to repurchasing
under the Rule increases. We find similar, if not stronger, results for the difference
in percent of plans completed: By the second quarter after the announcement 24%
more pure plans are completed than matched non-Rule plans. Furthermore, if we
exclude boilerplate plans, the percent of plans completed is greater for Rule 10b5-1
plans than non-Rule plans in every quarter; by quarter eight significantly more (13%
more) Rule 10b5-1 plans are complete than matched non-Rule plans.
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Our results suggest preset plans are associated with greater completion rates, es-
pecially earlier in the life of the repurchase program. These results point to firms
completing preset plans more quickly, which we test directly in Panel C using the
subsample of completed repurchase programs. We examine time to completion, de-
fined as the number of quarters to completion (conditional on completion). Consistent
with expectations, we find that time to completion is monotonically decreasing with
the level of commitment to a Rule 10b5-1 plan. In other words, firms complete preset
plans faster, and the greater the commitment to repurchasing under the Rule, the
faster the completion. Conditional on completion, firms complete non-Rule 10b5-1
plans in 3.2 quarters on average, whereas firms complete partial and pure Rule 10b5-1
plans within 2.7 and 1.5 quarters, respectively. After excluding boilerplate plans and
using propensity score matching to control for firm characteristics, we show these
differences are significant at the 1% level.
Overall, these results are consistent with preset plans being associated with stronger
commitments to repurchase previously announced shares. Firms buy back larger por-
tions of the announced repurchase under Rule 10b5-1 earlier in the program. Further,
we find that preset plans are strongly associated with an increase in the speed of com-
pletion, and this speed of completion is increasing in the level of commitment to Rule
10b5-1. Significantly greater and faster preset plan completion rates are consistent
with the Rule accomplishing one of the SEC’s original goals: providing firms with
the flexibility and legal protection to repurchase shares during times they otherwise
could not have.
1.5 The determinants of Rule 10b5-1 adoption
Understanding which firms choose preset plans and what motivates them to do so
provides unique insights into the signaling-flexibility tradeoff. In this section we study
the determinants of the decision to adopt a Rule 10b5-1 plan, relative to a non-preset
OMR, the most common repurchase vehicle, which leaves the firm with full flexibility.
1.5.1 Logit regressions of the decision to adopt a Rule 10b5-1 plan
Table 1.3 conditions on the sample of firms announcing a repurchase and presents
logit regressions modeling the decision to adopt a Rule 10b5-1 plan relative to adopt-
ing a non-preset OMR.15 We label firms that announce a Rule 10b5-1 plan during
the fiscal year “Rule 10b5-1 firms” that year; firms that announce open market re-
purchases without a preset component are “OMR firms.” The dependent variable
is a binary variable equal to one if the repurchase announcement includes a Rule
10b5-1 component. If a firm announces more than one repurchase in a fiscal year, we
categorize the firm as a Rule 10b5-1 firm if at least one of the repurchase announce-
ments includes a Rule 10b5-1 plan. When we condition on the availability of control
variables and collapse our sample to the firm-year level, our sample consists of 1,014
Rule 10b5-1 firm-year observations, 3,611 non-preset OMR observations, and 25,342
15Summary statistics and difference in means tests are reported in Internet Appendix Table IA4.
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non-repurchasing observations, unless otherwise noted. We match each repurchase
announcement to prior fiscal year end accounting data from Compustat and stock
price data from CRSP. Variable definitions are in Appendix A; continuous variables
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to mitigate the effect of potential data
errors and outliers. We report the coefficients on the independent variables along with
their z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firm. We include
year dummies and Fama and French (1997) 12 industry dummies in all specifications.
The results in Table 1.3 support the Abandonment Option Hypothesis’ predictions
that firms with large internal capital reserves and predictable cash flows will be more
likely to commit to a preset Rule 10b5-1 plan. Similar in spirit to Chay and Suh
(2009), who find that cash flow uncertainty is negatively related to (inflexible) divi-
dends, we find that the likelihood of adopting a Rule 10b5-1 plan as opposed to more
flexible OMR decreases with cash flow volatility. The coefficient on the standard de-
viation of cash flow in Model (1) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in
cash flow volatility decreases the likelihood of adopting a preset repurchase relative
to an OMR by 16%. These results are also consistent with agency costs driving firms
with more cash on hand and more predictable cash flows to commit to distribute
more to shareholders. We find further support of the Abandonment Option Hypothe-
sis as firms with better prior stock performance and more liquid stocks are generally
more likely to adopt a Rule 10b5-1 plan. These results are consistent with firms that
have better access to external capital being more likely to adopt a preset repurchase
program. In other words, firms that can raise external capital more easily are more
likely to commit to future payouts, which expend internal resources. Finally, we find
that firms that have already committed to dividend payouts are less likely to commit
to a preset repurchase plan—specifically, dividend payers are 17% less likely to adopt
a Rule 10b5-1 plan than non-payers.
The Timing Option Hypothesis predicts that firms with a history of poor re-
purchase timing will be more likely to adopt a preset plan. Consistent with this
prediction, we observe a significant and positive coefficient on our measure of repur-
chase timing. A one standard deviation increase in repurchase timing (implying worse
timing over the prior fiscal year) is associated with an 11% increase in the likelihood
of adopting a preset plan. The coefficients on financial sophistication, firm size, and
firm age are all negative, as predicted by the Timing Hypothesis ; however, the co-
efficients on financial sophistication and size fail to achieve statistical significance in
most models.
Adopting a Rule 10b5-1 repurchase program allows firms to circumvent blackout
windows. We find that the duration of prior blackout windows is positively and
significantly related to the likelihood of adopting a preset plan across all specifications.
The standardized odds ratio in Model (1) is 1.22, indicating a one standard deviation
increase in blackout windows over the prior 12 quarters will increase the likelihood
of adopting a 10b5-1 plan by 22% relative to a non-Rule 10b5-1 plan. We also
find that 8-K filing frequency is positively correlated with adopting a preset plan.
Thus, as predicted by the Blackout Window Hypothesis, we find that firms facing
greater constraints to repurchasing due to long blackout windows or more frequent
releases of material information are significantly more likely to use a preset Rule
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10b5-1 repurchase plan.
Though Rule 10b5-1 provides additional legal protection unavailable in an OMR,
we find no evidence that firms facing greater litigation risk are more likely to adopt
a preset plan relative to an OMR. Our failure to achieve empirical support for the
Litigation Risk Hypothesis is in line with the Rule’s initial intent to clarify enforce-
ment of insider trading laws for individuals and with anecdotal evidence: We observe
very few cases in the popular press of firms being accused of using inside informa-
tion while repurchasing.16 However, this could simply reflect care taken not to run
afoul of the law while executing these plans. Overall, our initial multivariate results
are consistent with the Abandonment Option, Timing Option, and Blackout Window
Hypotheses, but we fail to find support for the Litigation Risk Hypothesis.17
Lastly, we study if and how firms modify payout policy when the menu of payout
options expands by examining how pre-Rule payout behavior relates to Rule 10b5-
1 adoption likelihood. To examine which types of firms are most likely to exploit
the addition of Rule 10b5-1 plans to the menu of payout options, in Model (6) we
add indicators to capture pre-enactment payout policy. Specifically, we include three
indicators, which equal one if a firm has: (i) no repurchase announcement, (ii) no
dividend payment, or (iii) no payout (i.e., no repurchase announcement or dividend
payment) in the three years leading up to enactment (1998-2000). The no payout
indicator is econometrically equivalent to an interaction term of the other two in-
dicators. We find that firms without an active repurchase program in place when
Rule 10b5-1 was enacted are significantly more likely to adopt a preset repurchase
plan instead of an OMR. The no dividend and no payout indicators are statistically
insignificant. These results are consistent with preset repurchases occupying a unique
space within the payout landscape. Specifically, preset plans allowed a different set
of firms who had not been repurchasing to begin buying back their shares.
We include several other control variables that may affect a firm’s choice of payout
vehicle. Several models suggest that firms adopting 10b5-1 plans have more volatile
prior repurchases, which may be correlated with blackout window constraints.18 We
16A notable exception is AOL, Inc., which received a securities class action complaint on behalf of
selling shareholders between August 11, 2011 and April 9, 2012. The lead plaintiff alleged that
AOL deliberated kept their plan to monetize their legacy patents a secret in order to keep AOL
stock at an artificially depressed price, which enabled them to exploit the information imbalance
through a stock repurchase program. The court dismissed allegations based on lack of factual
support for the secret patent deal.
17In Internet Appendix Table IA6 we investigate whether firms with greater agency concerns, more
employee stock options (ESOs), or higher turnover are more likely to adopt Rule 10b5-1 plans.
The likelihood of adopting a Rule 10b5-1 plan is unrelated to the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell
(2008) Entrenchment Index, to whether the CEO is also Chairman of the Board, or to whether
an activist is present. However, firms with staggered boards, generally associated with worse
corporate governance, are more likely to adopt preset repurchase plans. We do not identify a
significant relation between the likelihood of adopting a Rule 10b5-1 plan and ESOs or turnover.
18We include repurchase frequency and standard deviation as controls to capture how regularly the
firm is in the market for its own stock. Firms with more regular repurchases (high frequency,
lower standard deviation) may not need preset plans to circumvent blackout windows because
they appear to already be able to be in the market consistently. On the other hand, regular
repurchasers may prefer preset plans to ensure that they can be in the market frequently without
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find that repurchase frequency, institutional ownership, share dilution, and executive
compensation are not significant predictors of Rule 10b5-1 adoption.19
1.5.2 Rule 10b5-1 plan adoption: Robustness to excluding boilerplate
announcements
We next examine whether our above results regarding the decision to adopt a preset
repurchase plan are sensitive to the exclusion of boilerplate announcements. Boiler-
plate Rule 10b5-1 plan announcements represent the lowest level of commitment to
repurchasing under the Rule and are most susceptible to false signaling, i.e., firms
including a Rule 10b5-1 component in their announcement but never actually es-
tablishing a preset plan. Table 1.4 reports the results of logit regressions modeling
the decision to repurchase shares under Rule 10b5-1 excluding boilerplate announce-
ments. In other words, Rule 10b5-1 firms are firms that announce a pure, partial,
or expected Rule 10b5-1 plan. The base case is OMRs not containing any preset
component. We report the coefficients along with their z-statistics. We include year
and industry indicators in all specifications.
We gain several new insights into the decision to adopt a preset plan when we
remove boilerplate plans. With a few caveats, our main results generally hold. We
continue to find that flexibility is an important determinant of the decision to adopt
a Rule 10b5-1 plan, consistent with the Abandonment Option Hypothesis. Firms with
more stable cash flows, stronger prior stock performance, and more liquid stocks are
generally more likely to adopt Rule 10b5-1 plans. Many of the cash and dividend
payer coefficients lose statistical significance, although they maintain their expected
sign in all cases. Given that our coefficients do not change drastically when we
remove boilerplate plans, our loss of significance is likely due to reducing the power
of our tests by cutting the sample size of Rule 10b5-1 plans by half. Poor repurchase
timing is strongly related to adopting a non-boilerplate Rule 10b5-1 preset repurchase
plan. Interestingly, when we exclude boilerplate plans, we discover that firm size is
negatively related to Rule 10b5-1 adoption. Small firms and firms with a record of
poor repurchase timing most likely lack the sophistication or desire to exercise the
timing option associated with OMRs and thus are more likely to adopt a pure Rule
10b5-1 plan, supporting our Timing Option Hypothesis. We continue to find some
support for the Blackout Window Hypothesis but no support of the Litigation Risk
Hypothesis.20 Further, we continue to show that firms without an active repurchase
risk of regulatory scrutiny.
19We also model the decision to adopt a Rule 10b5-1 plan versus an ASR in Table IA13. Relative to
firms adopting ASRs, Rule 10b5-1 firms have greater, less volatile cash flows, consistent with firms
with higher and more predictable cash flows being more willing to adopt Rule 10b5-1 plans, which
are executed over time. Yet, Rule 10b5-1 firms have more volatile, less liquid stocks than ASR
firms. These finding are consistent with firms with less predictable stock returns being less willing
to accept ASR contracts, whose ultimate cost is a function of the volume-weighted stock price
during the contract period, and with the immediate execution of ASRs being more problematic
for firms with illiquid stocks.
20Interestingly, we lose significance on Blackout window when we include Litigation risk in the
model, likely because these variables are correlated (ρ = −0.2563; p-value = 0.000).
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program when Rule 10b5-1 was enacted are significantly more likely to adopt preset
repurchase plans. Taken together, we conclude that our main findings generally hold
within Rule 10b5-1 plans that represent a stronger commitment to the Rule.21
1.5.3 What determines the speed to first preset repurchase plan adop-
tion?
We observe that many firms adopting a preset repurchase plan continue to use a
preset plan for future repurchases. In fact, only 199 firms that announce a preset
repurchase plan subsequently announce an OMR without a Rule 10b5-1 component.
Of these cases, 75% announced no further repurchase in the sample period, and the
remaining 25% adopt another preset plan in their next repurchase announcement
after the OMR. These findings suggest that a firm’s decision to adopt its first Rule
10b5-1 plan is quite important. Thus, we examine the time to first Rule 10b5-1 plan
or “adoption speed” in Table 1.5 employing a Cox proportional hazard model using
the sample of firms that announce a Rule 10b5-1 plan during our sample period. We
measure the duration to adoption as the number of calendar days from the end of
2003 to the first time a firm adopts a preset plan.
The hazard models generally corroborate the results from our logit models and
are consistent with the Abandonment Option, Timing Option, and Blackout Window
Hypotheses : Firms that have yet to adopt a preset plan are more likely to adopt a
preset plan at timet if they have more cash on hand, have more stable cash flows, carry
less debt, do not pay a dividend, have more liquid stocks, are smaller, are younger, are
less financially sophisticated, have a record of poor repurchase timing, and disclose
material information more frequently. In addition, we find that firms adopt Rule
10b5-1 plans more quickly if they did not have an active repurchase program but
paid a dividend at Rule enactment, they repurchased inconsistently in the past, their
CEO’s bonus is tied to earnings per share, and they have more dilution or executive
options.
1.5.4 Shock to cost of adopting a preset repurchase plan
Our results thus far suggest that firms for which financial flexibility is less valuable
are more likely to adopt a Rule 10b5-1 plan over a traditional OMR plan. To claim
a causal relation between financial flexibility and Rule 10b5-1 likelihood, we need
to rule out endogeneity resulting from reverse causality or omitted variables. For
reverse causality to be an issue, it must be the case that next year’s decision to
repurchase under Rule 10b5-1 affects this year’s firm characteristics. We find this
explanation improbable. A more reasonable concern is that we have failed to control
for a variable that drives both financial flexibility and Rule 10b5-1 likelihood. While
we take great care to control for an exhaustive list of observable variables, including
21Internet Appendix Table IA7 examines varying plan types in a multinomial logit setting, with a
base case of OMRs not containing a preset component. Overall, we observe that our results are
not driven by one specific plan type.
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firm-specific characteristics and industry and year fixed effects, our setting prevents
us from completely ruling out omitted variables.
One potential solution is to identify an exogenous shock to the value of financial
flexibility and examine changes in Rule 10b5-1 likelihood around this shock. Prior
literature identifies the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 as an unanticipated shock
to the supply of credit available to firms (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Cornett,
McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian, 2011; Bliss, Cheng, and Denis, 2015), and a credit
supply shock should increase the marginal benefit of financial flexibility. Therefore,
adopting a preset repurchase plan became more costly around the financial crisis, and
so we expect to see fewer firms adopting these types of plans during the crisis. In this
section we examine whether a shock to the marginal benefit of financial flexibility
affects the likelihood of adopting a preset plan.
Table 1.6 presents results on the effect of the shock to the benefits of financial
flexibility on the likelihood of adopting a Rule 10b5-1 plan. Mirroring our logit
analysis in Table 1.4, we condense our sample to the firm-year level and estimate
the probability of adopting a preset plan, conditional on announcing a repurchase.
We include the same list of control variables (though we only show our variables of
interest to conserve space), but we replace our year dummies with two variables: (1) a
trend variable capturing the increasing tendency for firms to adopt preset plans over
time and (2) an indicator variable to demarcate the financial crisis. The financial
crisis indicator variable captures any shift in the probability of announcing a preset
plan during the crisis.
As expected, we observe a significant upward trend in the likelihood of adopting
a Rule 10b5-1 plan relative to adopting an OMR. Holding other variables constant at
the mean, the coefficient on our trend variable implies that the likelihood of adopting
a Rule 10b5-1 plan, conditional on announcing a repurchase, increases by approxi-
mately 2.6% each year. However, the growth in preset repurchase plans significantly
stagnates during the financial crisis. Repurchasing firms are 5.7% less likely to adopt
a Rule 10b5-1 plan during the crisis.
In robustness tests, we run an “out-of-sample” logit model following Model (1)
of Table 1.6 using the non-crisis period (2004-2007 and 2010-2013) and excluding
the financial crisis indicator variable. We then predict the likelihood of announcing
a preset plan during the financial crisis. The average predicted value during the
financial crisis is 22.1%, significantly different at the 1% level from the actual value
of 16.4%. This 5.7% difference is in line with our prior results. Overall, this evidence
from an unanticipated positive shock to the marginal benefits of financial flexibility
confirms our causal interpretation of the effect of flexibility concerns on the choice to
adopt a 10b5-1 plan.
1.6 Repurchase announcement returns
We next examine abnormal returns surrounding announcements of Rule 10b5-1 re-
purchases and OMRs. Preset repurchases are unique in that, relative to an OMR,
private information should play a smaller role, if any. This would cause announce-
ment returns to be lower for preset trading plans. On the other hand, preset plans
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represent a greater commitment to repurchase shares, causing announcement returns
to be greater in response to this signal. The net effect is an empirical question.
Panel A of Table 1.7 reports five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from
trading days -2 to +2 around the announcement by type of repurchase (Rule 10b5-1
and non-preset OMR) and by level of commitment to repurchasing under the preset
plan. We remove observations with earnings announcements during this five-day win-
dow. We estimate the parameters of the market model over 255 trading days, ending
46 days prior to the announcement. We use the Center for Research in Security and
Prices (CRSP) value weighted index as the market portfolio and require a minimum
of 100 trading days over the estimation window. We winsorize our returns measures
at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the effect of outliers. Panel B presents
difference in means tests, calculated using propensity score matching, which controls
for observable firm characteristics likely to affect announcement returns. Control
firms are the five nearest neighbors identified through our propensity score matching
process based on logit regressions in Panel B of Table IA3 of the Internet Appendix.
We find positive and significant five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
to preset repurchase announcements. In the aggregate, Rule 10b5-1 plans are met
with CARs of 1.5%, or 0.4% greater than non-preset OMR plans.22 This difference
represents an increase of over 36% from the average non-preset CAR of 1.1%. An-
nouncements with little commitment to a preset plan are associated with lower returns
while announcements with a greater commitment are associated with higher returns.
Boilerplate Rule 10b5-1 plans are associated with the lowest CARs of 1.1% while pure
plans are associated with CARs of 2.4%; the returns to partial and expected plans
fall in between. Thus, pure plans, which we know with certainty are executed fully
under the Rule, are associated with CARs that are more than double the returns to
non-preset OMR announcements. Further, when we control for firm characteristics
likely to affect repurchase announcement returns, we find that announcement returns
to pure Rule 10b5-1 announcements are 1.4% greater than and statistically different
from abnormal returns to non-preset OMR announcements. These results are con-
sistent with the benefit of the increased commitment and reduction in agency costs
implied by preset plans outweighing the cost of being unable to exploit private in-
formation fully.23,24 The current literature documents announcement returns of 1.3%
and 3.4% for dividend increases and initiations, respectively (Farre-Mensa, Michaely,
22Rule 10b5-1 announcement returns are on par with CARs around ASR announcements, which
equal 1.8% for all ASR plans and 1.7% for pure ASR plans. We present these figures in Internet
Appendix Table IA14.
23In Internet Appendix Table IA8, we also regress announcement returns on a Rule 10b5-1 repurchase
plan indicator, the size of the repurchase program and our standard controls included in our base
logit model (from Table 1.4, Panel A, Model (1)). These regressions corroborate our prior results.
24Given that previous studies document anomalous returns following repurchase announcements
(e.g., Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1990; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995; Gong, Louis,
and Sun, 2008; Peyer and Vermaelen, 2009), we estimate long-run (12-month) abnormal stock
performance in Internet Appendix Table IA9. We document positive and significant long-run
abnormal returns of 55 bps per month, but they are driven by the subsample of 10b5-1 plans that
are concurrent with OMRs. Overall, our evidence on abnormal returns suggests that investors
recognize and immediately respond to the increased commitment in preset repurchase plans.
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and Schmalz, 2014; Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan, 2002; Michaely, Thaler,
and Womack, 1995). Therefore, the commitment value (as proxied by announcement
returns) of preset repurchases is comparable to that of dividend increases.
1.7 Rule 10b5-1 repurchase plans and overall payout policy
In a final series of tests, we further examine how Rule 10b5-1 plans fit into the broader
set of payout choices. We first test whether preset repurchases substitute for divi-
dend increases, and whether preset plans substitute more so than other repurchases.
We then examine whether the determinants of payout policy changed around the
introduction of the Rule.
1.7.1 Do preset repurchases substitute for dividend increases?
In Section 5 we documented that firms that have already committed to dividend pay-
outs are less likely to commit to a preset repurchase plan. In this section, we conduct
a more formal analysis of the dividend substitution effect of Rule 10b5-1 plans. The
consensus in the literature is that repurchases are gradually replacing dividends, even
among firms that continue to make distributions to shareholders through dividends
(Skinner, 2008). However, because investors generally view dividend cuts unfavorably,
most dividend-paying firms refuse to cut dividends outright, but rather choose not
to increase them, using funds instead to repurchase. Indeed, Grullon and Michaely
(2002) show that firms finance repurchases in part from cash that otherwise would
have been used to increase dividends. In this section we examine whether Rule 10b5-1
repurchases offset dividend increases and whether preset repurchases have more of a
substitution effect than other types of repurchases. Because dividend increases are
expected to be maintained, we expect firms using Rule 10b5-1 plans, which have a
higher level of commitment, to increase dividends less often and by less when they
do.
Table 1.8 presents models of dividend increases using the conditional sample of
repurchases at the firm-year level merged with non-repurchasing firm-years. Closely
following Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007), we define dividend changes as the
change in total dividends on common stock, scaled by assets, from fiscal year t-1 to
year t. Repurchases are total repurchases, scaled by assets, in year t. Rule 10b5-1
is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm announces a Rule 10b5-1
as part of its repurchase program during fiscal year t. Our control variables mimic
those in Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007); that is, we control for cash, cash flow,
leverage, book-to-market, lagged returns, the standard deviation of returns and firm
size. All control variables are measured at the end of fiscal year t-1 and are defined in
Appendix B. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
We include year and industry fixed effects and cluster our standard errors by firm.
Models (1) and (2) are Tobit regressions of dividend increases on repurchase activ-
ity. The dependent variable in Model (1) is the maximum of zero and the change in
dividends scaled by assets. In Model (2) we impose an additional restriction requiring
actual (i.e., unscaled) dividends to increase. We find that the substitution effect of
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repurchases with dividends is concentrated in the subset of repurchases associated
with Rule 10b5-1 plans. The coefficient on the interaction between repurchases and
the Rule 10b5-1 indicator is negative and highly significant, consistent with preset
repurchases serving as more of a substitution mechanism than other repurchases. In
fact, F-tests of the significance of the sum of the coefficients associated with repur-
chases and the interaction term reveals that increases in Rule 10b5-1 repurchases
result in firms increasing dividends to a lesser extent, if at all. Using the more con-
servative figures from Model (1), if a firm announced a Rule 10b5-1 plan, then a
one standard deviation increase in repurchases is associated with a 0.162% decline
in dividend increases, or 17.85% of the mean change in dividend, conditional on an
increase.
Models (3) and (4) are logit regressions modeling the likelihood of a dividend
increase. In Model (3) dividend increases are defined as any increase in dividends; in
Model (4) we additionally require unscaled dividends to increase. Our results corrob-
orate those from our Tobit models. Specifically, we observe that dividend increases
are more likely for firms with greater repurchase activity, except if the repurchases
are conducted under a Rule 10b5-1 plan. The coefficient on the interaction of repur-
chases and the Rule 10b5-1 indicator is negative and significant, consistent with Rule
10b5-1 repurchases having more of a substitution effect than other types of repur-
chases. Further, F-tests reveal that the net effect of repurchases on the likelihood of
dividend increases is negative if the firm announced a Rule 10b5-1 plan during the
fiscal year. Holding other variables constant at the mean, a one standard deviation
increase in repurchases if a firm announced a Rule 10b5-1 plan during the fiscal year
corresponds to a 1.8 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of increasing its divi-
dend. The effect is economically meaningful given that the unconditional probability
of increasing a dividend is 26.35%. Whereas earlier, we found that dividend payers
were not more likely to adopt a 10b-5 plan, here we find that conditional on repur-
chasing through a 10b-5 plan, repurchasing firms are using the plan to substitute for
dividends increases.
1.7.2 Determinants of payout decision before and after Rule 10b5-1 en-
actment
To further explore how payout policy decisions changed around the advent of preset
repurchase plans, in Table 1.9 we compare the drivers of payout before and after the
Rule enactment using the full, unconditional sample of firms with available payout
and control variables. We estimate payout choice separately for the pre-Rule 10b5-1
period (1990-2000) and the post-Rule 10b5-1 period (2004-2014) using multinomial
logits and then compare coefficients across the two periods. We exclude the 2001-2003
early adoption and learning period because our data suggest that very few firms use
preset repurchase plansperhaps because firms and investment banks were unaware
of these plans or uncertain about applying the Rule to repurchases. While we are
unable to completely rule out the effect of general time trends, we expand our list of
control variables to include two macroeconomic controls that may influence payout
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decisions.25 First, we define dividend premium, following Baker and Wurgler (2004),
as the difference in the logs of average market-to-book ratios of dividend-paying and
non-dividend-paying stocks. Second, we add market returns, defined as the 12-month
buy-and-hold returns on the value-weighted CRSP index. Our base group is firms
with no payout, and the three groups of interest are dividend increasers, repurchasers,
and firms that are both repurchasers and dividend increasers. Repurchasers are firms
that actually repurchased shares in a given year. Because firms do not report prior to
2004 the actual number of shares repurchased, we define repurchasers as firms with
positive values of repurchases calculated from cash flow statement values following
Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008).
Most changes in coefficients are concentrated in the decision to repurchase and the
decision to both increase a dividend and repurchase. This finding is consistent with
there being a shock to the repurchase landscape but with the factors determining
dividends remaining largely constant. With 10b-5 plans changing the composition of
repurchasing firms, cash and cash flow have become less important to the repurchase
decision, as has leverage, prior abnormal returns, and repurchase regularity. On the
other hand, return volatility, blackout window length, prior repurchase behavior, and
the dividend premium have become more important to the repurchase decision, and
option compensation is positively related to the repurchase decision in recent years.
While we are unable to fully eliminate general time trends in payout policy driving
changes in payout policy decision, coupling these findings with our logits in Table 1.3
modeling the OMR/Rule 10b5-1 decision, the multinomial logit results are consistent
with the enactment of Rule 10b5-1 enticing a new group of firmsthose without poor
prior abnormal returns, with longer blackout windows, and with more option com-
pensationto repurchase stock.26 Overall, our findings suggest that the determinants
of payout policy, specifically with respect to share repurchases, significantly changed
around the enactment of Rule 10b5-1.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper exploits a new addition to the menu of payouts, SEC Rule 10b5-1 preset
repurchase plans, to reexamine a choice at the core of corporate payout decisions:
whether to send a stronger signal of commitment or maintain options to abandon
and time payouts. Though the Rule’s original intent was to clarify the necessary
conditions for enforcing insider trading laws, generally thought to apply to individ-
uals classified as firm insiders, we find strong use of the Rule at the firm level to
repurchase company stock. We are the first to our knowledge to document and study
the widespread use of Rule 10b5 1 to repurchase company stock. Our evidence sug-
gests that preset repurchase plans represent a unique payout tool whose introduction
significantly altered the payout landscape.
25A common macroeconomic variable in payout policy models is the difference in the tax rates for
dividends versus long-term capital gains. We are unable to use tax differential because there is no
variation in the post-Rule period.
26Internet Appendix Table IA11 show results are similar if dividend increasers are replaced with
dividend payers.
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Table 1.1: Preset repurchase frequency and plan details
Panel A presents the annual frequency of preset repurchase plan announcements. “Pure” (“Partial”) preset plans represent
repurchase programs executed fully (in part) under Rule 10b5-1. “Expected” preset plans denote that the firm intends to adopt
a Rule 10b5-1 plan. “Boilerplate” refers to announcements that shares may be repurchased through a Rule 10b5-1 or through
other means. “ASR” refers to accelerated share repurchases, and “Total Repurchases” includes all Rule 10b5-1 plans, ASRs,
and all other open market repurchase (OMR) plans. Appendix A provides further details and examples of each type of plan.
Panel B presents summary statistics on Rule 10b5-1 plan details, which are only available for the subset of non-boilerplate
announcements that include such details. We report the size of the preset repurchase as a percentage of shares outstanding, in
millions of dollars, or as a percentage of the total repurchase plan. Time to commencement is the number of days between the
repurchase announcement and the start of the preset plan. Plan duration is the number of days during which the Rule 10b5-1
plan is effective.
Panel A: Annual preset repurchase announcement frequencies
Total Rule 10b5-1/ Rule 10b5-1 plans by commitment level
Year Rule 10b5-1 ASR Repurchases Total ASR/Total Boilerplate Expected Partial Pure
2001 4 10 1,131 0.35% 0.88% 0 2 2 0
2002 9 9 887 1.01% 1.01% 3 0 5 1
2003 22 15 734 3.00% 2.04% 4 1 8 9
2004 47 27 889 5.29% 3.04% 17 9 13 8
2005 86 52 1,099 7.83% 4.73% 22 16 25 23
2006 156 79 1,144 13.64% 6.91% 58 20 47 31
2007 180 131 1,540 11.69% 8.51% 52 28 54 46
2008 213 63 1,618 13.16% 3.89% 97 35 49 32
2009 81 20 580 13.97% 3.45% 31 11 21 18
2010 172 72 842 20.43% 8.55% 76 24 51 21
2011 247 69 1,152 21.44% 5.99% 138 30 54 25
2012 245 64 880 27.84% 7.27% 135 24 61 25
2013 200 97 766 26.11% 12.66% 126 19 41 14
2014 271 124 936 28.95% 13.25% 192 15 48 16
Total 1,933 832 14,198 13.61% 5.86% 951 234 479 269
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Table 1.1: Preset repurchase frequency and plan details,continued
Panel B: Preset repurchase plan details (excluding boilerplate)
N Mean 10th percentile Median 90th percentile Std. Dev.
% shares outstanding 307 5.20 0.84 3.46 10.63 8.01
$ millions 393 81.51 1.96 16.00 200.00 283.11
% total repurchase 383 93.81 85.58 100.00 100.00 19.58
Time to commencement (in days) 213 13.08 0 4 35 18.97
Plan duration (in days) 299 195.39 37 146 366 164.84
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Table 1.2: Do Rule 10b5-1 plans represent a greater commitment?
This table examines completion rates around Rule 10b5-1 repurchase announcements (by level of commitment) and around open
market repurchase (OMR) announcements without a Rule 10b5-1 component. Panel A presents average cumulative quarterly
completion rates the cumulative quarterly percentage of repurchase plans completed, where Quarter 0 corresponds to the quarter
of the announcement. We truncate completion rates at 100%. Panel B presents difference in means tests controlling for firm
characteristics using the five nearest neighbors from a propensity score matching process based on logit regressions presented
in Table IA3 of the Internet Appendix. Panel C presents the average time to completion, i.e., the number of quarters until the
plan is complete, and difference in means tests also using propensity score matching. ***, **, * represent significance at the
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Panel A: Average completion rates and percent of plans completed
Average completion rate Percent of plans completed
Quarter Non-Rule 10b5-1 Boilerplate Expected Partial Pure Non-Rule 10b5-1 Boilerplate Expected Partial Pure
0 0.245 0.240 0.250 0.304 0.317 0.060 0.054 0.062 0.092 0.136
1 0.399 0.412 0.450 0.495 0.541 0.140 0.146 0.169 0.208 0.333
2 0.503 0.521 0.564 0.624 0.607 0.221 0.240 0.302 0.317 0.443
3 0.576 0.595 0.634 0.690 0.660 0.302 0.315 0.375 0.435 0.493
4 0.629 0.639 0.682 0.728 0.674 0.376 0.385 0.451 0.513 0.523
5 0.668 0.676 0.707 0.761 0.681 0.433 0.444 0.487 0.564 0.532
6 0.696 0.702 0.731 0.784 0.682 0.478 0.495 0.513 0.623 0.529
7 0.718 0.724 0.746 0.779 0.697 0.516 0.541 0.556 0.616 0.552
8 0.737 0.738 0.764 0.783 0.705 0.545 0.567 0.562 0.663 0.554
Panel B: Differences in means controlling for firm characteristics using propensity score matching
Difference in completion rate Difference in percent of plans completed
Quarter All Rule 10b5-1 Expected, Partial, Partial & Pure All Rule 10b5-1 Expected, Partial, & Pure Partial & Pure
- OMR - & Pure - OMR -OMR Pure - OMR - OMR - & Pure - OMR -OMR Pure - OMR
0 0.005 0.039** 0.052** 0.079*** 0.003 0.033** 0.023 0.067***
1 0.067*** 0.101*** 0.150*** 0.151*** 0.036** 0.098*** 0.116*** 0.191***
2 0.048*** 0.109*** 0.145*** 0.121*** 0.054*** 0.147*** 0.145*** 0.240***
3 0.033** 0.078*** 0.125*** 0.101*** 0.042** 0.130*** 0.161*** 0.180***
4 0.030** 0.081*** 0.109*** 0.081*** 0.032 0.127*** 0.172*** 0.124***
5 0.028** 0.039* 0.106*** 0.097*** 0.054** 0.089*** 0.146*** 0.168***
6 0.025* 0.042** 0.087*** 0.042 0.043** 0.095*** 0.129*** 0.043
7 0.021 0.038* 0.078*** 0.049** 0.039* 0.075** 0.117*** 0.082***
8 0.022 0.042** 0.081*** 0.041*** 0.040* 0.083*** 0.129*** 0.055**
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Table 1.2: Do Rule 10b5-1 plans represent a greater commitment?, continued
Panel C: Time to completion
Mean time to completion
Non-Rule 10b5-1 Boilerplate Expected Partial Pure
3.218 3.103 2.747 2.720 1.453
Differences in means controlling for firm characteristics using propensity score matching
Expected, Partial, &
All Rule 10b5-1 - OMR Pure - OMR Partial & Pure - OMR Pure - OMR
-0.163 -0.640*** -1.016*** -1.470***
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Table 1.3: What firm characteristics are related to preset repurchase adoption?
Using our sample of firms that announce a repurchase, this table reports logit regres-
sions modeling the decision to adopt a Rule 10b5-1 plan relative to an open market
repurchase without a Rule 10b5-1 component. The dependent variable equals one
if the firm announced at least one Rule 10b5-1 repurchase program during the year
and zero otherwise. All variables are defined in Appendix A; continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All specifications include fixed effects for
year and Fama and French (1997) 12 industry classifications. Z-statistics (in paren-
theses) and based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table 1.3: What firm characteristics are related to preset repurchase adoption?, con-
tinued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Abandonment option hypothesis
Cash 0.933** 0.806 0.579 0.789** 0.559 0.517 0.966* 0.541
(2.377) (1.622) (1.182) (1.987) (1.348) (1.151) (1.826) (0.982)
Cash flow 2.205 4.242* 3.284 2.109 1.978 0.710 1.934 1.182
(1.088) (1.654) (1.306) (1.049) (0.929) (0.313) (0.739) (0.402)
Standard deviation of cash flow -13.384*** -16.886*** -17.241** -13.443*** -13.839** -12.516** -6.103 -15.955*
(-2.589) (-2.721) (-2.285) (-2.632) (-2.461) (-2.028) (-0.955) (-1.835)
Leverage -0.549 -0.693 -0.822* -0.668* -0.625 -0.789* -0.716 -0.931*
(-1.543) (-1.551) (-1.834) (-1.839) (-1.580) (-1.939) (-1.486) (-1.774)
Dividend payer -0.359*** -0.200 -0.455*** -0.351*** -0.352*** -0.311* -0.364* -0.449***
(-2.897) (-1.238) (-3.005) (-2.782) (-2.673) (-1.914) (-1.958) (-2.776)
Book-to-market 0.399** 0.310 0.344 0.287 0.164 0.269 0.647*** 0.229
(2.208) (1.270) (1.494) (1.569) (0.841) (1.353) (2.771) (0.823)
Prior stock performance 0.599** 0.099 0.553 0.589* 0.653** 0.840** 0.401 1.312***
(1.966) (0.256) (1.456) (1.906) (2.056) (2.506) (0.973) (2.963)
Standard deviation of returns 0.366 0.750 7.950 0.308 -5.523 4.451 -3.172 -5.953
(0.056) (0.090) (1.007) (0.046) (-0.776) (0.619) (-0.310) (-0.612)
Ln(illiquidity) -0.162** -0.157** -0.170* -0.177*** -0.149* -0.157** -0.075 -0.168
(-2.379) (-1.978) (-1.789) (-2.702) (-1.897) (-2.057) (-0.747) (-1.294)
Timing option hypothesis
Financial sophistication -0.094 -0.291* 0.030 -0.087 -0.156 -0.069 -0.262 -0.075
(-0.766) (-1.735) (0.206) (-0.691) (-1.163) (-0.509) (-1.281) (-0.463)
Ln(Market Cap) -0.153 -0.113 -0.178 -0.230** -0.240* -0.138 0.033 -0.279






Blackout window (days) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001*
(3.438) (3.753) (2.852) (2.931) (1.802) (2.825) (2.174) (1.820)





Payout at 10b5-1 enactment







Standard deviation of 0.081 0.068 0.116* 0.075 0.059 0.087 0.113 0.137**
repurchases (1.498) (1.042) (1.898) (1.380) (1.035) (1.462) (1.523) (1.980)
Repurchase frequency -0.004 0.169 -0.109 0.052 0.027 0.089 -0.106 0.082
(-0.020) (0.803) (-0.487) (0.303) (0.139) (0.465) (-0.427) (0.381)
Institutional ownership 0.047 -0.042 -0.125 0.144 0.055 0.061 0.276 0.076
(0.175) (-0.118) (-0.355) (0.515) (0.185) (0.200) (0.733) (0.164)
Dilution 0.232 -1.098 0.896 0.106 0.405 0.661 1.463
(0.188) (-0.599) (0.568) (0.084) (0.298) (0.478) (0.871)




Observations 4,625 2,435 2,949 4,502 3,678 4,129 2,497 2,692
Pseudo R-squared 0.0791 0.0834 0.0738 0.0788 0.0724 0.0752 0.0540 0.0658
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Table 1.4: Robustness to excluding boilerplate Rule 10b5-1 plans
Using our sample of firms that announce a repurchase, this table report logit regres-
sions modeling the decision to adopt a Rule 10b5-1 plan relative to an open market
repurchase without a Rule 10b5-1 component, using the subsample of Rule 10b5-1
plans excluding boilerplate plans. The dependent variable takes a value of one if a firm
announced at least one non-boilerplate (i.e., pure, partial, or expected) Rule 10b5-1
repurchase program during the year and zero otherwise. All variable are defined in
Appendix A; continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles All
specifications include fixed effects for year and Fama and French (1997) 12 industry
classifications. Z-statistics (in parentheses) and are based on robust standard errors
clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively.
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Table 1.4: Robustness to excluding boilerplate Rule 10b5-1 plans, continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Abandonment option hypothesis
Cash 0.861* 1.136* 0.195 0.600 0.560 0.448 1.009 0.190
(1.691) (1.763) (0.317) (1.200) (1.023) (0.777) (1.493) (0.262)
Cash flow 1.155 3.618 2.208 0.825 0.665 -0.882 0.490 -0.545
(0.467) (1.143) (0.708) (0.343) (0.251) (-0.313) (0.152) (-0.142)
Standard deviation of cash flow -11.885* -15.617** -17.117* -11.599* -12.790* -10.509 -5.491 -21.380*
(-1.858) (-2.125) (-1.779) (-1.846) (-1.827) (-1.457) (-0.733) (-1.854)
Leverage -0.812* -0.903 -1.033* -1.015** -0.654 -0.982* -0.858 -0.911
(-1.715) (-1.463) (-1.835) (-2.105) (-1.272) (-1.857) (-1.515) (-1.391)
Dividend payer -0.219 -0.041 -0.282 -0.224 -0.206 -0.156 -0.332 -0.396**
(-1.464) (-0.211) (-1.607) (-1.463) (-1.330) (-0.841) (-1.480) (-2.000)
Book-to-market 0.094 0.189 -0.018 -0.046 0.060 0.010 0.583** 0.012
(0.441) (0.617) (-0.066) (-0.212) (0.259) (0.043) (2.266) (0.037)
Prior stock performance 0.970*** 0.668 0.934** 0.997*** 0.979** 1.156*** 0.618 1.904***
(2.619) (1.427) (2.068) (2.667) (2.567) (2.933) (1.261) (3.624)
Standard deviation of returns -1.959 1.226 4.381 -1.546 -3.122 0.387 -7.283 -7.245
(-0.255) (0.120) (0.482) (-0.195) (-0.367) (0.046) (-0.605) (-0.627)
Ln(illiquidity) -0.183** -0.157 -0.213** -0.182** -0.210** -0.171** -0.012 -0.217
(-2.384) (-1.606) (-2.046) (-2.315) (-2.466) (-2.016) (-0.116) (-1.292)
Timing option hypothesis
Financial sophistication -0.223 -0.299 -0.168 -0.220 -0.166 -0.231 -0.271 -0.296
(-1.433) (-1.461) (-0.923) (-1.382) (-0.998) (-1.337) (-1.142) (-1.424)
Ln(Market Cap) -0.312*** -0.206 -0.382** -0.369*** -0.394*** -0.301** 0.004 -0.501**






Blackout window (days) 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001* 0.001 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*
(2.425) (2.940) (2.215) (1.855) (1.312) (1.998) (2.110) (1.887)





Payout at 10b5-1 enactment







Standard deviation of 0.143** 0.092 0.185*** 0.140** 0.124** 0.147** 0.163** 0.227***
repurchases (2.458) (1.280) (2.816) (2.361) (2.039) (2.299) (2.147) (2.973)
Repurchase frequency 0.208 0.469* 0.052 0.266 0.311 0.312 -0.119 0.435
(0.955) (1.813) (0.198) (1.227) (1.283) (1.321) (-0.415) (1.571)
Institutional ownership -0.027 -0.095 -0.029 0.069 -0.143 -0.017 0.559 -0.291
(-0.079) (-0.219) (-0.066) (0.193) (-0.378) (-0.044) (1.207) (-0.495)
Dilution -0.285 -1.351 -0.345 -0.497 -0.334 -0.073 0.778
(-0.186) (-0.581) (-0.168) (-0.315) (-0.197) (-0.042) (0.397)




Observations 4,202 2,189 2,686 4,099 3,327 3,806 2,375 2,451
Pseudo R-squared 0.0663 0.0672 0.0700 0.0662 0.0663 0.0687 0.0534 0.0781
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Table 1.5: Hazard models of preset plan adoption
Using our sample of repurchasing firms between 2004 and 2014, this table presents
Cox proportional hazard model of the duration to Rule 10b5-1 plan adoption. The
duration to adoption is the number of calendar days from the end of 2003 to the
first time the firm adopts a Rule 10b5-1 plan. If the firm enters the sample after
2003 we calculate duration as the number of days from the end of the first calendar
year in Compustat. All variables are defined in Appendix A; continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We also include industry fixed effects based
on Fama and French (1997) 12 industry classifications. Z-statistics (in parentheses)
are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent significance
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table 1.5: Hazard models of preset plan adoption, continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Abandonment option hypothesis
Cash 0.736** 0.285 0.160 0.582 0.630 0.338 0.614 0.319
(2.037) (0.740) (0.355) (1.558) (1.596) (0.963) (1.206) (0.665)
Cash flow 1.020 1.143 0.028 1.051 1.578 0.314 -1.104 -2.010
(0.527) (0.563) (0.012) (0.543) (0.747) (0.165) (-0.415) (-0.736)
Standard deviation of cash flow -10.251** -10.935** -11.695* -11.464** -10.171* -5.927 4.903 -5.596
(-2.085) (-2.253) (-1.665) (-2.260) (-1.927) (-1.314) (0.834) (-0.779)
Leverage -0.503 -0.764** -0.649 -0.686** -0.501 -0.654** -0.911* -0.415
(-1.584) (-2.131) (-1.554) (-2.095) (-1.426) (-2.061) (-1.655) (-1.005)
Dividend payer -0.253** -0.145 -0.361** -0.259** -0.191 -0.316** -0.422* -0.272*
(-2.007) (-1.034) (-2.210) (-1.992) (-1.402) (-2.323) (-1.957) (-1.729)
Book-to-market 0.314* 0.269 0.176 0.219 0.264 0.128 0.293 0.075
(1.888) (1.445) (0.800) (1.260) (1.424) (0.819) (1.152) (0.314)
Prior stock performance 0.321 -0.560 0.206 0.302 0.440 0.371 0.482 1.183**
(0.840) (-1.467) (0.396) (0.766) (1.092) (1.003) (1.039) (2.163)
Standard deviation of returns 4.361 -0.315 4.126 4.768 2.287 2.550 -53.901*** -10.950
(0.700) (-0.046) (0.557) (0.740) (0.320) (0.434) (-4.515) (-1.194)
Ln(illiquidity) -0.155** -0.072 -0.159* -0.135** -0.167** -0.100* -0.036 0.039
(-2.566) (-1.104) (-1.816) (-2.241) (-2.286) (-1.685) (-0.393) (0.369)
Timing option hypothesis
Financial sophistication -0.272** -0.326** -0.176 -0.283** -0.353** -0.267** -0.408* -0.355**
(-2.136) (-2.109) (-1.115) (-2.200) (-2.448) (-2.122) (-1.712) (-2.257)
Ln(Market Cap) -0.203** -0.082 -0.213* -0.221** -0.260** -0.149 0.022 -0.011






Blackout window (days) 0.000 0.002*** 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001* -0.001 0.000
(0.902) (2.745) (1.467) (0.517) (0.151) (1.844) (-1.237) (0.483)





Payout at 10b5-1 enactment







Standard deviation of 0.131** 0.055 0.149** 0.125** 0.116** 0.079 0.024 0.136*
repurchases (2.520) (0.864) (2.544) (2.321) (2.058) (1.395) (0.304) (1.936)
Repurchase frequency -0.180 -0.318 -0.495** -0.166 -0.191 -0.334* -0.542** -0.371*
(-1.048) (-1.579) (-2.191) (-0.960) (-1.020) (-1.933) (-2.080) (-1.734)
Institutional ownership 0.385 0.318 -0.104 0.477 0.323 0.392 0.204 0.685
(1.309) (0.990) (-0.257) (1.589) (0.991) (1.327) (0.475) (1.499)
Dilution 0.950 2.192 1.642 0.683 1.090 2.586** 3.377**
(0.866) (1.638) (1.031) (0.609) (0.891) (2.298) (2.512)




Observations 4,006 2,102 2,514 3,911 3,144 3,729 2,395 2,414
Pseudo R-squared 0.736** 0.285 0.160 0.582 0.630 0.017 0.614 0.319
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Table 1.6: Shock to cost of adopting a preset repurchase plan
Using our sample of firms that announce a repurchase, this table report logit regres-
sions modeling the decision to adopt a Rule 10b5-1 plan relative to an open market
repurchase without a Rule 10b5-1 component during the financial crisis. The depen-
dent variable equals one if the firm announced at least one Rule 10b5-1 repurchase
program during the year and zero otherwise. Trend is a count variable equal to 1
for observations in 2004, 2 for observations in 2005, etc. Financial crisis is an indica-
tor variable equal to 1 for announcements made during 2008 or 2009. All variables
are defined in Appendix A; continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. All specifications include fixed effects for Fama and French (1997) 12
industry classifications. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on
robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01,
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trend 0.163*** 0.175*** 0.151*** 0.167*** 0.176*** 0.146*** 0.258*** 0.118***
(9.236) (7.305) (6.437) (9.269) (9.211) (7.559) (3.289) (4.635)
Financial crisis -0.363*** -0.368*** -0.276** -0.342*** -0.408*** -0.408*** -0.527*** -0.461***



















Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,625 2,435 2,952 4,502 3,678 4,129 2,497 2,692
Pseudo R-squared 0.0765 0.0813 0.0711 0.0763 0.0696 0.0718 0.0515 0.0630
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Table 1.7: Univariate analysis - Abnormal returns around preset repurchase an-
nouncements
This table reports five-day cumulative abnormal returns around repurchase announce-
ments. We remove observations with earnings announcements during this five-day
window. Panel A shows mean abnormal returns by type of repurchase announce-
ment. Table 1 explains our categorization of announcements. Panel B examines the
difference in abnormal returns between groups of preset repurchase plans and open
market repurchase plans that do not include a preset component. Significance of
mean abnormal returns is assessed using a t-test or propensity score matching, as
indicated. We use the five nearest neighbors identified from the logit regressions in
Table IA3 as matched control firms then calculate the difference in means. ***, **,
* represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Panel A: Abnormal returns at announcement by type of repurchase
Rule 10b5-1
All Boilerplate Expected Partial Pure OMR
Mean 1.531 1.147 2.044 1.932 2.385 1.129
t-stat 7.276 4.256 4.237 2.891 3.879 13.046
N 842 512 124 94 112 4,274
Panel B: Differences in means controlling for firm characteristics
using propensity score matching
Rule 10b5-1
Expected
Partial, &Pure Partial & Pure
All - OMR - OMR -OMR Pure - OMR
0.222 0.88** 1.047** 1.436***
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Table 1.8: Do Rule 10b5-1 repurchases substitute for dividend increases?
Using the full, unconditional sample of firm-years created by merging our repurchase
announcement sample with non-repurchasing firm-years, this table presents models of
dividend increases as a function of repurchase activity, with a focus on the differential
substitution effect of Rule 10b5-1 repurchases. Models (1) and (2) report results
from Tobit regressions modeling dividend increases. In Model (1) dividend increases
are defined as the maximum of zero and the change in dividends, scaled by assets,
from fiscal year t-1 to year t ; in Model (2) we also require unscaled dividends to
increase. Models (3) and (4) are logit regressions modeling the likelihood of a dividend
increase. In Model (3) dividend increases are defined as any increase in dividends,
scaled by assets, from year t-1 to year t ; to be classified as a dividend increase;
in Model (4), we additionally require unscaled dividends to increase. Repurchases
are total repurchases, scaled by assets, in fiscal year t. Rule 10b5-1 is an indicator
variable that takes a value of one if a firm announced a Rule 10b5-1 as part of its
repurchase program during fiscal year t. Prior stock performance equals the return
on the company’s stock during fiscal year t-1, net the return on the value-weighted
CRSP index over the same period. All other variables are measured at the end of
fiscal year t-1 and defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We include year and Fama and French (1997) 12
industry fixed effects in all specifications. T-statistics or Z-statistics are reported in
parentheses and are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, *
represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Tobit models Logit models
∆Div/Assets >0 & ∆Div/Assets >0
∆Div/Assets >0 ∆Div >0 ∆Div/Assets >0 ∆Div >0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Repurchases/Assets 0.017** 0.017** 2.321*** 1.968***
(2.216) (2.169) (4.123) (3.530)
Repurchase/Assets x Rule 10b5-1 -0.063*** -0.066*** -5.641*** -5.630***
(-3.103) (-3.088) (-3.481) (-3.324)
Rule 10b5-1 -0.000 0.000 0.011 0.035
(-0.151) (0.099) (0.096) (0.304)
p-values from F-tests
Repurchases/Assets + -0.046** -0.049** -3.320** -3.662**
Repurchase/Assets x Rule 10b5-1 [0.020] [0.018] [0.035] [0.026]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36,619 36,723 36,619 36,723
Log likelihood 13,413 12,035 -17,603 -17,190
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Table 1.9: How have preset repurchases changed payout decisions?
Use the full, unconditional sample of firm-years created by merging our repurchase announcement sample with non-repurchasing
firm-years, this table presents multinomial logit models of dividend increases and repurchases in the pre-Rule 10b5-1 period
(1990-2000) and the post-Rule 10b5-1 period (2004-2014), as well as the difference in coefficients across the two periods. The
base group is firm-years with zero repurchases and no increase in dividends. The other groups include: (i) firm-years with
dividend increases but zero repurchases, (ii) firm-years with dividend increases and positive repurchases, and (iii) firm-years
with no dividend increase but positive repurchases. Dividend increases are cases in which the change in dividends, scaled by
assets, from fiscal year t-1 to year t is positive. Positive repurchases imply a positive repurchase value inferred from the cash
flow statement following Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008). Independent variables are measured at the end of fiscal year t-1 and
defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We include industry fixed effects
based on Fama and French (1997) 12 industry classifications. Z-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors
clustered by firm; p-values associated with differences are in brackets. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and
0.10 levels, respectively.37
Table 1.9: How have preset repurchases changed payout decisions?, continued
Pre-Rule 10b5-1 period (1990-2000) Post-Rule 10b5-1 period (2004-2014) Difference
Dividend Dividend Dividend
Dividend increase & Dividend increase & Dividend increase &
increase Repurchase Repurchase increase Repurchase Repurchase increase Repurchase Repurchase
Cash 0.447 0.735** 0.981*** 0.088 0.661*** 0.337*** -0.359 -0.074 -0.644***
(1.449) (2.534) (6.234) (0.526) (4.043) (3.138) [0.337] [0.842] [0.003]
Cash flow 3.408*** 6.910*** 6.907*** 3.640*** 5.219*** 3.329*** 0.231 -1.693 -3.575***
(2.895) (5.537) (11.569) (5.543) (7.092) (7.466) [0.893] [0.28] [0.000]
Standard deviation of cash flow 0.667 -5.189* -4.546*** -0.081 -5.339*** -2.950*** -0.747 -0.159 1.600
(0.654) (-1.955) (-3.795) (-0.125) (-3.558) (-3.601) [0.618] [0.968] [0.404]
Leverage 0.210 -0.801*** -0.983*** -0.066 -0.680*** -0.353*** -0.276 0.121 0.629***
(1.053) (-3.743) (-7.705) (-0.557) (-5.449) (-3.949) [0.267] [0.679] [0.001]
Dividend payer 3.200*** 2.981*** -0.143** 2.756*** 2.537*** -0.188*** -0.444*** -0.444*** -0.045
(25.656) (21.922) (-2.311) (42.149) (39.957) (-4.327) [0.004] [0.006] [0.603]
Book-to-market 0.256*** 0.025 -0.019 0.031 0.060 -0.048 -0.226** 0.036 -0.029
(3.324) (0.267) (-0.504) (0.673) (1.062) (-1.583) [0.012] [0.773] [0.574]
Prior stock performance 0.466*** 0.217** -0.319*** 0.300*** 0.345*** -0.044 -0.166** 0.128 0.275***
(5.985) (2.569) (-7.250) (6.011) (6.204) (-1.204) [0.058] [0.195] [0.000]
Standard deviation of returns -21.446*** -21.273*** -10.433*** -17.602*** -36.796*** -17.561*** 3.873 -15.534*** -7.131***
(-5.993) (-5.363) (-5.926) (-8.577) (-15.630) (-12.023) [0.409] [0.003] [0.008]
Ln(illiquidity) 0.086** 0.040 -0.030 0.083*** 0.080*** -0.016 -0.003 0.04 0.014
(2.395) (1.024) (-1.357) (5.012) (4.456) (-1.081) [0.942] [0.403] [0.637]
Ln(Market Cap) 0.169*** 0.128** -0.036 0.194*** 0.273*** 0.034 0.025 0.145** 0.070
(3.138) (2.246) (-1.027) (7.392) (9.966) (1.458) [0.702] [0.046] [0.142]
Blackout window (days) -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.004 0.008***
(-0.381) (0.802) (-0.328) (-0.491) (34.581) (37.860) [0.755] [0.434] [0.004]
Standard deviation of -0.015 -0.007 0.063*** 0.029 0.034 -0.003 0.045 0.042 -0.065**
Repurchases (-0.387) (-0.221) (3.015) (1.218) (1.623) (-0.174) [0.372] [0.346] [0.022]
Repurchase frequency -0.445** 3.748*** 3.774*** -0.280*** 4.205*** 4.440*** 0.166 0.457** 0.666***
(-2.357) (27.831) (35.456) (-2.691) (53.376) (64.876) [0.501] [0.013] [0.000]
Institutional ownership 0.011 0.171 0.709*** 0.037 0.533*** 0.449*** 0.026 0.361 -0.261
(0.052) (0.830) (5.481) (0.361) (5.066) (5.558) [0.915] [0.166] [0.131]
Dilution 2.035*** 0.702 -0.653* 1.652*** 2.330*** 0.778* -0.385 1.626** 1.432**
(3.972) (1.168) (-1.839) (2.992) (4.247) (1.910) [0.621] [0.071] [0.019]
Dividend premium -0.218 0.284 -0.300 0.707* -0.599 0.712** 0.908** -0.880 1.015***
(-0.601) (0.854) (-1.500) (1.749) (-1.493) (2.313) [0.091] [0.109] [0.008]
Market returns 0.150 0.504 -0.220 0.257* -0.486*** -0.265** 0.104 -0.989*** -0.045
(0.459) (1.634) (-1.133) (1.712) (-3.423) (-2.393) [0.777] [0.004] [0.845]
Observations 13,288 33,005
Pseudo R-squared 0.282 0.347
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Figure 1.1: Preset Repurchase Announcements
This figure shows the number of repurchase announcements containing a preset repur-
chase plan (left axis) and the percentage of repurchase announcements that include
a preset repurchase component (right axis) from 2001 to 2014.
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Figure 1.2: Preset repurchase plans in payout initiations
This figure presents initiations that include a preset repurchase component as a per-
centage of repurchase initiations and all payout initiations. We define repurchase
(payout) initiations as the first repurchase (payout) since 1990.
Copyright c© David Moore, 2018.
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Chapter 2 Managerial Self-Interest and Strategic Repurchases: Evidence
from Equity Vesting Schedules
2.1 Introduction
Share repurchases are an important corporate decision as they are the most prevalent
form of payout in the US in recent years. In 2014, S&P 500 firms spent over half-
a-trillion dollars on share repurchases, a year-over-year increase of over 16%. The
existing literature focuses primarily on firm-level motivations to announce and exe-
cute a repurchase program.1 An often overlooked element is the manager’s desire to
personally benefit from the repurchase program. This paper studies the strategic use
and timing of share repurchases by insiders for personal gain. Specifically, I study
the relation between monthly CEO equity sales and simultaneous share repurchase
likelihood and magnitude.
Several articles in the business press question whether managerial motivations for
repurchasing are actually in the best interest of the firm, or rather are for manager’s
own personal benefit.2 For example, a 2014 Economist article3 states:
...buy-backs have a flaw: they can create perverse incentives to pay out
too much cash, damaging firms’ balance-sheets and their ability to invest.
For a start, both investors and managers can become addicted to the
temporary ‘pop’ that a buy-back can give to a share price.
If managers use share repurchases as a tool to benefit personally from a temporary
boost in share price, then I expect share repurchases to increase when managers
personally benefit from stock prices the most.
Repurchases are often executed in conjunction with insider equity sales. For in-
stance, in June of 2012 General Electric repurchased 217,227 shares at an average
price of $38.29 the same month that the CEO Kendall Powell sold 58,684 shares at
$38.44. Prior literature studies insider trading as it relates to the credibility of the
undervaluation signal of repurchases (Bonaimé and Ryngaert (2013), Babenko, Tser-
lukevich, and Vedrashko (2012) and Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang (2012)), but
1The evidence suggests firms repurchase due to a combination of signaling (Vermaelen (1981) and
Comment and Jarrell (1991)), undervaluation (D’mello and Shroff, 2000), agency costs (Jensen
(1986) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998)), dilution (Fenn and Liang (2001) and Kahle (2002)),
capital structure adjustments (Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman, 2001), manipulating earnings-
per-share (EPS) (Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson, 2006), liquidity (Hillert, Maug, and Obernberger,
2016), and financial flexibility (Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) and Bonaimé, Hankins,
and Harford (2014)).
2See “Profits Without Prosperity” (Harvard Business Review, September 2014 issue),“Beware the
Stock-Buyback Craze”(The Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2015), “Is the Surge in Stock Buybacks
Good or Evil?” (The Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2015), and “Buybacks enrich the bosses
when business sags” (Reuters, December 10, 2015).
3“The Repurchase Revolution” (The Economist on September 13, 2014).
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does not draw a causal relationship between insider equity sales and actual share re-
purchases. Causal inferences are difficult to establish because share repurchases and
equity sales are endogenously determined. Market characteristics, such as liquidity
and returns, and firm characteristics, such as free cash flow and investment opportu-
nities, determine both share repurchases and equity sales. A manager can frequently
choose when to sell equity and when to repurchase shares,4 implying that the decision
to repurchase shares in a particular month is potentially correlated with the decision
to sell equity. Moreover, both the choice to sell equity and to repurchase shares are
potentially correlated with unobservable omitted variables. For example, a CEO may
be less likely to sell equity due to unobservable positive information about future cash
flows while at the same time the firm would be more likely to repurchase due to the
same information. This opposite correlation with potential omitted variables results
in a downward bias of the estimated effect of equity sales on repurchases.
To overcome the endogeneity of CEO equity sales, I use an instrumental variable
approach. As first shown in Edmans, Goncalves-Pinto, Wang, and Xu (2016), vesting
of stock and option grants increases the likelihood of equity sales in a given month.5
A CEO is significantly more likely to sell equity in a month when equity grants vest,
satisfying the relevance criterion for a valid instrument. Vesting schedules also satisfy
the exclusion restriction, as firms establish vesting schedules years in advance at the
grant date. Vesting typically begins at least 12 months after the grant date and
can extend 3-7 years. Therefore, vesting in a particular month is unlikely correlated
with current market and firm characteristics as well as any omitted variables that
may drive equity sales and repurchases. Lastly, the CEO is aware of the schedule in
advance, allowing sufficient time to adjust repurchases. From the previous example,
the CEO of General Mills Kendall Powell was awarded two restricted stock grants
totaling 58,684 shares in June of 2008 with vesting occurring 4 years after the grant
date. Mr. Powell sold the exact same amount of shares in June 2012, the same month
that the stock grants vested.
I identify vesting schedules using data on equity grants from ISS Incentive Lab. I
focus on time-based equity grants because performance-based vesting grants can influ-
ences share repurchases through alternative channels other than vesting. Performance-
based grants are often tied to current firm performance metrics and some metrics can
be directly manipulated using repurchases.6 Theory suggests that it is optimal for
an undiversified executive facing trading and hedging restrictions to exercise options
and/or sell equity upon vesting of grants (Hall and Murphy (2002) and Kahl, Liu,
and Longstaff (2003)). I show that vesting indeed increases the likelihood of an equity
sale by management. Focusing on time-based grants I document an increase of 3-5%
4Repurchases are constrained by SEC Rule 10b-18 whereas equity sales are constrained by SEC
Rule 144 and other imposed insider trading restrictions.
5Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen (2016) show a similar relationship between equity vesting and sales
using quarterly data.
6Cheng, Harford, and Zhang (2015) find that CEOs repurchase in larger quantities when their bonus
is tied to EPS. Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006) find that a large number of firms repurchase
shares to meet analysts’ forecasts. Almeida, Fos, and Kronlund (2016) document a similar rela-
tionship and show that investment and employment decrease after EPS-motivated repurchases.
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in the likelihood of equity sale by CEO in months when equity grants vest, which
is consistent with the empirical results of Edmans, Goncalves-Pinto, Wang, and Xu
(2016). I exploit this setting to test whether the firm alters its share repurchase
program during months when the CEO faces a greater incentive to manipulate the
current stock price.
Using a sample of hand-collected monthly repurchases, I find that a share re-
purchase is 2% more likely in a month when the CEO’s equity grant vests relative
to non-vesting months. This corresponds to a 7.5% increase over the unconditional
probability of repurchasing in a month. I also find that the number of shares re-
purchased is significantly increasing in the value of the equity grants vesting. A one
standard deviation increase from the mean value of vesting equity implies an increase
in shares repurchased that corresponds to approximately 8% of the mean monthly
shares repurchased. These results are consistent with managers strategically using
share repurchases to personally benefit from the positive effects of repurchasing on
the stock price.7
Do CEOs increase repurchases when selling equity to potentially benefit from
selling a higher stock price? I implement a two-stage least square (2SLS) analysis to
test if vesting driven equity sales are associated with increased repurchases. I find
that after using vesting as an instrument for equity sales, a firm is 47% more likely
to repurchase in months where the CEO also sells equity due to vesting. The results
hold if I use the value of vesting equity and equity sold rather than binary variables.
A firm increases repurchases by 0.05% of shares outstanding, an increase equivalent
to 30% of the mean, when the value of equity sold by the CEO in the same month
doubles. When managers sell equity due to vesting, I find the firm is more likely to
repurchase stock simultaneously and the number of shares repurchased is increasing
in the value of equity sold. The magnitude of the effect of equity sales on repurchases
is also much larger than that of vesting, consistent with managerial self-interest as
the equity sale is driving the repurchase and not dilution. This result is consistent
with managers using repurchases to personally benefit from the stock price support
and suggests a causal relation between CEO sales and share repurchases.
I next ask if firms strategically shift repurchases in the months surrounding equity
vesting. Since vesting schedules are known to the CEO well in advance of actual
vesting, it is possible that the CEO would reduce repurchase activity leading up to
or following a vesting month. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find a significant
decrease in repurchase activity one-month prior to vesting. These results suggest a
shifting of repurchases from the month before vesting to months where CEOs are
concerned with the current stock price.
Upon vesting of grants (or exercising of options) shares outstanding increase,
diluting the equity positions of existing shareholders. Previous literature shows ev-
idence that firms use repurchases to offset the dilutive effects of equity grants (e.g.,
Kahle, 2002; Dittmar, 2000; Cuny, Martin, and Puthenpurackal, 2009). To address
the potential alternative explanation that vesting induces dilution, which then causes
7McNally, Smith, and Barnes (2006) and Zhang (2005) have found evidence that repurchases affect
stock prices.
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repurchases, I control for firm-wide dilution in all regression specifications. I further
test this alternative hypothesis by limiting the sample to vesting months where only
option grants vest and there are also no simultaneous exercising of options held by
the CEO. A CEO in this sample experiences a change in their equity holdings, an in-
crease in unexercised exercisable options, while the firm experiences no direct dilution
caused by the CEO’s compensation, i.e., shares outstanding did not increase. The
vesting causes no immediate dilution while still increasing the incentive to maximize
the current stock price. I continue to find a significant and positive relationship be-
tween equity sales and repurchases under this specification. Alternatively, it is not a
necessary condition that vesting does not cause a dilution motivated repurchase. The
fact that the manager increased repurchases due to an equity sale suggests personal
benefit from the repurchase is an additional motive to repurchase.
In the next series of tests I test the robustness of the effect of vesting and equity
sales on repurchasing. First, there exists a tradeoff between using internal funds to
repurchase for personal gain and using those same funds for investments or precau-
tionary cash reserves. Equity sales increase the CEO’s personal incentive to maximize
the current stock price. It is also true that CEO’s typically hold a large equity stake
in the firm and thus their personal wealth is directly linked to the long-term value of
the firm. The manager must therefore balance the repurchase’s effect on long-term
value against its benefits to the current stock price. Do CEOs continue to repurchase
shares around equity sales when the costs of repurchasing are higher? Repeating the
2SLS analysis using subsample splits based on cash holdings, cash flow, cash flow
volatility, and investment opportunities to proxy for repurchasing costs, I find mini-
mal evidence that CEO’s adjust their behavior around vesting induced equity sales.
The costs to repurchasing have no significant incremental impact and my main result
holds.
Second, the potential price impact of the share repurchase varies by firm and
through time, which may change the incentive of the CEO to repurchase for personal
gain. I use illiquidity to proxy for potential price impact and find no evidence that
the CEO is more likely to repurchase around equity sales when the firm’s stock price
is more liquid. Third, increased monitoring may reduce the incentives of the CEO
to repurchase for personal gain; however, I find that increased monitoring through
institutional ownership does not have a differential effect on the relationship between
equity sales and share repurchases. I do find a significantly stronger effect if the CEO
is also the chairman. Lastly, I examine CEO characteristics. I find no significant
effect on the result based on age or tenure of the CEO. Overall the result continues
to hold even among CEOs with increased monitoring or greater career concerns.
Lastly, I look at abnormal returns following the simultaneous sale of equity and
share repurchase. If this behavior by the CEO is detrimental for the firm than I
would expect to see worse returns in the future. On the other hand, the CEO may
be increasing repurchases only to a point where it does not hurt the long-term value
of the firm, while still benefiting personally. I find that firms repurchasing in the
same month as vesting-induced equity sales have 78 bps lower abnormal returns in
the following month than firms that also had a vesting-induced equity sale but did
not repurchase. Looking at buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the quarter following
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the equity sale I find no significant difference between firms that repurchased shares
and those that did not. I also find no difference among repurchasing firms for those
that had equity sales and those that did not. There is also no significant difference in
abnormal returns when adjusting using DGTW portfolio returns. Overall, it does not
seem that using share repurchases for the personal benefit of the CEO is detrimental
to long-term firm value.
My results are consistent with the CEO repurchasing for personal benefit by
making minor deviations from the optimal share repurchase. It appears as though
the CEO is using repurchases to pump up the stock price around equity sales while
refraining from significantly affecting the long-run value of the firm. I find CEO
contracts have a real effect on repurchases and, that effect does not significantly
impact shareholder welfare.
2.2 Literature Review and Contribution
My findings contribute to two strands of literature. First, there is broad literature on
the motivation behind share repurchase programs. Specifically, this paper contributes
to the literature that relates repurchases to insider trading, timing, price effects, and
options. The second literature concerns CEO contracts, particularly the literature
on real outcomes of compensation contracts on the firm. Below I review each strand
of literature as it pertains to my results and discuss the paper’s contribution to the
literature.
My primary contribution is to the study of repurchase motivations. The litera-
ture has documented several motivations to repurchase stock, most of which appear
to have the intent of increasing shareholder value. Survey evidence suggests managers
prefer to repurchase if the stock is a good investment relative to its true value (Brav,
Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, 2005) and managers are often quoted in repurchase
announcements suggesting undervaluation as the reason behind the repurchase initi-
ation (Bonaimé, 2012). Empirical evidence supports the claim that undervaluation
is a primary driver of the repurchase decision (e.g., Vermaelen, 1981; Grullon and
Michaely, 2004; Louis and White, 2007).
Managers have superior information about the firm’s prospects, and theory sug-
gests they can use repurchases to signal this information to the market (Ofer and
Thakor, 1987; McNally, 1999). Studies on the market reaction of repurchases an-
nouncements as well as the long-run returns in the years following the announcement
find positive and significant returns suggesting signaling as a motivation to repur-
chase (e.g., Vermaelen, 1981; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Stephens and Weisbach,
1998; Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003; Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee, 2004; Ikenberry
et al., 1995; Bargeron et al., 2017; Manconi, Peyer, and Vermaelen, 2014).
Signaling and undervaluation are not the only motivations to repurchase. Other
important motivators are agency costs (Jensen, 1986), dilution (Kahle, 2002), capital
structure (Bonaimé, Öztekin, and Warr, 2014), takeover defense (Billett and Xue,
2007), and financial flexibility (Bonaimé, Hankins, and Harford, 2014). These mo-
tivations are not mutually exclusive as several factors can influence the decision to
repurchase.
45
My study differs in that I focus on the manager’s personal incentives to benefit
from the share repurchase program in the short-term by examining insider equity sales
around repurchases. On the one hand, managers tend to hold significant positions
in the firm and thus benefit from any value increasing activity. It follows then that
managers would benefit personally from a value increasing repurchase program. On
the other hand, the manager faces a motivation to support or boost the stock price
when selling equity. Bonaimé and Ryngaert (2013) find that repurchases are most
likely in quarters with net insider selling. Other studies that examine the relation-
ship between insider trading patterns and share repurchases focus on the direction of
insider trading and its ability to mitigate or validate the information signal of repur-
chases (Babenko, Tserlukevich, and Vedrashko, 2012; Bonaimé and Ryngaert, 2013)
or the undervaluation of the stock (Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang, 2012). Using an
improved sample of monthly repurchases and exploiting vesting schedules to control
for the endogeneity of equity sales, I show a strong causal link between equity sales
and repurchases. This result makes a significant contribution to the literature on
share repurchase motivations. Though prior literature generally finds evidence that
repurchases are done in “good faith” to improve shareholder value, I find evidence
that repurchases can be motivated by managerial self-interest to personally benefit
the CEO. This result is consistent with more recent studies suggesting more perverse
motivations to repurchases (Cheng, Harford, and Zhang (2015) and Almeida, Fos,
and Kronlund (2016)).
Recent studies have examined the timing of share repurchases. Bonaimé, Han-
kins, and Jordan (2016) find that on average the return on investment from share
repurchase programs would be greater if the firm smoothed repurchases through time,
suggesting insiders are suboptimal timers when it comes to executing share repur-
chases. On the other hand, Dittmar and Field (2015) show that frequent repurchasers
are able to execute repurchases at below-average prices, suggesting a subset of firms
are better able or willing to time repurchases. I add to the literature on timing abil-
ity by showing a scenario in which managers are less concerned about repurchasing
at below average prices and more concerned about supporting or boosting the stock
price. This implies that insiders aren’t necessarily bad at timing share repurchases
but rather face motivations that decrease their desire to time the market. Further-
more, I find evidence that managers strategically time share repurchases to coincide
with equity sales in vesting months as the number of shares repurchased is increasing
in the value of equity sold in a given month.
An important assumption is that share repurchases affect stock prices. McNally,
Smith, and Barnes (2006) find prices fall less after repurchases than matched within-
firm non-repurchase trades using data from the Toronto stock exchange. Zhang (2005)
finds a 3-day abnormal return to actual daily repurchases of 0.43% using data from
Hong Kong. A recent paper by Busch and Obernberger (2016) finds minimal evi-
dence that managers use share repurchases to manipulate stock prices but rather use
repurchases to ensure stock prices accurately reflect fundamental value. This paper is
not directly testing if share repurchases manipulate stock prices but rather whether
managers strategically use share repurchases when they face a greater incentive to
manipulate stock prices. Given the findings of Busch and Obernberger (2016), it is
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plausible that CEO’s use repurchases around equity vesting to help increase prices
and sell equity closer to its fundamental value, which would also imply that underval-
uation can still be a motive when managers are repurchasing for their own personal
benefit. Moreover, it is not necessary that repurchases have an impact on stock prices
on average but rather that the manager believes the share repurchase will affect their
stock price. My results are consistent with managers believing repurchases either
support or boost the stock price as they tend to increase repurchases around equity
sales.
This paper is also related to the study of options and share repurchases. There
are several papers that link options to repurchases (e.g., Kahle, 2002; Dittmar, 2000;
Cuny, Martin, and Puthenpurackal, 2009). This relationship could be explained by
the dilutive effects of options or the lack of dividend protections inherent in an option
grant. My paper is related to this literature in that I show the vesting schedule of
executive options is positively related to repurchasing. A contemporaneous paper by
Ferri and Li (2016) uses the expensing of options due to FAS 123R as an exogenous
shock to option compensation and contrary to previous findings shows no causal
relationship between options and repurchases. Though options granted may not have
a causal effect on the aggregate level of repurchases, my results show a causal effect
of the vesting schedule of options on repurchase timing.
Lastly, I add to a new strand of literature studying the real effects of CEO contract-
ing. The board of directors may neutralize the agency conflict between shareholders
and management by issuing equity grants. Equity grants generally have long-term
vesting schedules to encourage management to focus on long-term firm value, thus
aligning their incentives with long-term shareholders. However, equity grants may
be associated with some unintended consequences. For example, equity grants can
increase concerns over the current stock price which could lead to an increase in focus
on current cash flows rather than long-run value. Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen (2016)
show that CEO contracting can cause short-term real effects on the firm through a
reduction in investment and Edmans, Goncalves-Pinto, Wang, and Xu (2016) find
a shift in positive discretionary news releases towards vesting months. Both results
suggest CEO contracts may cause myopic behavior and an increased concern over
the current stock price. Ladika and Sautner (2016) show that the accelerated vesting
of options due to the expensing of options under FAS 123R induces myopic behavior
through a reduction in investment and an increase in both equity sales and depar-
tures. I add to this literature by showing that CEO contracts also have a real effect
on the cash policy of the firm through share repurchases.
2.3 Sample Selection
Beginning in 2004, the SEC required firms to report monthly share repurchase activity
under the newly created items 2(e) of Form 10-Q and 5(c) of Form 10-K. Firms report
the total number of shares purchased, the average price paid per share, the number
of shares purchased under a publicly announced program, and the maximum number
of shares that may still be repurchased under the programs. I use the total number of
shares repurchased under a publicly announced program as the measure of monthly
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repurchases. This measure differs from the total number of shares purchased, which
typically includes shares tendered by employees as payment of taxes withheld on
the exercise of stock options and the vesting of restricted stock granted under the
company’s equity compensation plans.
To collect the sample of monthly repurchases, I begin with all non-missing, non-
zero measures of quarterly shares repurchased as reported by Compustat. I download
the 10-Qs and 10-Ks from 2004-2014 for this sample of firms and manually collect
the table on repurchase activity as well as any accompanying footnotes. Not all firms
report repurchases by calendar month of the quarter as some repurchases span two
calendar months. I assume calendar month repurchases for these firms based on
quarter-end date.
Data on equity grants is obtained from ISS Incentive Lab, which collects detailed
information on executive compensation from annual proxy statements during the pe-
riod 1998-2013. They examine the largest 750 firms per year and ensure a complete
history for every company in the sample. The data is obtained from the Summary
Compensation, Outstanding Equity Awards, Grants of Plan-based awards, Options
Exercises and Stock Vested tables of the proxy statement and also from analysis of
the accompanying text and footnotes. I focus on time based grants as performance
based grants are tied to current firm outcomes such as earnings per share (EPS),
which could also influence repurchases. Cheng, Harford, and Zhang (2015) find a sig-
nificant relationship between executives with bonuses tied to EPS and repurchases.
Moreover, Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006) and Almeida, Fos, and Kronlund
(2016) find that firms are significantly more likely to repurchase if they would other-
wise miss analyst forecasts for EPS. Time based grants present the most exogeneous
identification strategy as they have no relation to the current performance of the firm.
Time based grants can follow either a ratable or cliff vesting schedule. I will refer
to vesting as the award of stock grants or the transition of options from unexercisable
to exercisable throughout the paper. Ratable awards vest monthly, quarterly, semi-
annually, or yearly and are assumed to vest equally over the vesting period. Vesting
usually begins 12-months after the grant date of the award and typically continues
over a 3-5 year period at the specified frequency, with some grants extending as long
as 7 years. Grants with a cliff vesting schedule are awards that do not vest until
the end of the term, which is typically after 2 years but can also last up to 7 years
at which point the entire award vests. For example, a ratable stock grant of 1,000
shares awarded today with a 4-year vesting period would vest 250 shares per year
starting one-year from today, whereas a similar grant with a cliff vesting schedule
would award all 1,000 shares at the end of 4 years. I exclude grants where the vesting
schedule is unclear.
Insider sales data is from Thomson Reuters Insider data, which reports not only
open market purchases and sales but also the exercise of in- or at- the money options.
All data sets are separately constructed on a monthly basis. Due to the improvements
in incentive contract reporting in 2006 and the use of end-of-year values to construct
certain control variables, the final sample is from 2007-2013. I exclude firms with
industrial classifications of financial or utility to be consistent with prior literature
on payout policy, leaving a final sample of 40,641 firm-months and 749 distinct firms.
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2.4 Variable Construction and Descriptive Statistics
I use the data on equity grants to create my variables of interest: vesting month and
vesting value. Vesting month is an indicator variable equal to one in a given month if
the CEO has stock grants or options that vest. To calculate the effective value of the
vesting equity, I first calculate the number of shares vesting in a given month. Since
we focus on time-based grants that are either ratable or cliff, it is straightforward
to determine the number of vesting securities: Ratable grants vest equally over the
vesting period based on the reported frequency, and cliff schedules vest entirely at
the end of the term. To get a more accurate measure of the value of the securities
vesting, I calculate the delta, which reflects the equivalent number of shares. I use
the Black-Scholes formula to calculate the delta of an option. The exercise price
and expiration date are given in the data, while the risk-free rate is the one-month
Treasury bill rate. Additional inputs are the prior fiscal year dividend yield and the
prior 12-month average stock return volatility calculated from CRSP. With the delta
of the options calculated and the delta of a share being equal to one, I sum across
the vesting stock and options to get an effective number of shares vesting for each
CEO-month. Lastly, I multiply the total effective number of shares vesting by the
prior month-end stock price. I refer to this measure as vesting value, which represents
the dollar sensitivity of vesting grants to a 100% change in the stock price. From
summary statistics reported in Table 2.1, the median month does not see any vesting
while 21% of months in our sample experience vesting with an average effective value
of $383,366 across the sample. When conditioning on months where vesting occurs,
the average vesting value is $1,803,674.
I also control for vested equity, which is the current value of exercisable options
plus the current value of shares held, and unvested equity, which is the sum of all
unexercisable options and unvested equity. These measures account for the current
wealth of the CEO that is trade-able (vested equity) and the current value of eq-
uity awarded that is not yet trade-able (unvested equity). The Outstanding Equity
Awards table reports option and stock awards that are outstanding as of year-end,
i.e., unexercised exercisable options, unexercised unexercisable options, and stock
grants that have not yet vested. To construct my measure of vested equity I begin by
calculating the delta of all unexercised exercisable options at year-end and take the
summation to get the effective number of shares of vested options. Each month I use
insider transaction data and data on vesting schedules to adjust for the exercise of
options and the vesting of option grants to get a monthly effective number of shares
exercisable. To calculate the value of vested stock, I use the Beneficial ownership
table reported in proxy statements which reports the number of shares held by ex-
ecutives, board members, and those owning more than 5% of shares outstanding. I
adjust the number of shares held to account for the fact that it contains all exercisable
options in the next 60 days. Again, I use Insider data to account for acquiring and
disposing of shares each month to get a monthly total of shares held. Vested value is
then calculated monthly as the sum of vested options and vested stock multiplied by
prior month-end stock price.
I calculate unvested equity in a similar fashion beginning with prior year-end
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values from the proxy statement. I start with the sum of all unexercised unexercisable
options and unvested stock from the Outstanding Options Awards table. I adjust
these figures monthly by adding new options and stock grants and subtracting any
option or stock grants that vest. I again calculate the delta of the options and stocks to
get an effective number of shares and multiply the sum of unvested stock and unvested
options by prior month-end stock price to get the monthly value of unvested equity.
Unvested equity and vested equity are log transformed in the regression analysis by
taking the log of one plus the variable to account for significant skewness. Table 2.1
reports that the average CEO in the sample has approximately $115 million in vested
equity and $29.7 million in unvested equity. These values are larger than those found
in Edmans, Goncalves-Pinto, Wang, and Xu (2016); however, this is expected as my
dataset contains only the largest firms, whereas their sample consists of Russell 3000
firms.
I employ two measures of share repurchases. The first is binary, taking a value
of one if the firm repurchased any shares under a publicly announced program in a
given month and zero otherwise. The second variable is equal to the percent of shares
outstanding repurchased under a publicly announced program in a given month.
Firms in my sample repurchase in 27.8% of months and repurchase 0.17% of shares
outstanding. Conditioning on repurchasing in a month the average repurchasing firm
buys back 0.61% of shares outstanding.
The final variable of interest is a measure of CEO equity sales. Using the Thomson
Reuters Insider Transaction data on Form 4 fillings, I create an indicator variable
equal to one if in a given month the CEO sold any equity and zero otherwise. I also
calculate the total value of shares sold as the number of shares sold multiplied by the
prior month-end stock price. CEOs sell equity in 9.6% of months and sell $492,635
worth of shares on average in a month. If I condition on equity sales being greater
than zero, the average value sold is $5,093,145. I also take the log of one plus equity
sold to account for skewness.
I construct control variables for stock and firm characteristics that may influence
repurchase behavior. Specifically, lagged stock returns may influence repurchase be-
havior. Firms may increase repurchasing following poor returns as they perceive the
stock as undervalued. Liquidity could influence whether a firm repurchases. Hillert,
Maug, and Obernberger (2016) show repurchases tend to increase liquidity therefore
one could argue firms repurchase when shares are less liquid to improve liquidity. I
use the natural log of market capitalization to control for firm size. I also control
for ability and flexibility to repurchase using cash, cash flow, and standard deviation
of cash flows. I control for leverage as Farre-Mensa, Michaely, and Schmalz (2016)
show 30% of aggregate payouts are financed by debt. I expect firms with more cash,
greater cash flows, more stable cash flows and lower leverage to be more likely to re-
purchase. I control for book-to-market as a proxy for growth opportunities. Theory
suggests firms with lower book-to-market, more growth opportunities, should be less
likely to repurchase (Jensen, 1986). Lastly, I control for firm-wide dilution by calcu-
lating the percent of shares outstanding that could be converted to stock and cause
dilution. This measure is constructed using the difference in number of shares used
to calculate shares outstanding for basic EPS and Diluted EPS, the latter includes
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any instrument that can be converted to stock, i.e., options, warrants, convertible
debt. If firms are concerned with dilution then greater levels of dilution should be
associated with an increase in repurchases. The literature finds evidence of a positive
relationship between dilution caused by option grants and repurchases (Kahle (2002)
and Fenn and Liang (2001)) but a recent paper by Ferri and Li (2016) suggests the
relation between option based pay and repurchases may not be causal suggesting the
prior documented relation suffers from an endogeneity bias. Summary statistics on
control variables are reported in Table 2.1 and fully defined in Appendix B.
2.5 Results
This section studies the relation between equity sales and share repurchases. I begin
by showing the endogenous relation between CEO equity sales and repurchases. I next
demonstrate that vesting is a valid instrument for equity sales. I then examine the
relation between vesting and repurchases before showing the effect of instrumented
equity sales on repurchases. Next, I examine the repurchase behavior in the months
surrounding an equity sale. I then do a sub-sample analysis to rule out dilution as an
alternative explanation. I perform robustness tests on the main result and conclude
by looking at abnormal returns in the following months.
2.5.1 Main results
I run the following equation to establish the baseline relation between CEO equity
sales and repurchases:
Repurchasesm,i = α1 + βSalesm,i + γControlsm−1,i + FixedEffects+ εm,i, (1)
Equity sales and repurchase are determined simultaneously by the CEO of the firm
and likely suffer from endogeneity bias. If I am omitting a variable that is positively
correlated with repurchases and negatively correlated with sales, or vice-versa, then
my estimate of β will suffer from a downward bias. It is likely that any omitted
variable that would increase the probability of a repurchase would also decrease the
probability of a CEO equity sale since they are opposite trades.
Table 2.2 shows the results of this regression. I find a positive and significant
relation between equity sales and repurchases when the dependent variable is a binary
measure of repurchases. However, the coefficient on β is insignificant when I include
a continuous measure of repurchases. As stated above, the β coefficient is biased
downward by omitted variables. Therefore, I apply a plausible instrument for equity
sales to test the relation between equity sales and repurchases.
Here I establish the relation between vesting and sales. Table 2.3 shows the results
of the following regression:
Salesm,i = α1 + βV estingm,i + γControlsm−1,i + FixedEffects+ εm,i, (2)
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where Sales is either a binary or continuous measure of CEO monthly equity sales.
Vesting is the variable of interest in this specification and is either vesting month or
vesting value as described in Section 2.4. Vesting and sales are defined for month m
and firm i. The control variables are defined in Appendix 2.6 and discussed previously
in Section 2.4. All control variables are lagged by one-month. I also control for any
time invariant firm characteristics with firm fixed effects. I use year fixed effects
for any macro level unobservables in a given year. Lastly, I include calendar month
fixed effects to control for any seasonality in vesting or sales that may be due to a
particular calendar month. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level to account
for possible correlation across residuals. I expect β > 0, i.e., vesting to be positively
associated with the likelihood and magnitude of equity sales.
Table 2.3 shows the results from these regressions. As expected, vesting equity
is positively associated with equity sales. The results are positive and statistically
significant for both samples of stock grants and option grants as well as the combined
sample. The results show that CEOs are 2.8-5.6% more likely to sell equity in a month
when stock or option grants vest, where the unconditional probability of an equity
sale in a given month is 9.6%. Similarly, a 100% change in the value of equity vesting
is associated with approximately 5% change in equity sales. We also see a positive
correlation between equity sales and lagged returns, size, and vested equity, whereas
the coefficient on book-to-market is negative. Overall, there is a strong statistically
significant relationship between vesting equity and equity sales by the CEO, which
suggests that managers sell equity shortly after experiencing vesting of equity grants.
This relation provides personal incentive for the CEO to maximize the current stock
price in vesting months.
I next show the relationship between vesting and repurchases. Table 2.4 shows
the results of the following regression:
Repurchasesm,i = α1 + βV estingm,i + γControlsm−1,i + FixedEffects+ εm,i, (3)
where repurchases is either a dummy variable or measured as repurchases as a
percentage of shares outstanding. As in Table 2.3, all specifications contain year,
month, and firm fixed effects. I also control for firm and stock characteristics that
may influence repurchases. The results show that firms are 1.4-2.3% more likely to
repurchase shares in months where grants vest; the unconditional probability of a
repurchase in a given month is 27%. I also find that the value of shares vesting
is significantly and positively associated with the percent of shares outstanding re-
purchased. A one standard deviation increase in vesting value is associated with a
0.01 percentage point increase in shares repurchased, which is equivalent to 8% of
the mean percentage of shares repurchased. In unreported results, I regress vesting
month on share repurchases and find that vesting months are associated with 0.03
percentage point increase in shares repurchased, which is 18% of the mean. Control
variables have the expected sign; firms with lower returns, more cash, lower leverage,
and more liquid stocks are more likely to repurchase shares.
The results indicate a positive relationship between repurchasing and vesting,
consistent with managers attempting to maximize the current stock price through
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repurchases. However, a more direct question is whether repurchases are higher in
months where the CEO sells equity. Equity sales represent a realization of an increase
in CEO personal wealth for which the value of the increase is directly related to the
current stock price. An issue with examining equity sales is that the CEO sells equity
based on similar factors that the firm repurchases shares. In other words, equity
sales are endogenous. Vesting months serves as a plausible instrument. Similar to
Edmans, Goncalves-Pinto, Wang, and Xu (2016), vesting is highly correlated with
equity sales as shown in Table 2.3 and by construction an equity grant’s vesting
schedule is set up years in advance and should be unrelated to current unobservables
that are correlated with equity sales and repurchases, thus satisfying the relevance
criterion and the exclusion restriction for a valid instrument.
In Table 2.5, I instrument equity sales using vesting and find positive and statisti-
cally significant coefficients in all specifications. In months when CEOs are predicted
to sell equity due to the vesting of equity grants they are more likely to repurchase
shares and repurchase more shares, indicating a plausibly causal relation between
equity sales and share repurchases. The economic significance is impactful. Vesting
induced equity sales increase the likelihood of repurchasing in a month by 4.0-5.5%,
an increase representing around 20% of the unconditional probability to repurchase.
The number of shares repurchased is increasing in the value of equity sold, suggesting
the CEO uses more firm resources as the personal benefit from repurchases increases.
A 100% change in the value of equity sold results in an increase of share repurchases
by 0.05% of shares outstanding, an increase equivalent to 30% of the average monthly
share repurchase volume.
In order to repurchase shares the CEO requires an approved share repurchase
program from the board of directors. The prior test assumes that the CEO can
unilaterally approve a share repurchase program if needed. In Table 2.6, I restrict the
sample to firms that announced a share repurchase program in the prior 36 months,
thus allowing the CEO to operate independently from the board. As expected, the
economic magnitude increases across all specifications. When the CEO is able to act
more independently from the board of directors, the degree of managerial self interest
increases.
I find strong evidence that CEOs are more likely to repurchase shares when they
are also selling equity. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the CEO
uses a portion of share repurchases to personally benefit. I find further evidence of
this relationship in that the number of shares repurchased is increasing in the value
of equity sold. The larger the potential benefit, the more firm funds are devoted
towards repurchasing shares. The results strengthen when I force the CEO to have an
approved repurchase program available. Overall, I find strong evidence that equity
sales and vesting schedules play a significant role in the timing and magnitude of
repurchases.
2.5.2 Dynamic analysis
In this section I test if managers strategically shift repurchases from surrounding
months to the vesting or equity sale month. In Table 2.7, I run the models from
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Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 and replace vesting with lagged values of one to two months
prior to the repurchasing month. In Panel B, I replace vesting with forward looking
values of vesting up to two months after the repurchase month. I find no change in
repurchase behavior following a vesting. Interestingly, I find a negative and statis-
tically significant coefficient for vesting in month m+1 on repurchases in month m.
This result suggests firms are less likely to repurchase and repurchase fewer shares
in the month before vesting and potentially shift those repurchases to the vesting
month. This result holds if I use vesting as an instrument for equity sales. Overall,
firms do not appear to shift repurchases from months following vesting; however, I
find evidence that firms reduce repurchases in the month preceding vesting and equity
sales.
2.5.3 Alternative hypothesis
This section addresses the potential concerns over the dilutive effect of options and its
impact on repurchasing. I’ve shown that the firm repurchases more shares in months
where the CEO sells equity due to vesting. My hypothesis is that this relation is
due to a personal incentive to maximize the current stock price through the use of
share repurchases in order to increase the return from equity sales. I conclude that
personal managerial incentives motivate share repurchases. An alternative hypothesis
is that the CEO is repurchasing to undo the dilution caused by the exercising of
options or the vesting of stock grants. In Table 2.8, I address the concern that
repurchases in vesting months are to offset dilution rather than for CEO personal
gain. I look at a sub-sample of months when CEO options vest and the CEO does
not exercise any existing or vesting options in the same month. I also condition on no
exercising occurring in the prior month. This subsample causes no dilution to current
shares outstanding by the CEO. I continue to find positive and significant coefficients
across all specifications. These results provide further evidence that vesting induced
repurchases are unlikely driven by the motivation to undo dilution but rather related
to manager’s personal incentive to maximize the current stock price. Taken together
with the result that equity sales cause an increase in repurchases, it is likely that the
CEO’s personal incentives motivate a subset of share repurchases beyond the desire
to offset the dilutive effect of options.
2.5.4 Robustness
In the next series of tests I examine if the effect of equity sales on repurchase behavior
varies based on potential costs to repurchase, CEO career concerns, and governance.
First, I look at potential costs to increasing repurchases. A common motive to re-
purchase is to distribute excess cash when the opportunity cost of that cash is low.
A share repurchase program becomes costly as cash reserves are depleted or alterna-
tive uses of the cash are bountiful and profitable. Do CEOs continue to repurchase
shares around equity sales when the costs to repurchasing are higher? In Table 2.9, I
run the model from Table 2.5 on subsample splits. In the first four columns I proxy
for repurchasing costs using cash holdings, market-to-book, cash flow, and cash flow
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volatility. Repurchases are potentially less costly to the firm if cash holdings are high
and the CEO of cash rich firms may be more likely to use repurchases for personal
gain. I find a stronger effect of equity sales on repurchases likelihood for high cash
periods however there is no significant difference in the effect when examining magni-
tude of share repurchases. An alternative cost to repurchasing is foregoing other more
profitable uses of cash. I proxy for investment opportunities using market-to-book,
the CEO of a firm with lower investment opportunities faces less of constraint to use
cash to repurchase for personal gain as there are fewer alternative uses for cash. I
find no significant difference in the coefficients on fitted equity sales.
Cash flow and cash flow volatility may be better indicators of funds available
to repurchase. I do find evidence that firms with higher cash flow volatility have a
greater effect of equity sales on repurchases. Again, this result does not hold when
testng the magnitude of repurchases. The effect on repurchases is not significantly
different across subsamples of cash flow. The CEO may increase repurchases at a
greater intensity around equity sales when the potential price impact is greater. On
the other hand, if the potential price impact of a share repurchase is low, a CEO may
increase repurchases more in order to cause any price impact. I proxy for potential
price impact using stock liquidity, the price of a more liquid stock may be less affected
by an increase in share repurchases relative to a more illiquid stock. I find no evidence
that the effect varies based on illiquidity of the firm’s stock. A key takeaway is that the
main result that fitted equity sales significantly increase the likelihood and magnitude
of repurchases holds in all but two subsamples, suggesting that the result is robust
across potential benefits and costs of repurchasing.
In a second set of subsample splits I look at proxies for governance and CEO career
concerns. If the CEO increasing repurchases around equity sales is undesirable to
shareholders, it may be less likely when monitoring of the CEO is greater. I proxy for
monitoring with institutional ownership but find no significant difference in the effect
of equity sales on repurchases across different levels of monitoring. Alternatively, it
may be easier for the CEO to act independent of the board if the CEO is also the
chairman. I find a significantly stronger effect when the CEO is also the chairman.
This result suggests the CEO repurchases more shares around equity sales when
monitoring by the board is lower.
In the last set of cross sectional tests I look at CEO characteristics. If using
repurchases for personal gain is viewed negatively then I expect CEOs with greater
career concerns are less likely to use repurchases in this manner. I use age of the
CEO and tenure as CEO at the current firm as proxies for career concerns. I find no
evidence that younger or less tenured CEOs use repurchases any differently around
equity sales. Lastly, I split the sample based on how much of the CEO’s wealth is
tied to firm value. If repurchases around equity sales hurt firm value then I would
expect the result to be weaker among CEOs with more wealth tied to firm value. I
find no significantly different effect suggesting that these repurchases may not harm
firm value. I continue to find a strong positive relation between equity sales and
repurchases across all but two subsamples.
Overall, these results show that the positive effect of equity sales on repurchases
is strong across all firms and does not seem to vary much based on costs and benefits
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to repurchasing, monitoring or CEO career concerns. Taken together this set of tests
is not clear on whether this behavior negatively impacts the firm. In the next series
of test I address this question directly.
2.5.5 Do these repurchases destroy shareholder value?
In this section I examine the 1-month and 3-month abnormal returns following a
month of simultaneous repurchasing and CEO equity sales. Table 2.10 shows buy-and-
hold abnormal returns for different subsets of firm-months. Monthly and quarterly
returns are adjusted using either the Fama-French 25 size and book-to-market port-
folios or the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) (referred to as DGTW)
125 size, book-to-market, and momentum portfolios.8 Within the sample of repur-
chasing months, I find positive and significant abnormal returns across all subgroups
that did not simultaneously sell equity(with our without simultaneous vesting), the
returns range from 20 to 54 bps (72 to 143 bps quarterly). However, in the month or
quarter following a simultaneous share repurchase and an equity sale I find no signif-
icant abnormal returns except for quarterly DGTW adjusted returns. Interestingly,
when vesting and equity sales occur but the firm does not engage in a share repur-
chase, I find positive and significant abnormal returns, 76-87 bps monthly. Next, I
look at differences in abnormal returns to test if repurchasing around equity sales is
harmful to firm value. I run several different comparisons based equity sales, vesting,
and repurchases. Though abnormal returns are consistently lower when the CEO
simultaneously repurchases and sells equity, the differences only reach marginal sig-
nificance when comparing abnormal returns following simultaneous repurchasing and
equity sales to abnormal returns following an equity sale with no repurchase. The
result increases in magnitude if I force equity sales to occur with vesting. Moreover,
the difference is not significant for quarterly abnormal returns.
The evidence suggests that the CEO is not destroying shareholder wealth. I do
not find a significant difference in abnormal returns and the effect is similar across
subsamples. Overall, this suggests that in the region around the optimal repurchase
amount, small deviations in repurchases do not have a significant effect on firm value
and CEOs are able to benefit without affecting shareholder wealth.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper exploits vesting schedules of equity grants to show a causal relationship
between CEO private equity sales and share repurchases. An increase in the personal
managerial incentive to maximize the current stock price, measured as vesting in-
duced equity sales, increases the likelihood and magnitude of share repurchases. This
finding indicates a personal managerial motivation to repurchase shares. Though eq-
uity grants with vesting schedules are intended to focus the interest of managers on
long-term firm value, I find evidence consistent with a short-term outcome of CEO
8Returns and breakpoints are obtained from Ken French’s and Russ Wermer’s websites respectively.
Book-to-market is industry adjusted for DGTW portfolios as per Wermers (2004).
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contracts in that managers use repurchases to personally benefit. However, I find
little evidence that firm value is destroyed.
I contribute to the literature on repurchase motivations and timing by drawing a
causal link between CEO equity sales and repurchases. A previously undocumented
motivation to repurchase shares is for the personal benefit of the CEO. I also con-
tribute to the growing literature on real outcome of CEO contracts by showing that
vesting schedules of equity grants have a real effect on share repurchases.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics on the main variables used in this study. The
sample period is from 2007 and 2013. Monthly repurchase data is hand collected
from 10-Qs and 10-Ks. The grant level data on vesting equity is from ISS Incentive
Lab which is collected from firm Proxy statements. Insider sales are taken from
Thomson Reuters Insider Trading filings, which pulls from SEC Form 4. Firm and
stock characteristics are taken from Compustat and CRSP respectively. All variable
are defined in Appendix B continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. Our sample consists of 41,692 firm-year observations and 763 distinct
firms over the sample period.
5th Percentile Mean Median 95th Percentile Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
Repurchases:
Repurchase Dummy 0 0.278 0 1.000 0.448 0.989 1.979
Repurchases 0 0.167 0 1.034 0.420 3.369 15.055
CEO Incentives (Binary):
Vest Month Dummy 0 0.211 0 1 0.408 1.414 3.000
Vest Month Dummy Stock 0 0.089 0 1 0.284 2.896 9.390
Vest Month Dummy Option 0 0.148 0 1 0.355 1.983 4.934
Sales Dummy 0 0.096 0 1 0.294 2.747 8.545
CEO Incentives ($Millions):
Vesting Value 0 0.383 0.000 1.820 2.135 15 399
Vesting Value Stock 0 0.124 0.000 0.451 1.116 44 3186
Vesting Value Option 0 0.260 0.000 0.905 1.711 15 363
Sales 0 0.493 0.000 1.894 4.274 60 6855
Controls:
Unvested ($Millions) 0.4 29.7 13.4 101.0 73.7 16 453
Vested ($Millions) 2.7 115.0 33.9 335.0 517.0 17 378
Return -0.176 0.011 0.012 0.193 0.111 0.081 4.315
Log(Illiquidity) -24.36 -21.90 -21.97 -19.12 1.59 0.559 3.975
Market Capitilization 6 8 8 11 1 0.17 3.32
Cash 0.008 0.144 0.096 0.449 0.144 2 6
Cash Flow 0.002 0.037 0.036 0.082 0.027 -0.128 7.190
Cash Flow Volatility 0.003 0.013 0.008 0.037 0.014 3.385 17.602
Leverage 0.000 0.256 0.233 0.609 0.191 1.033 4.619
Book-to-Market 0.017 0.434 0.388 1.072 0.376 -0.168 7.455
Dilution 0.000 0.020 0.011 0.071 0.033 3.996 20.999
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Table 2.2: Repurchases and Equity Sales
This table models the decision to repurchase. I report results from linear probability
regressions in Columns (1)-(2) where the dependent variable takes a value of one if
the repurchased in that given month and zero otherwise. In Columns (3)-(4), I report
results from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the number of shares
repurchased scaled by shares outstanding. All variables are defined in Appendix
B continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Quarterly
variables are held constant across the three months of the quarter. Firm, year, and
calendar month fixed effects are included in all specifications. t-statistics are reported
in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, *
represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Repurchase Dummy Repurchasesm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sales Dummym 0.020*** 0.030***
(2.674) (3.550)














Cash Flowq−1 -0.278*** -0.278***
(-4.450) (-5.046)








Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 69,846 41,692 69,846 41,692
R-squared 0.032 0.052 0.023 0.036
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Table 2.3: Does Vesting Predict Equity Sales?
This table models the decision to sell equity. I report results from linear probability
regressions in Columns (1)-(4) where the dependent variable takes a value of one if
the CEO sold equity in that given month and zero otherwise. In Columns (5)-(8) I
report results from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the natural log
of the value of equity sold in a given month. Columns (2) and (6) shows the results
for only vesting stock, Columns (3) and (7) shows option vesting only and Columns
(1), (4), (5), and (6) is for all vesting, stock and options. All variables are defined
in Appendix B continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Quarterly variables are held constant across the three months of the quarter. Firm,
year, and calendar month fixed effects are included in all specifications. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.
***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Vest month dummym 0.028*** 0.056*** 0.032*** 0.038***
(5.297) (6.988) (4.552) (6.424)
Vesting valuem 0.046*** 0.056*** 0.042*** 0.046***
(8.185) (6.837) (5.312) (7.367)
Unvestedm−1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.009 0.009
(0.806) (0.799) (0.740) (0.798) (0.698) (0.691)
Vestedm−1 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.205*** 0.196*** 0.203***
(4.117) (3.937) (4.036) (4.370) (4.187) (4.298)
Return m−1 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.164*** 2.478*** 2.440*** 2.447***
(12.334) (12.292) (12.340) (12.893) (12.677) (12.751)
Log(Illiquidity)m−1 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.045 0.057 0.054
(0.491) (0.529) (0.488) (0.739) (0.934) (0.894)
Log(Market Capitilization)q−1 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.705*** 0.706*** 0.704***
(4.946) (5.009) (4.968) (5.375) (5.385) (5.356)
Cashq−1 0.091* 0.095* 0.094* 1.184* 1.212* 1.177*
(1.717) (1.782) (1.757) (1.677) (1.709) (1.665)
Cash Flowq−1 0.261** 0.249* 0.252* 3.857** 3.721** 3.750**
(1.997) (1.897) (1.921) (2.060) (1.992) (2.011)
Cash Flow Volatilityq−1 -0.153 -0.170 -0.162 -1.179 -1.162 -1.086
(-0.516) (-0.566) (-0.538) (-0.283) (-0.279) (-0.261)
Leverageq−1 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.059 -0.007 -0.025
(-0.154) (-0.097) (-0.100) (-0.122) (-0.014) (-0.051)
Book-to-Marketq−1 -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.335*** -0.323*** -0.329***
(-2.805) (-2.713) (-2.700) (-2.837) (-2.724) (-2.785)
Dilutionq−1 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.556 0.526 0.517
(0.089) (0.108) (0.070) (0.430) (0.404) (0.397)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 69,846 41,692 41,692 41,692 69,846 41,692 41,692 41,692
R-squared 0.010 0.025 0.023 0.024 0.011 0.025 0.024 0.025
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Table 2.4: Does Vesting Predict Repurchases?
This table models the decision to repurchase shares. I report results from linear prob-
ability regressions in Columns (1)-(4) where the dependent variable takes a value of
one if the firm repurchased shares in that given month and zero otherwise. In Columns
(5)-(8) I report results from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the
number of shares repurchased scaled by shares outstanding. All variables are defined
in Appendix B continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Quarterly variables are held constant across the three months of the quarter. Firm,
year, and calendar month fixed effects are included in all specifications. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.
***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Vest month dummym 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.014** 0.018***
(3.033) (3.419) (2.009) (2.932)
Vesting valuem 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(3.807) (3.048) (3.366) (4.011)
Unvestedm−1 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.467) (1.466) (1.455) (0.030) (0.001) (0.002)
Vestedm−1 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.007 0.006 0.007
(1.817) (1.787) (1.815) (1.083) (1.039) (1.087)
Returnm−1 -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.201*** -0.204*** -0.203***
(-5.151) (-5.149) (-5.137) (-10.005) (-10.097) (-10.063)
Log(Illiquidity)m−1 -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.049***
(-2.944) (-2.936) (-2.946) (-6.554) (-6.481) (-6.508)
Log(Market Capitilization)q−1 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049***
(0.103) (0.121) (0.113) (-3.562) (-3.576) (-3.576)
Cashq−1 0.132** 0.134** 0.133** 0.111* 0.111* 0.110*
(2.034) (2.052) (2.042) (1.878) (1.870) (1.852)
Cash Flowq−1 0.465** 0.460** 0.461** 0.297 0.292 0.293
(2.486) (2.456) (2.464) (1.610) (1.577) (1.586)
Cash Flow Volatilityq−1 -1.009** -1.016** -1.013** -0.661 -0.660 -0.656
(-1.974) (-1.989) (-1.983) (-1.434) (-1.431) (-1.422)
Leverageq−1 -0.279*** -0.278*** -0.278*** -0.278*** -0.276*** -0.277***
(-4.468) (-4.442) (-4.444) (-5.056) (-4.972) (-5.000)
Book-to-Marketq−1 -0.037** -0.037** -0.037** -0.013 -0.012 -0.012
(-2.537) (-2.521) (-2.520) (-0.795) (-0.766) (-0.785)
Dilutionq−1 -0.326*** -0.325*** -0.327*** -0.080 -0.082 -0.082
(-2.592) (-2.588) (-2.601) (-0.712) (-0.730) (-0.730)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 69,846 41,692 41,692 41,692 69,846 41,692 41,692 41,692
R-squared 0.032 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.023 0.036 0.036 0.036
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Table 2.5: Equity Sales and Share Repurchases: Instrumental Variable Analysis
This table models the decision to repurchase shares. I report results from two-stage
least squared regression where the dependent variable takes a value of one if the firm
repurchased shares in that given month and zero otherwise in Columns (1)-(4) and
the number of shares repurchased scaled by shares outstanding in Columns (5)-(8).
Fitted equity sold dummy is from a first stage of Sales Dummy on Vesting month
(instrument) dummy and controls. Fitted equity is the fitted value from a first stage
regression of Ln(1 + Sales) on Vesting value (instrument) and controls. All variables
are defined in Appendix B continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. Quarterly variables are held constant across the three months of the
quarter. Firm, year, and calendar month fixed effects are included in all specifica-
tions. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors
clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively.










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fitted Equity Sold Dummym 0.553*** 0.401*** 0.456* 0.470***
(2.664) (3.060) (1.818) (2.625)
Fitted Equitym 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.054*** 0.045***
(3.354) (2.834) (2.769) (3.434)
Unvestedm−1 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(1.343) (1.326) (1.321) (-0.141) (-0.248) (-0.208)
Vestedm−1 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.004 -0.003
(0.907) (0.739) (0.731) (0.032) (-0.566) (-0.369)
Returnm−1 -0.151*** -0.160*** -0.162*** -0.278*** -0.336*** -0.313***
(-5.474) (-3.640) (-4.729) (-7.794) (-6.255) (-7.851)
Log(Illiquidity)m−1 -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.052***
(-3.023) (-3.010) (-3.019) (-6.540) (-6.319) (-6.440)
Log(Market Capitilization)q−1 -0.017 -0.019 -0.020 -0.070*** -0.087*** -0.080***
(-1.008) (-0.958) (-1.106) (-4.234) (-3.944) (-4.376)
Cashq−1 0.096 0.090 0.089 0.074 0.045 0.057
(1.353) (1.195) (1.215) (1.141) (0.598) (0.811)
Cash Flowq−1 0.360* 0.346* 0.343 0.178 0.090 0.124
(1.790) (1.650) (1.644) (0.875) (0.402) (0.588)
Cash Flow Volatilityq−1 -0.947* -0.939* -0.937* -0.624 -0.597 -0.607
(-1.835) (-1.794) (-1.790) (-1.326) (-1.188) (-1.246)
Leverageq−1 -0.277*** -0.276*** -0.276*** -0.276*** -0.275*** -0.276***
(-4.218) (-4.175) (-4.163) (-4.689) (-4.300) (-4.459)
Book-to-Marketq−1 -0.028* -0.027 -0.026* -0.002 0.005 0.002
(-1.809) (-1.642) (-1.682) (-0.131) (0.299) (0.142)
Dilutionq−1 -0.329** -0.330** -0.330** -0.097 -0.110 -0.105
(-2.515) (-2.493) (-2.487) (-0.777) (-0.778) (-0.782)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 69,830 41,692 41,692 41,692 69,830 41,692 41,692 41,692
R-squared 0.012 0.035 0.029 0.028 0.003 0.010 0.004 0.005
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Table 2.6: Equity Sales and Share Repurchases: Instrumental Variable Analysis
This table models the decision to repurchase shares. I report results from two-stage
least squared regression where the dependent variable takes a value of one if the firm
repurchased shares in that given month and zero otherwise in Columns (1)-(4) and
the number of shares repurchased scaled by shares outstanding in Columns (5)-(8).
Fitted equity sold dummy is from a first stage of Sales Dummy on Vesting month
(instrument) dummy and controls. Fitted equity is the fitted value from a first stage
regression of Ln(1 + Sales) on Vesting value (instrument) and controls. All variables
are defined in Appendix B continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. Quarterly variables are held constant across the three months of the
quarter. Firm, year, and calendar month fixed effects are included in all specifica-
tions. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors
clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively.














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fitted Equity Sold Dummym 0.914** 0.662** 0.603 0.740**
(2.245) (2.550) (1.343) (2.237)
Fitted Equitym 0.054*** 0.054** 0.087*** 0.077***
(2.830) (2.522) (2.606) (3.118)
Unvestedm−1 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.680) (0.707) (0.646) (-0.768) (-0.907) (-0.877)
Vestedm−1 0.008 0.009 0.007 -0.003 -0.010 -0.007
(0.833) (0.833) (0.686) (-0.237) (-0.746) (-0.641)
Returnm−1 -0.245*** -0.235*** -0.260*** -0.447*** -0.540*** -0.512***
(-4.488) (-2.746) (-3.867) (-6.430) (-5.407) (-6.597)
Log(Illiquidity)m−1 -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.067***
(-2.774) (-2.803) (-2.723) (-6.074) (-5.439) (-5.642)
Log(Market Capitilization)q−1 -0.009 -0.006 -0.013 -0.078*** -0.103*** -0.095***
(-0.315) (-0.178) (-0.413) (-2.667) (-2.683) (-2.890)
Cashq−1 0.093 0.101 0.081 0.071 0.009 0.028
(0.765) (0.756) (0.629) (0.618) (0.064) (0.218)
Cash Flowq−1 0.279 0.293 0.260 0.001 -0.112 -0.078
(0.864) (0.880) (0.770) (0.002) (-0.302) (-0.219)
Cash Flow Volatilityq−1 -1.807* -1.798* -1.819* -1.248 -1.369 -1.332
(-1.828) (-1.841) (-1.829) (-1.329) (-1.332) (-1.339)
Leverageq−1 -0.347*** -0.348*** -0.346*** -0.386*** -0.380*** -0.382***
(-3.075) (-3.106) (-3.027) (-3.751) (-3.298) (-3.438)
Book-to-Marketq−1 -0.020 -0.022 -0.019 0.032 0.043 0.040
(-0.619) (-0.652) (-0.559) (0.860) (1.055) (1.010)
Dilutionq−1 -0.492** -0.489** -0.496** -0.175 -0.219 -0.205
(-2.066) (-2.087) (-2.045) (-0.732) (-0.757) (-0.755)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 44,264 29,099 29,099 29,099 44,264 29,099 29,099 29,099
R-squared 0.007 0.038 0.044 0.032 0.005 0.011 0.004 0.005
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Table 2.7: Dynamic Analysis
This table models the decision to repurchase shares using lagged equity vesting and equity sales. I report results from linear
probability regressions where dependent variable, repurchase dummy, takes a value of one if the firm repurchased shares in that
given month and zero otherwise. I also report results from panel regressions where the dependent variable, repurchases, is the
number of shares repurchased scaled by shares outstanding. Fitted values are from a first stage regression where the instrument
is vesting month and vesting value, respectively. Panel A looks at one to three month lags of vesting variables and Panel B
looks at one to three months ex-post. All variables are defined in Appendix B continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentiles. Quarterly variables are held constant across the three months of the quarter. Firm, year, and calendar
month fixed effects are included in all specifications. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard
errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Panel A: Lagged Equity Vesting and Share repurchases
Vesting Month: m-1 m-1 m-1 m-1 m-2 m-2 m-2 m-2
Dependent variable: Rep. Dummym Rep. Dummym Repurchasesm Repurchasesm Rep. Dummym Rep. Dummym Repurchasesm Repurchasesm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Vest month dummy 0.008 -0.007
(1.405) (-1.221)
Fitted Equity Sold Dummy 0.227 -0.196
(1.337) (-1.215)
Vesting value 0.000 -0.000
(0.409) (-0.708)
Fitted Equity 0.004 -0.007
(0.406) (-0.707)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year, Month, and Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41,311 41,311 41,311 41,311 40,915 40,911 40,915 40,911
R-squared 0.052 0.029 0.036 0.035 0.052 0.027 0.037 0.033
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Table 2.7: Dynamic Analysis, continued
Panel B: Forward Looking Equity Vesting and Share Repurchases
Vesting Month: m+1 m+1 m+1 m+1 m+2 m+2 m+2 m+2
Dependent variable: Rep. Dummym Rep. Dummym Repurchasesm Repurchasesm Rep. Dummym Rep. Dummym Repurchasesm Repurchasesm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Vest month dummy -0.013** -0.004
(-2.216) (-0.669)
Fitted Equity Sold Dummy -0.339** -0.100
(-2.123) (-0.667)
Vesting value -0.001* 0.000
(-1.719) (0.965)
Fitted Equity -0.017* 0.010
(-1.678) (0.960)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year, Month, and Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41,100 41,100 41,100 41,100 40,504 40,502 40,504 40,502
R-squared 0.051 0.057 0.036 0.011 0.051 0.044 0.036 0.027
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Table 2.8: Equity Vesting: Restricted sample
This table reports OLS regression and a 2SLS regression similar to Table 2.4 and 2.5. I restrict the sample of vesting months
to option grant vesting where no options are simultaneously exercised. In Columns 5-8 I further restrict the sample to months
where there was also no exercising of options in the prior month. All variables are defined in Appendix B continuous variables
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Quarterly variables are held constant across the three months of the quarter.
Firm, year, and calender month fixed effects are included in all specifications. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are
based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Rep. Dummym Repurchasesm Rep. Dummym Repurchasesm Rep. Dummym Repurchasesm Rep. Dummym Repurchasesm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Vest month dummym 0.014* 0.018**
(1.819) (2.306)
Vesting valuem 0.002*** 0.002***
(3.157) (3.356)
Fitted Equity Sold Dummym 0.519* 0.689**
(1.733) (2.150)
Fitted Equitym 0.073*** 0.083***
(2.720) (2.906)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year, Month, and Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38,386 38,386 38,386 38,386 36,220 36,220 36,220 36,220
R-squared 0.053 0.037 0.048 0.006 0.053 0.038 0.037 0.005
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Table 2.9: Robustness: Split Sample
This table reports results from 2SLS regressions where the dependent variable , re-
purchase dummy, takes a value of one if the firm repurchased shares in that given
month and zero otherwise. I also report results where the dependent variable, re-
purchases, is the number of shares repurchased scaled by shares outstanding. Fitted
values are from a first stage regression where the instrument is vesting month and
vesting value, respectively. Subsample splits based on the sample median. All vari-
ables are defined in Appendix B continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles. Control variables from Table 2.5 are included in all specifications
and quarterly variables are held constant across the three months of the quarter.
Firm, year, and calendar month fixed effects are included in all specifications. I re-
port the p-values of a chi-squared test comparing the coefficient of fitted equity across
subsamples. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard
errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
levels, respectively.
Firm Governance and CEO
Dependent variable: Rep. Dummym Repurchasesm Rep. Dummym Repurchasesm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cash Institutional Ownership
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Fitted Equity Sold Dummy 0.211 0.846** 0.368** 0.573*
(1.301) (2.241) (2.079) (1.678)
Fitted Equity 0.025* 0.059*** 0.043*** 0.049**
(1.758) (2.714) (2.757) (2.336)
p-value of the χ2 test 0.051* 0.122 0.535 0.880
Observations 20,846 20,844 20,846 20,844 19,210 19,213 19,210 19,213
Market-to-Book Age
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Fitted Equity Sold Dummy 0.629*** 0.355 0.631** 0.316
(2.649) (1.511) (2.252) (1.421)
Fitted Equity 0.054*** 0.041** 0.049** 0.045**
(3.136) (2.129) (2.543) (2.375)
p-value of the χ2 test 0.344 0.541 0.328 0.869
Observations 20,846 20,842 20,846 20,842 20,164 17,290 20,164 17,290
Cash Flow Tenure
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Fitted Equity Sold Dummy 0.456** 0.469** 0.501** 0.550*
(1.987) (2.161) (2.151) (1.676)
Fitted Equity 0.037** 0.053*** 0.039** 0.067***
(2.164) (2.858) (2.432) (2.612)
p-value of the χ2 test 0.959 0.458 0.886 0.229
Observations 20,848 20,844 20,848 20,844 18,330 17,907 18,330 17,907
Cash Flow Volatility Chairman
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Fitted Equity Sold Dummy 0.161 0.985** 0.499** 0.338
(0.887) (2.276) (2.068) (1.396)
0.031** 0.055** 0.028* 0.067***
(2.111) (2.494) (1.951) (2.791)
p-value of the χ2 test 0.019** 0.281 0.599 0.089*
Observations 20,845 20,846 20,845 20,846 21,168 20,522 21,168 20,522
Illiquidity Wealth Performance Sensitivity
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Fitted Equity Sold Dummy 0.427** 0.469* 0.459* 0.395*
(2.214) (1.672) (1.789) (1.738)
Fitted Equity 0.060*** 0.028* 0.033* 0.065***
(3.244) (1.717) (1.831) (3.167)
p-value of the χ2 test 0.887 0.111 0.829 0.158
Observations 20,813 20,825 20,813 20,825 18,893 18,874 18,893 18,874
Controls (all panels) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year, calendar month, and firm FE (all panels) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.10: Abnormal Return Analysis
In this table, I report abnormal returns for the period m+1 and Quarter + 1 (m+1 to m+3 ), for firms that either repurchased
shares, had CEO equity sales, and CEO experienced equity vesting of grants, or for firms that did not experience these events.
Monthly returns are adjusted using the matched Fama-French 25 size and book-to-market portfolios or DGTW portfolio returns.








where ri,t is the return on stock i in month t and rp,t is the return on either the matched Fama-French 25 size and book-
to-market portfolio or DGTW portfolio returns. All returns are calculated using equal weights. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Repurchases=1 Repurchases=0









Sale=1 (2)-(1) (4)-(3) (2)-(5) (4)-(6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monthly Size and Book-to-Market Adjusted 0.199*** 0.008 0.457*** -0.015 0.427*** 0.762*** -0.191 -0.472 -0.419* -0.778*
(3.263) (0.052) (3.148) (-0.051) (3.17) (3.202) (-1.060) (-1.397) (-1.792) (-1.852)
Monthly DGTW adjusted 0.274*** 0.177 0.546*** 0.223 0.485*** 0.869*** -0.097 -0.323 -0.307 -0.646
(4.530) (1.106) (3.752) (0.734) (3.634) (3.589) (-0.544) (-0.955) (-1.336) (-1.525)
Quarterly Size and Book-to-Market Adjusted 0.716*** 0.403 1.281*** 0.880 0.940*** 1.272*** -0.313 -0.401 -0.537 -0.392
(6.512) (1.309) (4.827) (1.444) (3.638) (2.748) (-0.956) (-0.636) (-1.197) (-0.476)
Quarterly DGTW adjusted 0.948*** 0.831*** 1.435*** 1.441** 1.134*** 1.697*** -0.117 0.006 -0.303 -0.255
(8.649) (2.699) (5.347) (2.364) (4.454) (3.643) (-0.360) (0.010) (-0.688) (-0.310)
Copyright c© David Moore, 2018.
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions for Chapter 1
This appendix defines variables used in our empirical analysis. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentile.
Variable name Description Hypothesis
8-K reporting frequency The total number of 8-Ks filed by the company in the 6 month
period following the repurchase announcement.
Blackout window
Blackout window The minimum number of days over the past 12 quarters during
which the firm was likely to observe a blackout window, calculated
as the sum of the days elapsed between each quarter end and the
release of earnings for that quarter.
Blackout window
Book-to-market Total common equity over market capitalization. Abandonment option
Cash Cash and short-term securities scaled by assets. Abandonment option
Cash flow Operating income before depreciation scaled by assets. Abandonment option
Dilution The difference in the number of common shares used to calculate
diluted earnings per share (diluted shares) and the number of com-
mon shares outstanding used to calculate basic earnings per share
(basic shares), divided by the number of basic shares.
Control
Dividend payer An indicator variable equal to 1 if total dividends if the firm paid
a dividend during the prior fiscal year.
Abandonment option
Dividend premium The difference in the logs of average market-to-book ratios of
dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying stocks, following Baker
and Wurgler (2004).
Control
EPS bonus dummy From Cheng, Harford and Zhang (2015): An indicator variable
equal to one if the CEO’s bonus is tied to earnings per share. Data
span through 2009.
Control




Financial sophistication An indicator dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a non-
missing value for gain/loss on ineffective hedges (HEDGEGL) found
in Compustat and zero otherwise.
Timing
Institutional ownership Shares held by institutions (from Thomson Reuters 13F filings
database) as a percentage of shares outstanding, measured at the
end of the calendar quarter prior to the announcement.
Control
Leverage The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities scaled by
total assets.
Abandonment option
Litigation risk Using the model to predict litigation risk from Kim and Skinner
(2012) we create a probability of facing a class action lawsuit for
each firm from the predicted values of the logit model found in
Table IA2 of the Internet Appendix.
Litigation
Ln(Age) The natural log of the age of the firm, measured as number of years
since the firm’s IPO year.
Timing
Ln(illiquidity) The natural log of the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity: the
ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on
that day. We average daily illiquidity for each firm over the period
starting 255 trading days prior to the repurchase announcement
and ending 46 trading days prior to the announcement.
Abandonment option
Ln(Market Cap) The natural log of the firm’s market capitalization. Timing
Market returns 12-month buy-and-hold returns on the value-weighted CRSP index. Control
No active repurchase
program
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm did not announce a
repurchase program from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2000,
and zero otherwise. Require the firm to exist in the year 2000.
Payout at 10b5-1 enactment
No dividend An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm did not pay a dividend
from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2000, and zero otherwise.
Require the firm to exist in the year 2000.
Payout at 10b5-1 enactment
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No payout An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm did not announce a
repurchase program or pay dividend from January 1, 1998 to De-
cember 31, 2000, and zero otherwise. Require the firm to exist in
the year 2000.
Payout at 10b5-1 enactment
Options The sum of all executive unexercised exercisable options and all





The percentage of shares outstanding sought in the share repur-
chase.
Control
Prior stock performance The cumulative abnormal return starting 46 trading days prior to
the announcement and ending 6 days prior to the announcement.
Abandonment option
Repurchase frequency The portion of the prior 12 quarters during which the firm repur-
chased any stock.
Control
Repurchase timing The percentage difference in repurchase volume-weighted stock
price and volume-weighted stock price. The repurchase volume-
weighted price is the sum of quarterly shares repurchased times the
average quarterly repurchase price per share, divided by the total
number of shares repurchased. Volume-weighted price is the trad-
ing volume weighted average daily closing price over the prior fiscal
year. Positive values are associated with poor repurchase timing




The standard deviation of quarterly operating income before depre-







The standard deviation of seasonally adjusted cash flow calculated
over the 12 quarters preceding the repurchase announcement. Sea-
sonally adjusted cash flow is defined as quarterly operating income
before depreciation scaled by assets minus Fama-French 49 indus-





The standard deviation of quarterly repurchases over the previous
12 quarters. Repurchases are calculated as the number of shares




The standard deviation of daily stock returns over the period from
255 to 46 trading days prior to the repurchase announcement. We
require a minimum of 100 trading days.
Abandonment option
Trend A count variable equal to 1 for observations in 2004, 2 for observa-
tions in 2005, etc.
Control
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions for Chapter 2
This appendix defines variables used in my empirical analysis for Chapter 2 of this paper. All continuous variables are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentile.
Variable name Description
Repurchase Dummy An indicator variable equal to one if the firm repurchased any shares in a given
month and zero otherwise.
Repurchases Shares repurchased as a percentage of shares outstanding. Calculated as the number
of shares repurchased under a publically announced program in given month divided
by prior month-end shares outstanding.
Vest Month Dummy An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO has any grants vesting in a given
month and zero otherwise.
Vesting Value The dollar change in the value of all CEO option and stock grants vesting in a given
month for a 100% change in the stock price. Calculated as the aggregate delta of
vesting equity in a given month multiplied by the prior month end stock price.
Vest Month Dummy Stock An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO has any option grants vesting in a
given month and zero otherwise.
Vesting Value Stock The dollar change in the value of all CEO stock grants vesting in a given month for
a 100% change in the stock price. Calculated as the number of vesting shares in a
given month multiplied by the prior month end stock price.
Vest Month Dummy Option An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO has any stock grants vesting in a
given month and zero otherwise.
Vesting Value Option The dollar change in the value of all CEO option grants vesting in a given month
for a 100% change in the stock price. Calculated as the aggregate delta of vesting
options in a given month multiplied by the prior month end stock price.
Sales Dummy An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO sold any equity in the firm in a given
month and zero otherwise.
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Ln(1 + Sales) The natural log of 1 + the value of shares sold calculated as the number of shares
sold multiplied by the prior month end stock price.
Unvested The dollar change in the value of all unvested equity held by the CEO for a 100%
change in the stock price. Calculated as the sum of aggragate delta of unvested
options and the number of unvested shares in a given month multiplied by the prior
month end stock price.
Vested The dollar change in the value of all vested equity held by the CEO for a 100% change
in the stock price. Calculated as the sum of aggragate delta of vested options and
the number of vested shares held in a given month multiplied by the prior month
end stock price.
Return One-month past return
Log(Illiquidity) The natural log of the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity: the ratio of the daily
absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that day. We average daily illiquidity
for each firm over the prior month.
Market Capitilization The natural log of the firm’s market capitalization.
Cash Cash and short-term securities scaled by assets.
Cash Flow Operating income before depreciation scaled by assets.
Cash Flow Volatility The standard deviation of quarterly operating income before depreciation scaled by
assets calculated over the prior 12 quarters.
Leverage The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities scaled by total assets.
Book-to-Market Total common equity over market capitalization.
Dilution The difference in the number of common shares used to calculate diluted earnings
per share (diluted shares) and the number of common shares outstanding used to
calculate basic earnings per share (basic shares), divided by the number of basic
shares. Measured quarterly
Institutional Ownership The number of shares held by institutions as a percentage of shares outstanding.
Measured quarterly
Age The age of the CEO.
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Tenure The number of months the Current CEO has been CEO at the current firm.
Chairman Equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board, zero otherwise.
Wealth Performance Sensitivity The dollar change in CEO wealth for a 100 percentage point change in firm value,
divided by annual flow compensation. See Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) for




In this Internet Appendix, we present examples of preset repurchase announcements
in Section I. We present plan details for pure Rule 10b5-1 plans in Section II. Section
III shows models for litigation risk and propensity score matching, and Section IV
shows full summary statistics and univariate tests for firms announcing preset repur-
chases, open market repurchases, and all other firms. Section V provides additional
results on repurchase timing in preset plans. Section VI shows that our main results
are robust to alternative specifications and offer several additional results. Section
VII presents similar results on accelerated share repurchases.
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I. Examples of preset repurchase announcements
Pure: Announcement to conduct the entire repurchase program under a preset plan.
Excerpt from March 1, 2007 Business Wire article “Clifton Savings Bancorp, Inc.
Announces Fourth Stock Repurchase Plan”
Clifton Savings Bancorp, Inc. (NASDAQ:CSBK) announced today that
the Company’s board of directors has approved the repurchase for up to
615,000 shares, or approximately 5% of the Company’s outstanding com-
mon stock held by persons other than Clifton MHC. These repurchases
will be conducted solely through a Rule 10b5-1 repurchase plan
with Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Inc., based upon parameters of
the Rule 10b5-1 repurchase plan. Repurchased shares will be held
in treasury. The Rule 10b5-1 repurchase plan allows the Company to re-
purchase its shares during periods when it would normally not be active
in the market due to its internal trading blackout period.
Partial: Announcements that definitely contain a preset component.
Excerpt from February 25, 2010 Canada Stockwatch article “THI Tim Hortons to
buy back $200-million worth of shares”
Tim Hortons Inc.’s board has approved a new 12-month, $200-million
share repurchase program to commence in March, 2010, subject to re-
ceipt of final regulatory approval. The company’s common shares will
be purchased under the program through a combination of a 10b5-1
automatic trading plan as well as at management’s discretion
in compliance with regulatory requirements, and given market, cost and
other considerations.
Expected: Announcements that “expect to/intend to” have a preset component.
Excerpt from March 2, 2012 US Fed News article “Lattice Semiconductor files current
report”
Lattice Semiconductor Corporation (the “Company”) issued a press re-
lease announcing that its Board of Directors has authorized a share re-
purchase program of up to $20.0 million of the Company’s common stock
over the next 12 months. In connection with the new stock repur-
chase program, the Company intends to enter into a 10b5-1 plan,
which will allow for repurchases of up to $20.0 million. How much com-
mon stock, if any, will be repurchased will depend on market conditions,
including the price of the common stock.
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Boilerplate: Announcements that “may” have a preset component.
Excerpt from October 1, 2012 Theflyonthewall.com article “TRW Automotive an-
nounces $1B share repurchase program”
TRW Automotive announced that its board has authorized a $1B share
repurchase program. The repurchase program, which will commence in
the fourth quarter of this year, is expected to be executed over two years.
In implementing the program, the company may utilize a variety
of methods, which may include negotiated block transactions,
accelerated share repurchase transactions or open market pur-
chases, some of which may be effected through Rule 10b5-1
plans, or by any combination of the foregoing.
Preset repurchase mentions in other announcements
Excerpt from August 1, 2005 Business Wire article “Post Properties Announces Sec-
ond Quarter 2005 Earnings”
From April 1, 2005 through August 1, 2005, the Company repurchased
412,600 shares of its common stock totaling approximately $13.6
million under 10b5-1 stock purchase plans, the most recent of which
will expire on August 31, 2005. These shares were repurchased at an
average price of $32.95 per share. Year-to-date through August 1, 2005,
the Company has repurchased 698,400 shares of its common
stock totaling approximately $22.6 million under 10b5-1 stock
purchase plans at an average price of $32.42 per share.
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II. Pure Rule 10b5-1 plan details
Table IA1: Pure Rule 10b5-1 plan details
This table presents summary statistics on pure Rule 10b5-1 plan details, which are
only available for the subset of non-boilerplate announcements that include such
details. “Pure” preset plans represent repurchase programs executed fully under
Rule 10b5-1. We report the size of the preset repurchase as a percentage of shares
outstanding, in millions of dollars, or as a percentage of the total repurchase plan.
Time to commencement is the number of days between the repurchase announcement
and the start of the preset plan. Plan duration is the number of days during which
the Rule 10b5-1 plan is effective.
N Mean 10th percentile Median 90th percentile Std. Dev.
% shares outstanding 163 6.51 1.15 4.52 11.81 10.36
$ millions 213 56.33 1.76 10.60 140.42 137.43
% total repurchase 323 100 100 100 100 0
Time to commencement (in days) 57 14.68 0 5 40 19.43
Plan duration (in days) 93 217.55 53 184 366 146.16
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III. Litigation risk and propensity score matching models
Table IA2: Model for litigation risk
This table reports results from a logit regression predicting litigation risk for all
Compustat firms with non-missing data for the period 1996-2014. The depen-
dent variable is set equal to one if the firm faced a class action lawsuit according
to the filings listed on Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse
(http://securities.stanford.edu) during the year and zero otherwise. Following Kim
and Skinner (2012) we exclude fillings related to IPOs, hedge funds, mutual funds,
and analysts. High litigation industry and standard deviation of returns are as de-
fined in Appendix A. Ln (assets) is the natural log of assets at the end of year t - 1.
Sales growth is year t -1 sales minus year t t - 2 sales scaled by total assets at the
beginning of year t - 1. Return is the market adjusted value-weighted 12-month stock
return for the year t - 1. Return skewness is the skewness of the firm’s 12-month re-
turn for year t -1. Turnover is trading volume accumulated over the 12-month period
ending with the t -1 fiscal year-end before lawsuit scaled by beginning of year t - 1
shares outstanding. All return measures and turnover require at least 200 trading
days. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors.
***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.



















Table IA3: Logit regressions for propensity score matching
This table reports results from logit regressions where the dependent variable takes a
value of zero for open market repurchases in all specifications and a value of one for
the specified group of Rule 10b5-1 announcers. Panel A includes the full sample of
repurchase announcements. Panel B corresponds to the subsample of repurchase not
announced contemporaneously with earnings. Independent variables are as defined in
Appendix B. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Industry controls are
based on Fama and French (1997) (1997) 12 industry classifications and are included
in all specifications. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on robust
standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.10 levels, respectively.
IV. Summary statistics
V. Repurchase timing
VI. Alternative specifications of main results and additional results
81
Panel A: Completion rate propensity score matching
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expected, Partial,
All Rule 10b5-1 & Pure Partial & Pure Pure
Percent shares outstanding sought -0.015** -0.028** -0.020 -0.107***
(-2.190) (-2.429) (-1.379) (-3.522)
Cash 1.288*** 1.490*** 1.700*** 2.846***
(4.597) (3.757) (3.327) (3.968)
Cash flow 3.867** -0.059 2.577 1.631
(2.205) (-0.024) (0.790) (0.365)
Standard deviation of cash flow -12.439*** -7.396 -9.698 -6.778
(-2.917) (-1.280) (-1.243) (-0.656)
Leverage -0.175 -0.545 -0.995 0.129
(-0.631) (-1.203) (-1.603) (0.158)
Dividend payer -0.428*** -0.137 -0.289 -0.088
(-4.255) (-0.898) (-1.468) (-0.319)
Book-to-market 0.656*** 0.437** 0.488* 1.005***
(4.405) (2.019) (1.819) (2.795)
Prior stock performance 0.198 0.255 0.027 -0.270
(0.635) (0.567) (0.048) (-0.353)
Standard deviation of returns 0.787 -2.817 -4.513 8.069
(0.137) (-0.347) (-0.437) (0.592)
Ln(illiquidity) -0.092* -0.143** -0.072 -0.056
(-1.813) (-1.992) (-0.820) (-0.463)
Financial sophistication 0.067 0.010 0.079 0.110
(0.668) (0.066) (0.389) (0.375)
Ln(Market Cap) -0.051 -0.276** -0.363** -0.517**
(-0.685) (-2.501) (-2.536) (-2.481)
Blackout window (days) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002
(4.413) (4.048) (3.356) (1.521)
Standard deviation of repurchases 0.032 0.055 -0.062 0.029
(0.725) (0.875) (-0.693) (0.248)
Repurchase frequency -0.229* 0.017 0.113 0.125
(-1.665) (0.081) (0.399) (0.302)
Institutional ownership -0.162 -0.362 0.548 1.288**
(-0.708) (-1.091) (1.262) (2.111)
Dilution 1.387 1.505 0.234 0.937
(1.351) (1.010) (0.115) (0.349)
Constant -4.915*** -5.792*** -5.729*** -17.510
(-5.702) (-4.859) (-3.531) (-0.037)
Observations 5,327 4,866 4,742 4,654
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.0732 0.0715 0.0927 0.148
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Panel B: Five-day cumulative abnormal return propensity score matching
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expected, Partial,
All Rule 10b5-1 & Pure Partial & Pure Pure
Percent shares outstanding sought -0.008 -0.029** -0.029* -0.100***
(-1.025) (-2.133) (-1.650) (-2.948)
Cash 1.256*** 1.330*** 1.404** 2.602***
(3.690) (2.836) (2.321) (3.170)
Cash flow 2.818 -0.149 1.998 2.335
(1.341) (-0.051) (0.535) (0.479)
Standard deviation of cash flow -12.505** -6.066 -8.330 -4.493
(-2.374) (-0.899) (-0.930) (-0.395)
Leverage -0.563* -0.677 -1.087 0.344
(-1.662) (-1.288) (-1.532) (0.387)
Dividend payer -0.324*** -0.102 -0.309 0.046
(-2.679) (-0.575) (-1.364) (0.154)
Book-to-market 0.726*** 0.497** 0.616** 1.061***
(4.102) (1.973) (2.009) (2.633)
Prior stock performance 0.159 0.300 0.037 -0.152
(0.438) (0.591) (0.059) (-0.179)
Standard deviation of returns 0.397 -1.301 0.749 5.028
(0.058) (-0.139) (0.064) (0.327)
Ln(illiquidity) -0.119** -0.216** -0.141 -0.071
(-1.963) (-2.535) (-1.373) (-0.532)
Financial sophistication 0.101 0.053 0.096 -0.081
(0.842) (0.287) (0.404) (-0.233)
Ln(Market Cap) -0.055 -0.378*** -0.462*** -0.488**
(-0.622) (-2.885) (-2.767) (-2.161)
Blackout window (days) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001
(4.116) (3.102) (2.475) (1.173)
Standard deviation of repurchases 0.057 0.165** 0.043 0.085
(1.066) (2.413) (0.427) (0.650)
Repurchase frequency -0.135 -0.073 -0.200 -0.001
(-0.813) (-0.290) (-0.600) (-0.002)
Institutional ownership -0.118 -0.191 0.884* 1.265*
(-0.432) (-0.497) (1.773) (1.871)
Dilution 0.515 0.606 0.224 1.486
(0.367) (0.324) (0.093) (0.511)
Constant -5.190*** -6.127*** -5.929*** -17.755
(-5.429) (-4.643) (-3.419) (-0.030)
Observations 3,506 3,190 3,101 3,038
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects No No No No
Pseudo R-squared 0.0814 0.0754 0.100 0.133
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Table IA4: Summary statistic of repurchasing firms
This table presents more detailed summary statistics on characteristics of firms that
announce Rule 10b5-1 repurchase plans (Panel A), firms that announce open mar-
ket repurchases (OMRs) without a Rule 10b5-1 or accelerated component (Panel B),
and all other non-repurchasing firms (Panel C) between 2004 and 2014. We collapse
our data to the firm-year level, implying that firms with at least one Rule 10b5-1
are considered Rule 10b5-1 firms in the year of the announcement. Each repurchase
announcement is matched to annual data from the prior fiscal year-end, unless other-
wise noted. Our sample generally consists of 1,014 Rule 10b5-1 firm-year observations
and 3,611 non-preset OMR firm-year observations but drops to 685 (608; 578; 368)
Rule 10b5-1 observations and 2,264 (1,827; 2,114; 2,129) non-preset OMR observa-
tions for our measure of repurchase timing (age; options; EPS bonus dummy). The
non-repurchasing firm sample generally consists of 25,342 firm-year observations and
drops to 13,258 (9,317; 15,606) for age (options; EPS bonus dummy). ***, **, *
represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, for difference in
means tests.
Panel A: Rule 10b5-1 firm-years
25th 75th
Mean Std. Dev. Min percentile Median percentile Max
Abandonment option hypothesis
Cash 0.206 0.197 0.002 0.052 0.139 0.302 0.807
Cash flow 0.035 0.027 -0.059 0.018 0.033 0.049 0.159
Standard deviation of cash flow 0.011 0.012 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.014 0.100
Leverage 0.157 0.172 0 0.002 0.109 0.240 0.832
Dividend payer 0.443 0.497 0 0 0 1 1
Book-to-market 0.574 0.369 -0.037 0.295 0.499 0.756 2.080
Prior stock performance -0.025 0.131 -0.496 -0.090 -0.016 0.053 0.315
Standard deviation of returns 0.024 0.010 0.009 0.017 0.023 0.029 0.061
Ln(illiquidity) -19.830 2.669 -24.870 -21.630 -20.240 -18.430 -10.970
Timing hypothesis
Financial sophistication 0.207 0.405 0 0 0 0 1
Ln(Market Cap) 7.165 1.769 2.420 6.011 7.145 8.272 11.680
Ln(Age) 2.370 0.574 0.693 3.258 1.946 2.485 2.833
Repurchase timing -0.014 0.098 -0.366 -0.0533 -0.0107 0.0285 0.273
Blackout window hypothesis
Blackout window (days) 392.763 108.681 167 315 387 455 805
8-K reporting frequency 6.772 3.333 1 5 6 8 19
Litigation risk hypothesis
Litigation risk 0.0249 0.0180 0.0042 0.013 0.020 0.031 0.111
Payout at 10b5-1 enactment
No active repurchase program 0.712 0.453 0 0 1 1 1
No dividend 0.645 0.479 0 0 1 1 1
No payout 0.495 0.500 0 0 0 1 1
Additional controls
Standard deviation of repurchases 0.876 1.060 0 0.034 0.563 1.266 5.187
Repurchase frequency 0.468 0.365 0 0.083 0.423 0.833 1
Institutional ownership 0.740 0.246 0.013 0.595 0.800 0.914 1.187
Dilution 0.025 0.037 0 0.006 0.014 0.028 0.306
EPS bonus dummy 0.220 0.415 0 0 0 0 1
Options 0.0242 0.0227 0 0.009 0.019 0.032 0.126
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Panel B: Open market repurchase (without preset component) firm-years
25th 75th
Mean Std. Dev. Min percentile Median percentile Max
Abandonment option hypothesis
Cash 0.170 *** 0.172 0.002 0.039 0.103 0.252 0.807
Cash flow 0.034 0.030 -0.059 0.013 0.031 0.048 0.173
Standard deviation of cash flow 0.012 0.014 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.015 0.119
Leverage 0.174 *** 0.171 0 0.027 0.142 0.255 0.832
Dividend payer 0.559 ** 0.497 0 0 1 1 1
Book-to-market 0.539 *** 0.354 -0.037 0.298 0.461 0.704 2.080
Prior stock performance -0.039 *** 0.134 -0.496 -0.106 -0.029 0.039 0.315
Standard deviation of returns 0.024 0.010 0.009 0.016 0.021 0.028 0.061
Ln(illiquidity) -19.470 *** 3.098 -24.870 -21.750 -19.990 -17.600 -10.970
Timing hypothesis
Financial sophistication 0.195 0.396 0 0 0 0 1
Ln(Market Cap) 7.088 1.962 2.420 5.664 7.094 8.412 11.680
Ln(Age) 2.372 0.513 0 2.079 2.485 2.773 3.258
Repurchase timing -0.021 * 0.096 -0.366 -0.056 -0.011 0.022 0.273
Blackout window hypothesis
Blackout window (days) 371.7 *** 120.2 167 285 351 439 805
8-K reporting frequency 6.493 ** 3.307 1 4 6 8 19
Litigation risk hypothesis
Litigation risk 0.024 0.017 0.004 0.012 0.019 0.030 0.111
Payout at 10b5-1 enactment
No active repurchase program 0.625 *** 0.484 0 0 1 1 1
No dividend 0.549 *** 0.498 0 0 1 1 1
No payout 0.400 *** 0.490 0 0 0 1 1
Additional controls
Standard deviation of repurchases 0.732 *** 0.943 0 0.007 0.434 1.031 5.187
Repurchase frequency 0.452 0.369 0 0.083 0.417 0.833 1
Institutional ownership 0.688 *** 0.278 0.013 0.527 0.764 0.889 1.187
Dilution 0.027 0.040 0 0.005 0.015 0.030 0.306
EPS bonus dummy 0.167 ** 0.373 0 0 0 0 1
Options 0.024 0.024 0 0.007 0.016 0.033 0.126
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Panel C: All other firms
25th 75th
Mean Std. Dev. Min percentile Median percentile Max
Abandonment option hypothesis
Cash 0.178 *** 0.208 0.000 0.031 0.094 0.249 0.990
Cash flow 0.016 *** 0.079 -5.140 0.005 0.023 0.040 0.276
Standard deviation of cash flow 0.022 ** 0.129 0.000 0.005 0.010 0.020 6.933
Leverage 0.205 *** 0.233 0.000 0.023 0.153 0.310 7.485
Dividend payer 0.457 0.498 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Book-to-market 0.652 *** 0.781 -9.001 0.304 0.529 0.840 5.358
Standard deviation of returns 0.031 *** 0.017 0.009 0.019 0.027 0.038 0.099
Ln(illiquidity) -17.897 *** 3.470 -24.247 -20.564 -18.384 -15.607 -9.549
Timing hypothesis
Financial sophistication 0.186 0.389 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Ln(Market Cap) 6.205 *** 2.104 -0.240 4.687 6.151 7.631 11.131
Ln(Age) 2.389 *** 0.496 0.000 2.079 2.485 2.773 3.526
Blackout window hypothesis
Blackout window (days) 432.2 *** 149.492 193 322 413 521 1351
8-K reporting frequency 6.534 ** 3.526 0 4 6 8 19
Litigation risk hypothesis
Litigation risk 0.021 *** 0.018 0.004 0.010 0.015 0.025 0.116
Payout at 10b5-1 enactment
No active repurchase program 0.717 0.450 0 0 1 1 1
No dividend 0.566 *** 0.496 0 0 1 1 1
No payout 0.443 * 0.497 0 0 0 1 1
Additional controls
Institutional ownership 0.557 *** 0.320 0.001 0.271 0.594 0.830 1.198
Dilution 0.019 *** 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.021 0.306
EPS bonus dummy 0.076 *** 0.265 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Options 0.023 0.024 0.000 0.006 0.016 0.032 0.147
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Table IA5: Repurchase timing by plan type
This table examines repurchase timing around Rule 10b5-1 repurchase announce-
ments (by level of commitment) and around open market repurchase (OMR) an-
nouncements without a Rule 10b5-1 component. Panel A presents average pre- and
post-announcement repurchase timing. Panel B presents difference in means tests
controlling for firm characteristics using the five nearest neighbors from a propen-
sity score matching process based on logit regressions presented in Table IA3 of
the Internet Appendix. Repurchase timing is the percentage difference in repur-
chase volume-weighted stock price and volume-weighted stock price. The repurchase
volume-weighted price is the sum of quarterly shares repurchased times the average
quarterly repurchase price per share, divided by the total number of shares repur-
chased. Volume-weighted price is the trading volume weighted average daily closing
price. Positive values are associated with poor repurchase timing and negative values
with good timing. The pre-announcement period refers to the fiscal year prior to the
repurchase announcement. The post-announcement period spans four quarters be-
ginning the quarter of the repurchase announcement. ***, **, * represent significance
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Panel A: Mean repurchase timing by type
Non-Rule 10b5-1 Boilerplate Expected Partial Pure
Repurchase timing
(pre-announcement) -0.022 -0.011 -0.003 -0.022 -0.008
Repurchase timing
(post-announcement) -0.016 -0.025 -0.010 -0.013 -0.018
Panel B: Difference in mean repurchase timing controlling for firm characteristics
using propensity score matching
All Rule 10b5-1 Expected, Partial, & Partial & Pure
OMR Pure - OMR OMR Pure - OMR
Repurchase timing
(pre-announcement) 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.018* 0.036***
Repurchase timing
(post-announcement) 0.009 0.019** 0.005 0.001
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Table IA6: Are governance characteristics related to preset repurchase adoption?
Using the sample of firms that announce a share repurchase, this table reports logit
regressions modeling the decision to adopt a Rule 10b5-1 plan relative to an open
market repurchase without a Rule 10b5-1 component. The dependent variable takes
a value of one if a firm announced at least one a Rule 10b5-1 as part of its repurchase
program and zero otherwise. Employee stock options are total employee stock options
outstanding from Compustat, scaled by shares outstanding. Governance data are
from ISS Governance and ISS Directors. Entrenchment index is the Bebchuk, Cohen,
and Ferrell (2008) E-index constructed using the following six provisions: staggered
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and
supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. Staggered board
is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s board of directors is divided into
separate classes, i.e., staggered or classified, for elections. Dual CEO/Chairman is an
indicator equal to one if the CEO is also chairman of the board. Turnover represents
annual average of monthly trading volume (VOL/SHROUT from CRSP). We adjust
NASDAQ stocks following Gao and Ritter (2010). Activist (fiscal yr) and Activist
(prior 6 mo.) are indicator variables equal to one if the firm was targeted by an
activist during the fiscal year or prior 6 months, respectively. We define an activist
investor as any investor who files a 13D for more than one company. We include all
Table 4 Model (1) control variables, which are defined in Appendix B; continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Year and on Fama and
French (1997) 12 industry fixed effects are included in all specifications. Z-statistics
are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.
***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)










Activist (fiscal yr.) -0.026
(-0.152)
Activist (prior 6 mo.) 0.055
(0.269)
Options 0.372 -1.016 -0.895 -0.448 0.329 0.231 0.235
(0.280) (-0.423) (-0.378) (-0.186) (0.266) (0.187) (0.190)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,431 4,431 2,039 2,039 1,923 4,625 4,625 4,625
Pseudo R-squared 0.0770 0.0770 0.0682 0.0698 0.0689 0.0793 0.0792 0.0792
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Table IA7: Multinomial logits
Using the sample of firms that announce a share repurchase, this table presents
multinomial logit regressions modeling the decision to adopt a Rule 10b5-1 plan
relative to the decision to adopt an open market repurchase without a Rule 10b5-1
component using. The base case is open market repurchases not associated with a
preset plan. We collapse our data to the firm-year level, implying that firms with at
least one Rule 10b5-1 repurchase program are considered Rule 10b5-1 firms. If a firm
announces multiple Rule 10b5-1 repurchase plans within the same year, we categorize
it according to the announcement with the highest level of commitment. Independent
variables are as defined in Appendix A. Table 1 and Internet Appendix Section I
explain our categorization of Rule 10b5-1 announcements. Year and Fama and French
(1997) 12 industry fixed effects are included in all specifications. Z-statistics are
reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.
***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Boilerplate Expected Partial Pure Boilerplate Expected Partial Pure
Abandonment option hypothesis
Cash 0.878** 1.711*** 0.024 1.957*** 0.268 3.970*** -0.094 1.530**
(2.276) (2.849) (0.058) (3.154) (0.530) (5.024) (-0.183) (1.991)
Cash flow 4.690* -3.910 3.439 -0.009 5.064* -2.071 6.045** 1.840
(1.957) (-0.997) (1.405) (-0.002) (1.663) (-0.387) (1.993) (0.357)
Standard deviation of cash flow -16.470*** -8.463 -13.376** -15.459 -20.659*** -27.235** -13.148* -16.067
(-2.767) (-1.025) (-2.197) (-1.549) (-2.826) (-2.063) (-1.845) (-1.366)
Leverage -0.330 -0.163 -1.318*** -0.178 -0.563 -0.622 -1.287*** -0.215
(-0.947) (-0.252) (-3.255) (-0.258) (-1.257) (-0.657) (-2.647) (-0.257)
Dividend payer -0.515*** 0.201 -0.353** 0.019 -0.460** 0.845** -0.203 -0.110
(-3.865) (0.844) (-2.545) (0.076) (-2.561) (2.524) (-1.136) (-0.342)
Book-to-market 0.783*** 0.122 -0.123 0.557* 0.524* 0.554 -0.171 0.568
(4.098) (0.345) (-0.584) (1.814) (1.926) (1.079) (-0.620) (1.502)
Prior stock performance -0.061 1.301* 1.061** 0.246 -0.849 1.264 1.005* -0.332
(-0.143) (1.771) (2.349) (0.353) (-1.583) (1.202) (1.756) (-0.408)
Standard deviation of returns 4.023 6.341 -6.675 9.930 1.587 -19.211 -0.245 10.251
(0.509) (0.510) (-0.817) (0.826) (0.152) (-1.044) (-0.024) (0.698)
Ln(illiquidity) -0.125* -0.252** -0.167** -0.115 -0.163* -0.336** -0.180* 0.009
(-1.754) (-2.125) (-2.232) (-1.062) (-1.722) (-1.977) (-1.853) (0.069)
Timing option hypothesis
Financial sophistication 0.039 -0.312 -0.171 -0.348 -0.266 -0.194 -0.302 -0.493
(0.306) (-1.194) (-1.187) (-1.206) (-1.439) (-0.554) (-1.592) (-1.317)
Ln(Market Cap) 0.032 -0.208 -0.351*** -0.454** 0.031 -0.187 -0.261* -0.228
(0.319) (-1.210) (-3.202) (-2.532) (0.221) (-0.748) (-1.784) (-0.980)
Ln(Age) -0.588*** 0.253 -0.129 -0.180
(-4.345) (0.923) (-0.870) (-0.698)
Blackout window hypothesis
Blackout window (days) 0.002*** 0.002* 0.002*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.003** 0.002*** 0.002*
(3.727) (1.812) (2.793) (1.245) (3.540) (2.356) (2.767) (1.768)
Controls
Standard deviation of repurchases -0.052 0.142 0.147*** 0.004 0.046 -0.020 0.148** -0.000
(-0.811) (1.583) (2.669) (0.040) (0.564) (-0.138) (2.037) (-0.002)
Repurchase frequency -0.281 -0.255 0.316* 0.196 -0.237 -0.162 0.524** 0.572
(-1.593) (-0.796) (1.684) (0.579) (-0.985) (-0.352) (2.156) (1.352)
Institutional ownership 0.276 -1.400*** 0.476 0.479 0.081 -2.047*** 0.379 0.750
(0.877) (-2.763) (1.435) (0.894) (0.197) (-2.943) (0.879) (1.092)
Dilution 1.033 1.739 -0.996 -1.393 -0.786 3.770 -2.945 -2.655
(0.737) (0.801) (-0.593) (-0.533) (-0.354) (1.258) (-1.185) (-0.731)
Observations 4,947 2,443
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.083 0.111
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Table IA7: Multinomial logits, continued
(3) (4)
Boilerplate Expected Partial Pure Boilerplate Expected Partial Pure
Abandonment option hypothesis
Cash 1.071** 0.671 -0.691 1.703** 0.910** 0.369 0.007 2.066***
(2.202) (0.804) (-1.378) (2.167) (2.279) (0.545) (0.018) (3.289)
Cash flow 6.014** -9.245* 5.107* 2.358 4.834** -8.507** 3.936 0.610
(2.008) (-1.784) (1.689) (0.437) (1.971) (-2.032) (1.593) (0.143)
Standard deviation of cash flow -19.819** 4.027 -27.027*** -25.982* -16.716*** -3.251 -14.670** -17.669*
(-2.343) (0.380) (-3.073) (-1.746) (-2.736) (-0.396) (-2.358) (-1.740)
Leverage -0.582 -0.339 -1.763*** -0.013 -0.352 -0.816 -1.414*** -0.206
(-1.244) (-0.386) (-3.605) (-0.016) (-0.990) (-1.142) (-3.442) (-0.299)
Dividend payer -0.717*** 0.276 -0.401** -0.280 -0.496*** 0.284 -0.368*** 0.027
(-4.161) (0.901) (-2.472) (-0.955) (-3.655) (1.132) (-2.629) (0.111)
Book-to-market 0.804*** -0.255 -0.393 0.816** 0.734*** -0.291 -0.211 0.540*
(3.320) (-0.516) (-1.485) (2.263) (3.719) (-0.746) (-0.978) (1.739)
Prior stock performance -0.221 1.262 1.089** 0.160 -0.120 1.209 1.059** 0.370
(-0.393) (1.203) (1.983) (0.188) (-0.275) (1.563) (2.326) (0.529)
Standard deviation of returns 12.224 5.363 6.020 11.229 3.276 12.915 -6.867 8.415
(1.218) (0.306) (0.613) (0.745) (0.406) (0.993) (-0.830) (0.696)
Ln(illiquidity) -0.101 -0.450** -0.184* -0.148 -0.161** -0.268** -0.174** -0.119
(-1.051) (-2.262) (-1.937) (-1.071) (-2.094) (-2.062) (-2.247) (-1.087)
Timing option hypothesis
Financial sophistication 0.219 -0.113 -0.177 -0.018 0.052 -0.327 -0.169 -0.356
(1.410) (-0.358) (-1.045) (-0.060) (0.405) (-1.185) (-1.161) (-1.233)
Ln(Market Cap) 0.074 -0.495* -0.390*** -0.502** -0.059 -0.352* -0.401*** -0.477***
(0.550) (-1.855) (-2.846) (-2.255) (-0.543) (-1.856) (-3.534) (-2.623)
Repurchase Timing 0.870 2.113 0.329 2.282**
(1.193) (1.575) (0.462) (2.070)
Blackout window hypothesis
Blackout window (days) 0.002*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002 0.002*** 0.000 0.001** 0.001
(2.632) (0.992) (2.670) (1.438) (3.598) (0.339) (2.439) (1.342)
8-K reporting frequency 0.037** 0.023 0.037** 0.060*
(2.196) (0.718) (2.017) (1.921)
Controls
Standard deviation of repurchases -0.032 0.234** 0.191*** -0.055 -0.058 0.155* 0.144*** -0.010
(-0.433) (2.321) (3.033) (-0.472) (-0.894) (1.670) (2.586) (-0.103)
Repurchase frequency -0.292 0.284 0.143 -0.544 -0.231 -0.075 0.350* 0.157
(-1.213) (0.618) (0.585) (-1.293) (-1.281) (-0.224) (1.847) (0.464)
Institutional ownership -0.282 -1.508** 0.449 0.022 0.395 -0.973* 0.487 0.320
(-0.670) (-2.043) (1.094) (0.033) (1.191) (-1.741) (1.434) (0.585)
Dilution 2.980* 2.564 0.332 -4.739 0.931 2.162 -1.205 -1.517
(1.647) (0.875) (0.169) (-1.214) (0.661) (0.955) (-0.708) (-0.580)
Observations 3,203 4,822
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.093 0.083
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Table IA7: Multinomial logits, continued
(5)
Boilerplate Expected Partial Pure
Abandonment option hypothesis
Cash 0.485 1.897*** -0.615 3.113***
(1.156) (2.955) (-1.385) (3.022)
Cash flow 4.725* -2.911 2.117 1.710
(1.884) (-0.697) (0.809) (0.377)
Standard deviation of cash flow -15.773** -7.642 -14.927** -16.071
(-2.519) (-0.863) (-2.273) (-1.499)
Leverage -0.623 0.394 -1.380*** 0.226
(-1.570) (0.577) (-3.221) (0.298)
Dividend payer -0.540*** 0.068 -0.288** 0.047
(-3.767) (0.269) (-1.976) (0.179)
Book-to-market 0.359 0.349 -0.311 0.789**
(1.549) (0.885) (-1.325) (2.304)
Prior stock performance 0.022 1.695** 1.015** 0.205
(0.050) (2.172) (2.128) (0.284)
Standard deviation of returns -9.429 7.806 -13.662 18.821
(-1.015) (0.553) (-1.472) (1.427)
Ln(illiquidity) -0.048 -0.183 -0.186** -0.204
(-0.567) (-1.294) (-2.105) (-1.496)
Timing option hypothesis
Financial sophistication -0.108 -0.304 -0.104 -0.366
(-0.742) (-1.091) (-0.685) (-1.129)
Ln(Market Cap) -0.028 -0.159 -0.485*** -0.446**
(-0.240) (-0.818) (-3.954) (-2.135)
Blackout window hypothesis
Blackout window (days) 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.002
(1.749) (1.223) (0.813) (1.588)
Litigation risk hypothesis
Litigation risk 5.418 3.952 3.391 -22.782*
(1.262) (0.545) (0.691) (-1.912)
Controls
Standard deviation of repurchases -0.085 0.129 0.129** -0.042
(-1.206) (1.378) (2.196) (-0.371)
Repurchase frequency -0.382* -0.189 0.374* 0.289
(-1.945) (-0.542) (1.835) (0.759)
Institutional ownership 0.443 -0.959* 0.174 0.456
(1.257) (-1.707) (0.482) (0.773)
Dilution 1.638 1.044 -0.878 -0.807
(1.101) (0.429) (-0.484) (-0.305)
Observations 3,959
Year fixed effects Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.085
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Table IA8: Regression analysis: Abnormal returns around Rule 10b5-1 announce-
ments
This table reports results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable equals
the five-day cumulative abnormal returns around repurchase announcements. We
remove observations with earnings announcements during this five-day window. Re-
gressions include indicator variables equal to one if the announcement contains a
Rule 10b5-1 component. We include all control variables from our base model (Table
4, Panel A, Model 1) as well as the percentage of shares outstanding sought in the
repurchase program. Variables are defined in Appendix B. Table 1 and Appendix A
explain our categorization of preset announcements. All specifications include stan-
dard controls and year fixed effects. Industry controls are based on Fama and French
(1997) 12 industry classifications but are excluded in the specification with the high
litigation industry indicator. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based
on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent significance at the
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rule 10b5-1 0.285
(1.077)
Rule 10b5-1 excluding boilerplate 0.887**
(2.343)
Rule 10b5-1: pure and partial 1.018**
(1.998)
Rule 10b5-1: pure only 1.834**
(2.456)
Percent shares outstanding sought 0.032 0.050** 0.051** 0.053**
(1.508) (2.363) (2.438) (2.515)
Constant -2.502 -2.530 -2.390 -1.771
(-1.524) (-1.508) (-1.414) (-1.034)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,525 3,209 3,120 3,049
R-squared 0.044 0.048 0.047 0.049
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table IA9: Long-run abnormal returns
This table presents long-run abnormal returns calculated over the 12-month window beginning the month after Rule 10b5-1
announcements. Monthly abnormal returns (α) are estimated from Fama-French five-factor calendar time portfolio regressions:
Rt −Rf,t = α1 + β1(Rmkt,t −Rf,t) + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4RMWt + β5CMAt, where Rt is the return on an equally weighted
portfolio of stocks at time t. Rf,t and Rmkt,t are the risk-free rate and the return on the market at time t. SMBt, HMLt, RMWt,
and CMAt are the monthly returns on the Fama-French size, book-to-market, operating profitability, and investment factors in
month t. The intercept term (α) of the regression represents the average monthly abnormal return. The last row represents the
difference in abnormal returns in preset repurchase firms and firms that announced an open market repurchase without a preset
component. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
No Rule Expected, partial, Partial
Full sample 10b5-1 Rule 10b5-1 & pure & pure Boilerplate Expected Partial Pure
Alpha 0.291*** 0.284*** 0.604*** 0.511** 0.446* 0.526** 0.062 0.245 0.570
(3.002) (2.809) (3.438) (2.399) (1.715) (2.328) (0.258) (0.740) (1.410)
Rm - Rf 0.913*** 0.912*** 0.922*** 0.904*** 0.905*** 0.968*** 0.908*** 0.992*** 0.774***
(32.658) (31.309) (18.220) (14.745) (12.233) (15.031) (13.562) (10.723) (6.784)
SMB 0.478*** 0.469*** 0.558*** 0.558*** 0.676*** 0.492*** 0.452*** 0.461*** 0.771***
(10.080) (9.491) (6.511) (5.334) (5.340) (4.498) (3.940) (2.881) (3.945)
HML -0.028 -0.031 0.011 0.033 -0.016 -0.042 0.008 -0.367** 0.276
(-0.597) (-0.643) (0.124) (0.326) (-0.130) (-0.390) (0.071) (-2.257) (1.379)
RMW -0.130* -0.114 -0.223* -0.227 -0.254 -0.260 -0.143 -0.352 -0.313
(-1.810) (-1.527) (-1.719) (-1.444) (-1.328) (-1.528) (-0.785) (-1.396) (-1.006)
CMA -0.081 -0.057 -0.263* -0.061 -0.143 -0.432** 0.308 0.252 -0.530
(-1.050) (-0.712) (-1.888) (-0.360) (-0.688) (-2.349) (1.535) (0.907) (-1.566)
Observations 132 132 132 131 128 127 122 121 124
R-squared 0.949 0.945 0.870 0.819 0.774 0.819 0.787 0.684 0.591
Difference in alpha 0.320 0.227 0.162 0.242 -0.222 -0.039 0.286
(1.577) (0.964) (0.586) (0.990) (-0.881) (-0.116) (0.705)
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Table IA10: How have preset repurchases changed payout decisions? Alternative model
This table presents multinomial logit models of dividends and repurchases in the pre-Rule 10b5-1 period (1990-2000) and the
post-Rule 10b5-1 period (2004-2014), as well as the difference in coefficients across the two time periods. The base group
is firm-years with zero repurchases and dividends. The other groups include: (i) firm-years with positive dividends but zero
repurchases, (ii) firm-years with positive dividends and repurchases, and (iii) firm-years with zero dividends but positive repur-
chases. Independent variables are measured at the end of fiscal year t-1 and defined in Appendix B. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Industry controls are based on Fama and French (1997) 12 industry classifications.
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm; p-values associated with
differences are in brackets. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Pre-Rule 10b5-1 period (1990-2000) Post-Rule 10b5-1 period (2004-2014) Difference
Dividend Dividend Dividend
Dividend increase & Dividend increase & Dividend increase &
increase Repurchase Repurchase increase & Repurchase Repurchase increase Repurchase Repurchase
Cash 0.290 0.308 1.270*** -0.427** 0.087 0.394*** -0.718 -0.222 -0.876***
(0.696) (0.716) (7.284) (-2.079) (0.416) (3.297) [0.113] [0.658] [0.000]
Cash flow 5.623*** 11.001*** 7.064*** 7.484*** 8.593*** 4.054*** 1.852 -2.421 -3.006***
(3.631) (6.391) (10.806) (8.521) (9.072) (7.895) [0.497] [0.369] [0.003]
Standard deviation of cash flow -2.769 -10.765*** -4.031*** 0.218 -6.393*** -1.773** 2.986 4.363 2.262
(-0.944) (-3.113) (-3.155) (0.388) (-4.167) (-2.177) [0.569] [0.464] [0.24]
Leverage -1.135*** -2.490*** -0.738*** -0.906*** -1.429*** -0.341*** 0.229 1.061*** 0.397**
(-4.086) (-8.276) (-5.078) (-5.869) (-8.777) (-3.288) [0.485] [0.005] [0.051]
Dividend payer 6.070*** 5.952*** -0.749*** 5.466*** 5.172*** -0.540*** -0.603*** -0.78*** 0.209
(42.250) (37.201) (-4.506) (69.669) (60.345) (-5.674) [0.001] [0.000] [0.308]
Book-to-market 0.169* -0.112 0.027 -0.209*** -0.254*** -0.011 -0.378*** -0.143 -0.038
(1.804) (-1.075) (0.645) (-4.161) (-4.041) (-0.312) [0.005] [0.352] [0.507]
Prior stock performance 0.489*** 0.110 -0.278*** 0.185*** 0.242*** -0.076* -0.304*** 0.132 0.202***
(5.039) (1.001) (-5.882) (2.948) (3.503) (-1.867) [0.008] [0.311] [0.001]
Standard deviation of returns -48.817*** -50.146*** -11.629*** -34.993*** -58.692*** -12.749*** 13.793** -8.599 -1.122
(-11.113) (-10.237) (-6.071) (-14.198) (-20.738) (-7.676) [0.017] [0.202] [0.705]
Ln(illiquidity) 0.244*** 0.201*** -0.035 0.155*** 0.149*** -0.004 -0.089 -0.052 0.030
(4.834) (3.738) (-1.399) (6.281) (5.719) (-0.235) [0.129] [0.406] [0.378]
Ln(Market Cap) 0.384*** 0.330*** -0.050 0.489*** 0.532*** 0.088*** 0.104 0.202** 0.137**
(4.917) (4.003) (-1.185) (12.187) (12.742) (2.807) [0.277] [0.042] [0.018]
Blackout window (days) -0.010* -0.009 0.000 -0.001*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.008 0.015** 0.007**
(-1.720) (-1.496) (0.018) (-3.660) (20.803) (33.188) [0.175] [0.025] [0.022]
Standard deviation of -0.057 -0.004 0.051** -0.001 -0.012 0.007 0.055 -0.008 -0.044
repurchases (-1.088) (-0.078) (2.102) (-0.046) (-0.390) (0.362) [0.447] [0.909] [0.197]
Repurchase frequency 0.368 4.270*** 3.791*** 0.176 4.538*** 4.591*** -0.192 0.268 0.799***
(1.435) (17.522) (27.399) (1.325) (37.051) (51.531) [0.543] [0.355] [0.000]
Institutional ownership -0.223 0.296 0.651*** -0.627*** -0.229 0.529*** -0.404 -0.525 -0.123
(-0.737) (0.947) (4.216) (-4.444) (-1.568) (5.356) [0.217] [0.128] [0.541]
Dilution 1.827** 0.363 -0.438 -0.047 0.908 0.753* -1.872** 0.549 1.191**
(2.403) (0.435) (-1.125) (-0.065) (1.256) (1.664) [0.091] [0.677] [0.070]
Dividend premium 0.169 0.502 -0.415* 3.510*** 2.557*** 1.219*** 3.365*** 2.09*** 1.636***
(0.340) (0.986) (-1.823) (6.305) (4.520) (3.270) [0.000] [0.007] [0.000]
Market returns 0.614 0.669 -0.203 0.930*** 0.429** -0.317** 0.320 -0.234 -0.114
(1.336) (1.419) (-0.900) (4.593) (2.109) (-2.363) [0.507] [0.633] [0.676]
Observations 13,288 33,005
Year fixed effects No No
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.532 0.576
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Table IA11: Payout initiations
This table reports the probability of initiating a payout for each year from 2001 to 2014 for the 5,688 firms with zero payout in
the pre-Rule period (1990-2000) that initiated a payout between 2001 and 2014. Payout (repurchase) initiations are defined as
the first payout (repurchase) since 1990. We classify repurchases as greater than zero if we observe at least one open market
repurchase announcement in the period and zero otherwise. Dividends are greater than zero for the period if at any time we
observe the firm paying a dividend and zero otherwise. Rule 10b5-1 is greater than zero if at any time in the 2001-2013 period
the firm made a Rule 10b5-1 announcement.
Payout initiations Repurchase initiations
Repurchases >0 Repurchases >0 Repurchases >0 Repurchases >0
Dividends = 0 0 Dividends = 0 Repurchases = 0 Dividends >0 Dividends >0 Repurchases >0 Repurchases >0
Year Rule 10b5-1 = 0 Rule 10b5-1 >0 Dividends >0 Rule 10b5-1 = 0 Rule 10b5-1 >0 Rule 10b5-1 = 0 Rule 10b5-1 >0
2001 64.21% 0.31% 34.22% 1.26% 0.00% 99.65% 0.35%
2002 57.21% 1.44% 40.14% 1.20% 0.00% 98.19% 1.81%
2003 38.50% 2.77% 58.45% 0.28% 0.00% 95.07% 4.93%
2004 33.08% 3.76% 60.90% 2.26% 0.00% 93.59% 6.41%
2005 37.38% 6.64% 54.84% 1.14% 0.00% 87.61% 12.39%
2006 35.84% 8.85% 53.76% 1.11% 0.44% 83.61% 16.39%
2007 50.29% 11.00% 36.54% 1.77% 0.39% 83.60% 16.40%
2008 61.26% 12.13% 25.20% 1.42% 0.00% 83.74% 16.10%
2009 45.54% 4.69% 48.83% 0.94% 0.00% 89.36% 10.64%
2010 33.23% 8.63% 56.23% 1.60% 0.32% 80.42% 19.58%
2011 33.80% 10.89% 53.63% 0.84% 0.84% 73.49% 26.51%
2012 20.89% 8.88% 67.89% 0.78% 1.57% 66.08% 33.92%
2013 18.14% 7.17% 72.15% 2.11% 0.42% 72.80% 27.20%
2014 35.96% 14.47% 48.68% 0.44% 0.44% 69.15% 30.85%
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VII. Accelerated share repurchases
Table IA12: Accelerated share repurchases plan details
Panel A divides accelerated share repurchase (ASR) announcements by level of com-
mitment. “Pure” (“Partial”) preset plans represent repurchase programs that are
executed fully (in part) through an ASR. We refer to preset plans as “expected” if
the firm indicates that it expects to or intends to adopt an ASR plan to execute
its announced repurchase. “Boilerplate” refers to announcements that shares may
be repurchased through an ASR or through other means. For further details of our
categorization, please see the Section I of the Internet Appendix. Panel B present
summary statistics on plan details, which are only available for the subset of an-
nouncements that voluntarily disclose such details. We report the size of the preset
repurchase as a percentage of shares outstanding, in millions of dollars, or as a per-
centage of the total repurchase plan. Time to commencement is the number of days
between the repurchase announcement and the commencement of the preset plan.
Duration of the plan is the number of days during which the Rule 10b5-1 trading
plan is effective.
Panel A: Preset repurchase announcements by level of commitment
Pure Partial Expected Boilerplate Total
ASR announcements
285 217 46 284 832
34.25% 26.08% 5.53% 34.13% 100.00%
Panel B: Accelerated share repurchase plan details
N Mean 10th percentile Median 90th percentile Standard Deviation
% shares outstanding 361 6.22 1.24 3.87 12.40 8.51
$ millions 442 604.82 50.00 250.00 1200.00 1536.04
% total repurchase 416 91.11 50.00 100.00 100.00 21.11
Time to commencement (in days) 20 7.70 0 3 19 12.96
Duration of plan (in days) 79 173.16 30 143 356 156.26
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Table IA13: Rule 10b5-1 adoptions versus accelerated share repurchase adoption
Using the sample of firm-years with a Rule 10b5-1 or ASR announcement, this table
reports logit regressions modeling the decision to adopt a Rule 10b5-1 plan relative
to an ASR. The dependent variable takes a value of one if a firm announced at least
one Rule 10b5-1 as part of its repurchase program and zero otherwise. All variables
are defined in Appendix A; continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. Year and Fama and French (1997) 12 industry fixed effects are included
in all specifications. Z-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors
clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cash 0.696 -0.521 0.004 0.526 0.073 0.224 2.072** 0.444
(1.067) (-0.630) (0.006) (0.772) (0.112) (0.314) (2.064) (0.551)
Cash flow 9.233** 7.212 5.765 7.873* 10.032** 7.806 5.288 7.310
(1.986) (1.304) (1.113) (1.705) (2.060) (1.489) (0.811) (1.139)
Standard deviation of -23.002*** -28.047*** -29.813*** -21.392** -17.609* -20.948** -23.378** -19.738
cash flow (-2.805) (-3.148) (-2.844) (-2.525) (-1.896) (-2.296) (-2.025) (-1.400)
Leverage -0.330 -0.511 -0.425 -0.350 -0.845 -0.606 0.096 -0.408
(-0.501) (-0.642) (-0.537) (-0.529) (-1.188) (-0.805) (0.086) (-0.487)
Dividend payer -0.013 0.059 -0.286 0.000 0.004 0.094 -0.393 0.051
(-0.049) (0.161) (-0.876) (0.001) (0.012) (0.314) (-1.008) (0.176)
Book-to-market 0.788* -0.080 0.560 0.754 0.665 0.883* 1.517* 0.902*
(1.707) (-0.145) (1.044) (1.599) (1.360) (1.826) (1.712) (1.683)
Prior stock performance 0.069 -0.195 0.140 0.068 0.195 -0.110 0.489 0.179
(0.104) (-0.201) (0.180) (0.103) (0.274) (-0.153) (0.502) (0.235)
Standard deviation of 30.516* 11.798 35.705* 33.303** 9.858 49.495*** 48.051* 43.313**
returns (1.840) (0.600) (1.884) (2.052) (0.569) (2.645) (1.724) (2.292)
Ln(illiquidity) 0.489*** 0.466* 0.329 0.433** 0.538*** 0.539*** 0.502** 0.197
(2.987) (1.918) (1.578) (2.447) (2.865) (2.961) (2.331) (0.818)
Financial sophistication -0.061 -0.338 -0.068 -0.039 -0.031 -0.035 -0.044 0.079
(-0.264) (-1.109) (-0.255) (-0.168) (-0.124) (-0.136) (-0.108) (0.301)
Ln(Market Cap) 0.115 0.049 -0.044 0.063 0.049 0.222 0.175 -0.217





Blackout window (days) 0.001 0.004** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.250) (2.017) (0.614) (1.062) (0.730) (0.902) (0.595) (0.906)




No repurchase when -0.298
Rule 10b5-1 enacted (-0.800)
No dividend when 0.498
Rule 10b5-1 enacted (1.086)
No payout when -0.029
Rule 10b5-1 enacted (-0.056)
Standard deviation of -0.109 -0.106 -0.090 -0.098 -0.105 -0.111 -0.046 -0.181*
repurchases (-1.211) (-0.797) (-0.946) (-1.077) (-1.114) (-1.167) (-0.323) (-1.839)
Repurchase frequency -0.101 -0.296 -0.139 -0.066 -0.462 -0.114 -0.047 0.111
(-0.317) (-0.711) (-0.357) (-0.205) (-1.330) (-0.321) (-0.092) (0.305)
Institutional ownership -0.819 -0.986 -1.613** -0.597 -0.595 -0.876 -0.142 -1.072
(-1.259) (-1.139) (-1.970) (-0.869) (-0.788) (-1.224) (-0.159) (-1.290)
Dilution 2.209 8.722* 5.085 2.129 3.042 2.067 1.496
(0.821) (1.944) (1.453) (0.788) (1.016) (0.798) (0.427)




Observations 1,258 708 888 1,219 1,079 1,064 498 799
Pseudo R-squared 0.212 0.206 0.206 0.207 0.221 0.0729 0.231 0.172
99
Table IA14: Abnormal returns around ASR announcements
This table reports five-day cumulative abnormal returns and differences in returns
by type of repurchase announcement. We remove observations with earnings an-
nouncements during this five-day window. Panel A shows abnormal returns by type
of repurchase announcement, along with statistical significance. Table 1 and sec-
tion I of the Internet Appendix explain our categorization of announcements. Panel
B examines the difference in abnormal returns between groups of preset repurchase
plans and open market repurchase plans that do not include a preset component.
Significance of mean abnormal returns is assessed using a t-test or propensity score
matching, as indicated. We use the five nearest neighbors identified from the logit re-
gressions in Table IA3 as matched control firms then calculate the difference in means.
***, **, * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Panel A: Abnormal returns at announcement by type of repurchase
Accelerated share repurchase
All Boilerplate Expected Partial Pure
Mean 1.827 1.320 1.760 2.661 1.665
t-stat 7.771 2.910 0.960 4.780 5.469
N 382 143 9 61 145
Panel B: Difference in means tests
Accelerated share repurchase
Expected,
Partial, & Partial & Pure
All - OMR Pure - OMR - OMR Pure - OMR
Difference in means 0.573* 0.825** 0.834** 0.538
Propensity score matching 0.777*** 1.396*** 1.300*** 1.302***
100
Figure IA1: Example of Rule 10b5-1 Contract Details
This figure provides an example of a Rule 10b5-1 contract. The following contract
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Bonaimé, Alice A, and Michael D Ryngaert, 2013, Insider trading and share repur-
chases: Do insiders and firms trade in the same direction?, Journal of Corporate
Finance 22, 35–53.
102
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and Jarrad Harford) Revise and Resubmit at Management Science
• Presented at the American Finance Association*, Eastern Finance Association,
Financial Management Association, UK/UT Conference, Midwest Finance As-
sociation, Northern Finance Association, the University of Arizona*, the Uni-
versity of Kentucky, the University of South Carolina*, and the Washington
University Corporate Finance Conference (Early ideas)*.
“The Evolution of Employee Compensation, Dilution, and Payout Policy” (with
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